Jon S, Gary R, John S, Gary F, List,
A question has been raised about the connection between the phenomenological categories of first, second and third, and the modal conceptions of what is possible, existent and (contingently) necessary. Here is one place where Peirce provides a relatively clear explanation of the relation between these tones of thought--considered as formal elements and as material categories--as they are studied in phenomenology and these three modal conceptions. But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation – what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness -- that is what Secondness is, of itself -- and the Firstness of Thirdness. (CP 1.530). A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, "possibility" would have answered the purpose. (CP 1.531) We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general Firstness of all true Secondness is existence, though this term more particularly applies to Secondness in so far as it is an element of the reacting first and second. If we mean Secondness as it is an element of the occurrence, the Firstness of it is actuality. But actuality and existence are words expressing the same idea in different applications. Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and has no other being; and therefore different Secondnesses, strictly speaking, have in themselves no quality in common. Accordingly, existence, or the universal Firstness of all Secondness, is really not a quality at all. (CP 1.532) I think the following questions about the phenomenological categories are worth considering. 1. If Peirce's grand hypothesis concerning the character of the formal and material categories is plausible then, philosophically speaking, what follows as a consequence? 2. If the phenomenological analysis of the formal and material categories is on track, then how can we use these insights as a guide for philosophical inquiry? Here is a start on question (1). While it might seem something of a leap, I think the phenomenological theory provides the seeds of the arguments needed to show that analytic philosophers such as Quine and Goodman, and continental philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault, are mistaken. That is, these 20th century philosophers are mistaken in claiming that human experience is "radically subjective" in character and, as a result, that there are strong reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of any of us ever really understanding the reference and meaning of one another's expressions. Here is a start on question (2). The phenomenological account of the categories of experience and the methods that are employed in this kind of study provide us with the tools needed to more carefully the phenomena that are observed in any area of inquiry--including philosophical inquiry. Philosophy, in particular, requires more care and greater exactitude because the observations are drawn from common experience. As a result of the familiarity, we are highly prone to making various sorts of observational errors. Such errors, if not corrected, will tend to have a large impact on the hypotheses we form and the inductions we carry out to test the explanations. The history of philosophical inquiry tends to confirm the suspicion that we are, indeed, subject to such errors, both on the side of analyzing the observations that call out for explanation, and in drawing inferences about what follows from the data we've gathered. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2018 6:25 AM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the sciences? Gary R., List: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns). Thanks, Jon S. On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, list, Jon wrote: JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological. Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological." I BI would hope that goes without saying. But of all the sciences following phenomenology, I believe that the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three Universes, not Categories, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these Universes are truly metaphysical; after all, they are the primary basis for classifying Signs within Speculative Grammar, the first branch of logic as semeiotic. But in Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first introduced in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as metaphysics. Jon continued: JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that context is a kind of hypostatic abstration. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood and applied, become those of metaphysics. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Gary R., List: GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. Representation/mediation (3ns) is one irreducible element of the Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally phenomenological. I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the constituents of three Universes, not Categories, although there is an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these Universes are truly metaphysical; after all, they are the primary basis for classifying Signs within Speculative Grammar, the first branch of logic as semeiotic. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that context is a kind of hypostatic abstration. CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list, I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should be placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As JAS wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a Normative Science? But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his initial post in this thread: JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. Where? I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every perception involves signs. While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. And while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am tending to think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of semeiotics per se principally occurs in the first of the three branches of logic, i.e., theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical logic ("logic as logic" as Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns itself principally with "classif[ying] arguments and determin[ing] the validity and degree of force of each kind," while the third and final branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric) principally takes up "the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth." But all of these branches of logic are, as I see it, informed by the categories. 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260 All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) Critic, which classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) Methodeutic, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it (boldface added). I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion about the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he suggested that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if it were, there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, Peirce had already done most all the important work in it. As you might imagine, I disagreed. I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every perception involves signs," that wherever you might place phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology (so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that everything is semiotic, but semiotic is studied in semeiotic (I always use this spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science). I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering more seriously Peirce's distinction between logica utens, the ordinary logic we all use and must use, and logica docens, the formal study of logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if we are to say anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for that matter, theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly dependent on our ordinary logic, our logica utens. Theoretical ethics, esthetics, and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) can, however, offer examples to the first cenoscopic science, phenomenology. So, along with such exemplary cases, since we have a logica utens we can make progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, under-appreciated science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in several places makes clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are drawn to it and others are not, some have great intellectual capacity for tackling it, some have less. JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to semiotic"? His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the Categories of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I do, as does John, see the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more categorial involvement in semeiotics than "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants" which are, after all, principles that the science following logic as semeiotic, that is, metaphysics offers. However, a discussion of this would divert us from the present one. JAS wrote: What Peirce did say on various occasions is that Signs are the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, which is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. Yes, and this is yet another way in which the categories figure in semeiotic. Why the three branches of semeiotic are themselves categorially informed (as most of Peirce's classication of sciences are). Many of the topics of semeiotic relating especially, but not exclusively, to the classification of signs, but also to to critical logic and theoretical rhetoric (including pragmatism) draw upon phenomenology . I think to reduce the application of the catories to the 3ns of signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. While it seems clear enough that the triad possibles/existents/necessitants is itself tricategorial. JAS concluded: Nevertheless, again, the science that studies Signs is not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science Regarding this there seems to be, for good reason as I see it, more agreement than disagreement. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
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