Jon, are you warranted in saying "not", in "not 'the physico-psychical universe' itself". Isn't the relation of God the Creator to His Creation, viz., the physico-psychical universe, for all we know, the same as the relation of force to acceleration?
CSP: "Whether we ought to say that force *is* an acceleration, or that it *causes* an acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of language…" Matt On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 11:08 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, Stephen R., List: > > Robert Lane's new book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, helpfully > clarifies Peirce's verbal and pragmaticistic definitions of "real," and how > he carefully distinguished that term from "external." On Peirce's account, > the "real" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks *about it*," > while the "external" is "that which is independent of what anyone thinks > *about > anything at all*" (Lane, p. 3). The upshot is that there are *internal > realities*, such as the fact that I had a particular dream last night; > but this by no means entails that *what I dreamed* was real. On the > contrary, since the contents of my dream are directly dependent on my > (unconscious) thoughts *about them*, what I dreamed is most definitely *not > *real (cf. CP 6.453). > > Likewise, according to Peirce a belief is not a reality merely by virtue > of someone holding it; on the contrary, in order to be real, the *Dynamic > Object *of the belief must be such as it is independently of anyone *holding > *that belief. Hence when Peirce described God as "*Ens necessarium*; in > my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452), > he was not merely asserting his (subjective) belief in God; he was > explicitly claiming that the referent of the vernacular word "God" is > (objectively) Real--"having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to > identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise > attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453). > Based on this and other writings, those attributes include necessary Being, > creative power/activity, omniscience, omnipotence, benignity, transcendence > (vs. immanence), infinity, supremacy, and infallibility. > > Since you mentioned CP 6.502, I think that it is worth quoting at greater > length. > > CSP: If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he can > only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great character may > deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that a glance at his > portrait may make a difference, just as almost living with Dr. Johnson > enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a really sublime book, > just as long study of the works of Aristotle may make him an acquaintance, > so if contemplation and study of the physico-psychical universe can imbue a > man with principles of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's > works or conversation, then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible > to say that *any *human attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he > means by "God" ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict > *what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we > cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, > as it were. > > > Peirce is clearly saying here that by carefully reading the "book of > nature," we become acquainted with its Author, which is what we mean by > "God"--not "the physico-psychical universe" itself, but the One who created > it and is still creating it. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 7:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Stephen, list: >> >> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his >> Fixation of Belief. >> >> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function >> in the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our >> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we >> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real? >> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that >> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of >> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation? >> >> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN, >> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of >> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real. >> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine' >> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I >> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our >> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our arguments for or against them >> are empty and subjective. >> >> Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as 'in 'Can >> there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the human intellect >> is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a quasi-intentional effect >> of the struggle for existence?...and "among the inscrutable purposes of God >> or the virtual purposes of nature" [8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have >> some glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see >> 6.502, where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means >> by "God". >> >> In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the use >> of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be tested >> within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is certain but >> relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction gives us the only >> approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have >> [ibid].... Therefore, my point is that claims based around only deduction >> remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but still, only beliefs. >> >> But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated from >> 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a species, >> almost unique in our requirement for social networking and our use of >> symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social stability and >> even, our individual psychological health. Again, this does not make our >> beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and, as such, open to change >> when the societal need for them changes. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Thu 17/05/18 5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent: >> >> In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like theism >> the definition will not be anything more than supposition. Wittgenstein >> understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It is real but it is >> also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of what we call the divine >> or any other name you want to give it. The replies to my post about life >> beyond this planet are similar to posts about theism. They reference >> mystery. Since we have no proof we do not know. It is just as >> significant that something is not present as that it is. The triadic maxim >> says the substance is practical and ordinary and accessible. That is what I >> drive at. Everything else to me is binary thinking that often shields >> another purpose than arriving at truth and beauty which I take to be the >> aim of al consideration. You can reply to this in the list if you think it >> is worth noting. Otherwise no problem. Cheers, S >> >> amazon.com/author/stephenrose >> >>
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