Edwina, List: ET: Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case, the Reality of X, depends on an individual existentiality of X, then isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism?
No, according to Peirce's pragmaticism, the Reality of X *does not* depend on "an individual existentiality of X," or even any discrete collection (no matter how large) of such individual existentialities. *That *view--making Reality coextensive with existence/actuality (2ns), rather than also encompassing ideas/possibilities (1ns) and generals/habits (3ns)--is nominalism. CSP: I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call "intellectual concepts," that is to say, of those upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge ... Intellectual concepts, however,--the only sign-burdens that are properly denominated "concepts,"--essentially carry some implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the "*would-acts*" of habitual behavior; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a "would be." But that the *total *meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,--that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken *as they would occur *in experience) certain facts would exist,--*that *proposition I take to be the kernel of pragmatism. More simply stated, the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances. (EP 2:401-402; 1907) Peirce's insistence on the "would-be" nature of real generals is a recurring point of emphasis in Lane's book. A subjunctive conditional proposition can be true even though the antecedent never comes to pass. If a particular diamond *were *to be rubbed by a knife, then it *would *resist scratching. Therefore, it *really *possesses the property of hardness, even if it never *actually* gets tested in this way (cf. CP 5.457, EP 2:356-357; 1905). ET: But- when we say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then - heck - we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that belief is held by a large population. Stephen R. seems to be the only List member advocating anything like this particular definition of Reality, which is directly contrary to Peirce's--for him, the Reality of X is precisely its *independence *of anyone's beliefs (or thoughts) *about it*. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > John, list: > > My understand of 'the Real' refers to generals rather than individual > instantiations or existences of that generality. > > Now - we can presumably consider that IF truth, i.e., in this case, > the Reality of X, depends on an individual existentiality of X, then > isn't this the Scientific Method - or Peirce's pragmatism? But- when we > say that the Reality of X depends only on our belief in it - then - heck - > we've essentially moved into nominalism - even if that belief is held by a > large population. > > Edwina > > On Thu 17/05/18 10:09 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: > > On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that > > to disclude things is to complexify. > > I agree. And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged > in years of debates with William of Ockham. Both Chatton and Ockham > were students of John Duns Scotus. Ockham was a nominalist who rejected > the realism of Scotus. But Chatton was a realist who defended Scotus > in debates with Ockham. (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.) > > See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/ > <http://parse.php/?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fplato.stanford.edu%2Fentries%2Fwalter-chatton%2F> > > > Brief summary of the anti-razor: > If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence > of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed. > > But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions, > all of which imply my summary. > > John > >
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