Edwina, List:
ET: And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as
an action. Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a
passive consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited
passage. In fact, this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase
of it, so I will quote it in full.
CSP: It seems, then, that the true categories of
consciousness are: first, feeling, the consciousness which
can be included with an instant of time, passive
consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis;
second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of
consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of
another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding
time together, sense of learning, thought.
If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes
of consciousness, they afford a psychological explanation of
the three logical conceptions of quality, relation, and
synthesis or mediation. The conception of quality, which is
absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed in its relations
is seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever feeling
or the singular consciousness becomes prominent. The
conception of relation comes from the dual consciousness or
sense of action and reaction. The conception of mediation
springs out of the plural consciousness or sense of
learning. (CP 1.377-378; 1887-1888)
Peirce here did not characterize mediation as
"active," or even directly contrast "passive consciousness"
(1ns) with "synthetic consciousness" (3ns) so as to imply
that the latter is active. On the contrary, he also
mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and then
went on to call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and
reaction." In other words, it is clearly the latter type of
consciousness (2ns), rather than synthetic consciousness
(3ns), that is properly described as active.
ET: Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic
process, which is to say, an action.
No. For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns,
not 3ns. This is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as
having a Dynamic Object and producing Dynamic Interpretants
by means of its actual Instances.
ET: As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it
generalizes. These are all actions - powerful actions.
Again, no. For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and
generalizing are indeed powerful, but they are not actions.
They are manifestations of 3ns, while actions are always
and only manifestations of 2ns. As Gary R. already
pointed out, in Peirce's terminology, molding
reactions is not an action; imparting a quality to
reactions is not an action; and bringing things into
relation with each other is not an action.
CSP: It is to be observed that a sign has its being in
the power to bring about a determination of a
Matter to a Form, not in an act of bringing it
about. There are several good arguments to show that this is
the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the
circumstance that there is no such act. For an act has a
Matter as its subject. It is the union of Matter and Form.
But a sign is not Matter. An act is individual. The sign
only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in
Peirce's--someone who is not interested in terminology is
evidently not interested in making our ideas clear.
Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to
describe what is going on is not merely an academic exercise
for the seminar room, but pragmatically critical for
understanding and discussing what is actually happening in the
real world.
CSP: Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in
itself ... merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of
hard words and of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of
whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement.
(CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907)
Regards,
