Mike, Jon, Edwina, List, Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'."
Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only highly unlikely, but actually would contradict most everything he had to say about not only 3ns but also 2ns. Whatever you might mean by "natural language" in the present context, we are concerned here with technical scientific terminology, specifically Peirce's in consideration of his three universal categories. Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly connected in Peirce's phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it seems peculiarly obdurate to suggest that they are not, that they may be associated in any integral way with 3ns. You will certainly have to offer more support for your comment than your mere assertion that it is so. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:41 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, List, > > Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words > for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including > what is meant by the word 'action'. > > Mike > > On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. > Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which > is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 > > > No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage. In fact, > this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it in full. > > CSP: It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: > first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of > time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; > second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, > sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, > synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought. > > If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of consciousness, > they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical conceptions of > quality, relation, and synthesis or mediation. The conception of quality, > which is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed in its relations is > seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever feeling or the singular > consciousness becomes prominent. The conception of relation comes from the > dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction. The conception of > mediation springs out of the plural consciousness or sense of learning. (CP > 1.377-378; 1887-1888) > > > Peirce here *did not* characterize mediation as "active," or even > directly contrast "passive consciousness" (1ns) with "synthetic > consciousness" (3ns) so as to *imply *that the latter is active. On the > contrary, he also mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and > then went on to call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and > reaction." In other words, it is clearly the latter type of consciousness > (2ns), rather than synthetic consciousness (3ns), that is properly > described as *active*. > > ET: Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which > is to say, an action. > > > No. For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns, not 3ns. This > is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as having a *Dynamic *Object and > producing *Dynamic *Interpretants by means of its *actual *Instances. > > ET: As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all > actions - powerful actions. > > > Again, no. For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are > indeed powerful, but they are *not *actions. They are manifestations of > 3ns, while actions are *always and only* manifestations of 2ns. As Gary > R. already pointed out, *in Peirce's terminology*, molding reactions is > *not* an action; imparting a quality to reactions is *not* an action; and > bringing things into relation with each other is *not *an action. > > CSP: It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the *power *to > bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an *act *of > bringing it about. There are several good arguments to show that this is > the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the circumstance > that there is no such act. For an act has a Matter as its subject. It is > the union of Matter and Form. But a sign is not Matter. An act is > individual. The sign only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904) > > > Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in Peirce's--someone who is not > interested in terminology is evidently not interested in *making our > ideas clear*. Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to > describe what is going on is not merely an academic exercise for the > seminar room, but *pragmatically critical *for understanding and > discussing what is actually happening in the real world. > > CSP: Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself ... merely > a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract > concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to > that statement. (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. >> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which >> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 >> >> That is, semiosis as a process does not confine action to dyadic >> act-react kinesis between two existential things. Thirdness is in my >> understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which is to say, an action. As >> such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all actions - >> powerful actions. >> >> "Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run mould >> reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being cosists. >> For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought >> the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of >> imparting a quality to reactions in the future" 1.343. >> >> "The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it >> mediates and which it brings into relation to each other" 1.356 >> >> This action, of bringing things into mutual relationships is a frequent >> description by Peirce, of Thirdness. >> >> Now - to me, such is an action... A plural interaction mediating and >> generating the commonalities among separate things >> >> I am not sure if we should continue this discussion, since we both hold >> to different views and are probably boring the list. >> >> Edwina >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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