Gary R., Jeff, List:
I am familiar with the debate between Lalor and Short, and have always
found the latter more persuasive. For one thing, I find it misleading to
imply that Peirce employed Emotional/Energetic/Logical earlier (not 1906
but 1907, in "Pragmatism") and Immediate/Dynamic/Final later (1909).
Already in 1904, in the same letter to Lady Welby in which he first
introduced the whole notion of two Objects and three Interpretants, he
labeled the latter as Immediate/Dynamic/Signified--"its interpretant as
represented or meant to be understood, its interpretant as it is produced,
and its interpretant in itself" (CP 8.333).
Peirce's initial division of Signs according to the Immediate Interpretant
was into "1st, those which are interpretable in thoughts or other signs of
the same kind in infinite series, 2nd, those which are interpretable in
actual experiences, 3rd, those which are interpretable in qualities of
feelings or appearances" (CP 8.339). Although reversing the usual
sequence, these seem to align quite clearly with what he later called the
Logical, Energetic, and Emotional Interpretants, respectively. Then in
1906 ("Prologomena"), he characterized the (Dynamic) Interpretant as "that
which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by
determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign" (CP
4.536). By 1908, this division had become Sympathetic/Percussive/Usual,
while the one for the Immediate Interpretant was ("with great hesitation")
Hypothetic/Categorical/Relative (EP 2:489-490).
Presumably that is why David Savan and others associated
Emotional/Energetic/Logical with *only* (or at least *primarily*) the
Dynamic Interpretant, which is how I lean myself. Another reason is the
fact that Peirce referred to each member of that 1907 trichotomy as the
"proper significate effect of a sign" (CP 5.475) and "something which the
sign in its significant function essentially determines in its interpreter"
(EP 2:409); i.e., the Sign's *actual* effect, which is precisely the *Dynamic
*Interpretant. I therefore suggest that all Instances of Signs produce *at
least* Feelings as their Dynamic Interpretants, while some (Indices and
Symbols) *also* produce Exertions, and some of those (Symbols) *also *produce
*other *Instances of Signs. Each of these kinds of outcomes is amenable to
the self-controlled cultivation of Interpretative Habits, and thus
corresponds to a Normative Science--Esthetics, Ethics, and Logic as
Semeiotic, respectively.
This brings up something that has bothered me for quite some time, and
probably contributed to my thought process in developing an alternative
framework. The three Universes for each trichotomy in Peirce's 1908
taxonomy are Possible/Existent/Necessitant, but those labels seem to apply
to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final Interpretants *themselves* as how the Sign
may/does/would affect an interpreting Quasi-mind, rather than how Signs are
divided according to them. Transferring the same principle to the Object
results in exactly what I am proposing.
- The *Immediate *Object and *Immediate *Interpretant are the
*possible *denotation
and signification of any *Replica* of the Sign within a particular Sign
System.
- The *Dynamic *Object and *Dynamic *Interpretant are the *actual
*denotation
and signification of an individual *Instance* of the Sign that occurs at
a single place and time.
- The *General *Object and *Final *Interpretant are the *necessary
*denotation
and signification of the Sign *itself *in the ultimate opinion.
Perhaps I should replace "General Object" with "Final Object" to make the
parallelism complete.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jeff, Robert, Jon S, Francesco, List,
>
> Jeff,
>
> This is very helpful, perhaps especially this quotation:
>
> *In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional
> interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective";
> both, too, pertain to all signs without exception.* The real object and
> energetic interpretant also correspond, both being real facts or things.
> But to our surprise, we find that the logical interpretant does not
> correspond with any kind of object. This defect of correspondence between
> object and interpretant must be rooted in the essential difference there is
> between the nature of an object and that of an interpretant; which
> difference is that former antecedes while the latter succeeds. The logical
> interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively future tense (Boldface
> added GR).
>
>
> I currently happen to be rereading a short article on the perennially
> disputed topic of the relationship of the 1906 interpretant trichotomy and
> that of 1909 by Brendan Lalor ( *Semiotica* 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997)
> available here: http://thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-int
> erpretants/
>
> Abstract. After characterizing the role of the interpretant in semiosis,
> I consider two passages in which Peirce makes a threefold division of
> interpretants, one from 1906, one from 1909. Then I suggest that Thomas
> Short and others are wrong in holding that in the two passages, Peirce put
> forward two completely separate trichotomies. Instead, I argue that the
> 1906 trichotomy is in fact a special case of that put forward by Peirce in
> the 1909 passage, not a separate trichotomy. I then explain more
> specifically how we ought to conceive the relationship between these two
> classifications.
>
>
> As we know, Peirce's 1906 trichotomy is into the emotional, energetic, and
> logical interpretants.
>
> BL: ‘The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced
> by it,’ hence the *emotional* interpretant (5.475). The *energetic*
> interpretant
> is any further effect a sign might produce; this will always involve a
> mental or muscular effort and will always be mediated through the emotional
> interpretant. Thus, any energetic interpretant will involve an emotional
> interpretant as its condition. . . Peirce designates the *logical*
> interpretant
> as the meaning of a concept.
>
>
> In 1909, however, he introduces another trichotomy, the immediate, dynamic,
> and final interpretants:
>
> BL: These are, respectively, the total unanalyzed effect the sign first
> produces, the direct actual effect on the interpreter, and finally, ‘the
> effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind upon which circumstances
> should permit it to work out its full effect.’
