Auke, Francesco, Frances, Gary F, and Jon AS,
I agree with your points, but none of them explain one important
issue: Peirce's categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are central to
semiotic, and they are usually called *phenomenological* categories.
But in that classification of 1903, he did not mention semiotic
in connection with phenomenology. At the end of this note, I
include a copy of every paragraph from the 1903 classification
that mentions the word 'phenomenology'.
AvB
Speculative rhetoric the first branch of non-mathematical logic is
an alias for semiotics. There is no reason at all to look elsewhere
in the classification of the science.
In the middle of CP 1.191, where Peirce is talking about normative
science, he wrote "All thought being performed by means of signs,
logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs."
That sentence mentions logic and signs in connection with normative
science. But why didn't he mention a connection between phenomenology
and signs in paragraph 186 or 190?
FB
I take seriously his claim that "logic is semiotics" and use "semiotics"
as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad sense). If this identification
is made, every problem about semiotics' collocation in the scheme
disappears
I agree. But that does not explain why he did not mention either
word 'logic' or 'semiotic' in his discussion of phenomenology.
FK
it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the
new thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics.
That is probably what Peirce intended, since he continued to use
both words. In fact, his ethics of terminology would prevent him
from dropping the word 'logic', which had a long history of usage.
GF
I’m guessing that you don’t want to include semiotics with logic,
as Peirce did in the Syllabus classification of 1903 (without using
the word “semiotic”)
I *definitely* want to include semiotic with logic. But that
is not the question I was asking.
GF
I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to trichotomize
logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic.
But that sentence is in the middle of a discussion of normative
science. It doesn't explain why he didn't mention either word
'logic' or 'semiotic' in connection with phenomenology.
JAS
I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement
that there is any question about this.
CSP: Normative Science has three widely separated divisions:
(i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; (iii) Logic.
I certainly wasn't puzzled about that. My question was about
the absence of any mention of semiotic in Peirce's discussion
of phenomenology.
My guess: Peirce started to write a brief summary of his
classification. Note the one sentence paragraph 190 below,
but the much longer paragraphs 191.
I suspect that Peirce continued to get many new ideas as he
wrote. Therefore, his omission of any mention of semiotic in
his discussion of phenomenology was accidental, not deliberate.
That conclusion is supported by the fact that his lengthy discussion
about logic in a paragraph about the normative sciences seems to be
out of place. As Peirce was writing, he seemed to get sidetracked
by new ideas that came to mind. He probably wrote them down as
they came to him, and he never went back to edit the earlier parts.
John
____________________________________________________________________
CP 1.186
Philosophy is divided into a. Phenomenology; b. Normative Science;
c. Metaphysics. Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of
elements universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the
phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way.
Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not
to be, and makes many other divisions and arrangements subservient to
its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysics seeks to give an account
of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on
phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on
normative science.
189
The Psychical Sciences are: a. Nomological Psychics or Psychology;
b. Classificatory Psychics, or Ethnology; c. Descriptive Psychics,
or History. Nomological psychics discovers the general elements and
laws of mental phenomena. It is greatly influenced by phenomenology,
by logic, by metaphysics, and by biology (a branch of classificatory
physics). Classificatory psychics classifies products of mind and
endeavors to explain them on psychological principles. At present it
is far too much in its infancy (except linguistics, to which reference
will be made below) to approach very closely to psychology. It borrows
from psychology and from physics. Descriptive psychics endeavors in
the first place to describe individual manifestations of mind, whether
they be permanent works or actions; and to that task it joins that of
endeavoring to explain them on the principles of psychology and
ethnology. It borrows from geography (a branch of descriptive physics),
from astronomy (another branch) and from other branches of physical
and psychical science.
190
Phenomenology is, at present, a single study.
191
Normative science has three widely separated divisions: i. Esthetics;
ii. Ethics; iii. Logic.
Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively
admirable without any ulterior reason. I am not well acquainted with
this science; but it ought to repose on phenomenology. Ethics, or the
science of right and wrong, must appeal to Esthetics for aid in
determining the summum bonum. It is the theory of self-controlled, or
deliberate, conduct. Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or
deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for its
principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and upon mathematics.
All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded
as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches:
1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings
of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; 2, Critic, which
classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of
each kind; 3, Methodeutic, which studies the methods that ought to be
pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application
of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it.
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
