Edwina and Jon AS,
ET
My concern is that this list seems to focus almost exclusively
on debates about terminology and classification of research areas,
and doesn't venture outside the seminar room into the mud and dirt
of the real matter-as-mind world.
Peirce had a long career in science and engineering. He certainly
knew how to apply mathematics and science to build things and make
them work. And his engineering work influenced what he wrote about
the practical sciences in his classifications.
One reason why I like Peirce's classification is that it shows
how all the sciences are related to each other, to mathematics,
to philosophy, to the methodeutic that "digs in the dirt" to
discover facts, and to the practical sciences that build things.
If you can find anything "in the mud and dirt" that it doesn't
cover, I'd like to see that.
JFS: The subject matter of phenomenology is the totality of signs
that appear to the mind, and CP 1.300 calls the semiotic categories
"conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of thought".
JAS: This does not seem right to me; it presupposes that anything
that appears to the mind must be a Sign.
Two points: (1) if the phaneron contains anything that is not
a sign, semiotic could be defined as the study of the signs in
phenomenology. (2) In any case, it's hard to imagine anything
that appears to the mind that is not a sign. If Peirce ever said
that there are things in the mind, in thought, or in the phaneron
that are not signs, I'd like to see the quotation.
John
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