>
>
> The relationship of these two trichotomies has been debated now for
> decades. Lalor summarizes two prominent views:
>
> Two main views have been put forward as to the relation of the 1906 and
> 1909 terminologies, the first asserting their semantic uniformity, the
> second their semantic distinctness. In the first camp, some scholars have
> held that the 1909 trichotomy is coextensive with the one of 1906 — that
> Peirce was simply exploring various terminological possibilities. Others in
> this camp, such as J.J. Liszka (1990), hold that the terminologies are not
> merely synonymous, but complementary in the sense that they clarify one
> another.] Scholars in the second camp, most notably Thomas Short (1981:
> esp. 212f., 1982: esp. 286-288), have held that the 1909 classification is
> a distinct second trichotomy of interpretants [Short goes so far as to
> argue that each of the immediate, dynamic, and final interpretants may be
> divided into emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants, the
> intersection of the two trichotomies yielding 9 interpretants. GR]
>
> Lalor's own hypothesis, different from these, is that the 1909
> classification is a generalization of the 1906 classification, that the
> 1906 classification pertains specifically to concrete human semiosis, while
> the latter pertains to semiosis more generally.
>
> BL: This relation is analogous (but only analogous) to the relation of the
> phenomenological to the metaphysical categories. That is, for example, just
> as a quality of red which exists intentionally in a feeling is *how we
> experience *quality (i.e. firstness), so also, an emotional interpretant
> (i.e. a feeling produced by a sign), is *our version *of the immediate
> interpretant of a sign (i.e. ‘the total unanalyzed effect the sign … might
> be expected to produce'. . . So, the relation of Peirce’s references to
> *the *interpretant-trichotomy, and his references to other
> interpretant-trichotomy terminologies might be said to be that of genus to
> species.
>
>
> Yet Lalor is hesitant to restrict the initial effect of a sign to
> conscious feeling since, and as has been briefly discussed on the list
> recently, the initial effect may be unconscious.
>
>
> BL: It may possibly be, for example, that I am taking too narrow a
> conception of the sign in general in saying that its initial effect must be
> of the nature of feeling, since it may be that there are agencies that
> ought to be classed along with signs and yet that at first begin to act
> quite unconsciously. (MS 318: 43, in Peirce (1907: 392))
>
>
> It may be that Peirce saw the need for its generalization into the latter
> trichotomy.
>
> Lalor concludes that the two trichotomies ought be distinguished as
> outlining two *levels* of analysis, the first anthroposemiotic, the
> second generalized for all possible semiosis, the second being considerably
> more abstract.
>
> BL: I suggest that Peirce’s 1909 trichotomy is the result of his
> generalization of these human conceptions in an attempt to characterize
> semiosis universally. On this view, the immediate, dynamical, and final
> interpretants are Peirce’s meta-theoretical generic place-holders for
> interpretants which play a role in semiosis taking place at any and all
> levels of reality — even levels of concreteness too low, or levels of
> abstraction too high, for humans to notice without the aid of instruments
> or theoretical speculation. Emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants
> are the theoretical terms for a species of interpretants with which humans
> are intimately acquainted.
>
> Although Lalor's paper doesn't discuss the immediate object as such, I've
> introduced this comparison of the 1906 and 1909 trichotomies of the
> interpretants in the hope that it might shine some light on the current
> discussion of the nature and role of the immediate object seemingly having
> a unique semiosic relation to the emotional -> immediate interpretant.
>
> (Parenthetically, Short replied to Lalor's thesis, defending his own view.)
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Tue, Sep 25, 2018 at 11:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Francesco, Jon S., Robert, List,
>>
>> The list Robert has compiled contains an entry that bears on the question
>> of how we might understand the character of the immediate object. The entry
>> the 40th in the list, and it is from *MS 318, Pragmatism (1907).*
>>
>> I am now prepared to risk an attempt at defining a sign, --since in
>> scientific inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds: nothing
>> hazard, nothing gain. I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever
>> mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since
>> it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and
>> determining the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to
>> cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation
>> of this "sign".
>>
>> The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the
>> sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. Moreover,
>> the sign being defined in terms of these correlative correlates, it is
>> confidently to be expected that object and interpretant should precisely
>> correspond, each to the other. In point of fact, we do find that the
>> immediate object and emotional interpretant correspond, both being
>> apprehensions, or are "subjective"; both, too, pertain to all signs without
>> exception. The real object and energetic interpretant also correspond, both
>> being real facts or things. But to our surprise, we find that the logical
>> interpretant does not correspond with any kind of object. This defect of
>> correspondence between object and interpretant must be rooted in the
>> essential difference there is between the nature of an object and that of
>> an interpretant; which difference is that former antecedes while the latter
>> succeeds. The logical interpretant must, therefore, be in a relatively
>> future tense.
>>
>> The relevant passage is the one where he says of the immediate object and
>> the emotional interpretant that "both, too, pertain to all signs without
>> exception." This seems to suggest that any sign that involves the
>> apprehension of an object does so in virtue of its having a relation to
>> an immediate object. While some external signs may not, at some point in
>> time, be apprehended by an interpreter, all are capable of being so
>> apprehended. This suggests that all signs have an immediate object--at
>> least as a possible sort of thing--even if the object is not actually
>> apprehended at some given time. When the sign of any type is interpreted *in
>> **actu*, it will come to be apprehended in this way--and the immediate
>> object appears to be essential for the interpretation of every sign.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>
>
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