Correction: "Probably is not a good choice" is the rheme.
John, list,
Is a seme that what might be replaced by a name? Because a rheme, as I remember, is the part of a proposition, that is not the part that might be replaced with a name. So, does a proposition consist of a seme and a rheme?
Example: In "resistance is futile": Is "resistance" the seme, and "is futile" the rheme, the rheme consisting of the predicate "futile" and the peg "is"?
Ok, "resistance" might be called a name itself. Other example: "Attending the Southpark elementary school probably is not a good choice": "Attending the Southpark elementary school" is not a name, but might be replaced by one: "Helmut probably is not a good choice". So "Attending the Southpark elementary school" is the seme, "is not a good choice" is the rheme, "not a good choice" is the predicate, and "probably is" is the peg?
Best wishes from the good choice
Helmut
30. Januar 2019 um 16:36 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
Von: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
Stephen and Jon,
SCR
> I have longed for some sense that there could be conversation
> that recognizes the efforts of persons like me who have labored
> considerably to create a more general and universal understanding
> that will resonate with ordinary readers.
I agree that those issues are far more important than trying
to resuscitate a dead word.
Right now, the world is going through some very dangerous times.
The billionaires who did more to create the danger than anyone
else are building bunkers in New Zealand in hope of surviving the
impending doom.
Peirce is one of the few mathematicians and scientists who had a high
respect for the normative sciences. With his logic and semeiotic, he
laid the foundation for all the branches of philosophy and the special
sciences.
But the so-called "mainstream" of analytic philosophy (Frege, Russell,
Carnap, Quine, and their buddies) denounced metaphysics and ignored
the normative sciences as mindless feelings. Carnap's most damning
rejection of anything other than science was "That's poetry!"
What I've been trying to say is that a century of Frege, Russell,
Carnap, and Quine has trivialized philosophy and made it irrelevant
to the daily lives of nearly everybody. And haggling over dead
words like 'seme' is trivializing Peirce.
JAS
> The question remains whether, after introducing "Seme" in 1906,
> he ever used any other word for a Sign classified as a Possible--
> rather than an Existent (Pheme/Proposition) or a Necessitant
> (Delome/Argument)--according to its relation with its Final
> Interpretant.
Anything in any of Peirce's three universes (possibles, actuals,
and the necessitated) can be given a name. In fact, you can take
the definition quoted in Commens (CP 4.548) and replace the word
'seme' with 'name'. That produces the following definition:
> By a name, I shall mean anything which serves for any purpose
> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
> representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a class-name,
> is a name. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a name.
This shows how vague that definition really is. The word 'name',
which every child knows, fits the definition in CP 4.548 just as
well or better than the word 'seme'. That is why Peirce never
found any use for it. Any thought he might express with the
word 'seme' could be expressed more clearly without it.
> JFS: That is more ethical than implying that you have a deeper
> understanding of what Peirce intended than he had.
>
> When have I ever made or implied such an outrageous claim?
Peirce only used that word in CP 4.538 ff and the MSS of the
drafts of that article. Two years later, he mentioned it
(without further comment) in a list of triads that he sent
to Lady Welby. He never used it for any other purpose.
But you wrote "Like turtles, it's semes all the way down."
And with all these notes about that word, you're implying
that it's very important for semeiotic. If Peirce had
thought that, he would have (a) used it more often, and
(b) written much more about it.
John
-----------------------------
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SCR
> I have longed for some sense that there could be conversation
> that recognizes the efforts of persons like me who have labored
> considerably to create a more general and universal understanding
> that will resonate with ordinary readers.
I agree that those issues are far more important than trying
to resuscitate a dead word.
Right now, the world is going through some very dangerous times.
The billionaires who did more to create the danger than anyone
else are building bunkers in New Zealand in hope of surviving the
impending doom.
Peirce is one of the few mathematicians and scientists who had a high
respect for the normative sciences. With his logic and semeiotic, he
laid the foundation for all the branches of philosophy and the special
sciences.
But the so-called "mainstream" of analytic philosophy (Frege, Russell,
Carnap, Quine, and their buddies) denounced metaphysics and ignored
the normative sciences as mindless feelings. Carnap's most damning
rejection of anything other than science was "That's poetry!"
What I've been trying to say is that a century of Frege, Russell,
Carnap, and Quine has trivialized philosophy and made it irrelevant
to the daily lives of nearly everybody. And haggling over dead
words like 'seme' is trivializing Peirce.
JAS
> The question remains whether, after introducing "Seme" in 1906,
> he ever used any other word for a Sign classified as a Possible--
> rather than an Existent (Pheme/Proposition) or a Necessitant
> (Delome/Argument)--according to its relation with its Final
> Interpretant.
Anything in any of Peirce's three universes (possibles, actuals,
and the necessitated) can be given a name. In fact, you can take
the definition quoted in Commens (CP 4.548) and replace the word
'seme' with 'name'. That produces the following definition:
> By a name, I shall mean anything which serves for any purpose
> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
> representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a class-name,
> is a name. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a name.
This shows how vague that definition really is. The word 'name',
which every child knows, fits the definition in CP 4.548 just as
well or better than the word 'seme'. That is why Peirce never
found any use for it. Any thought he might express with the
word 'seme' could be expressed more clearly without it.
> JFS: That is more ethical than implying that you have a deeper
> understanding of what Peirce intended than he had.
>
> When have I ever made or implied such an outrageous claim?
Peirce only used that word in CP 4.538 ff and the MSS of the
drafts of that article. Two years later, he mentioned it
(without further comment) in a list of triads that he sent
to Lady Welby. He never used it for any other purpose.
But you wrote "Like turtles, it's semes all the way down."
And with all these notes about that word, you're implying
that it's very important for semeiotic. If Peirce had
thought that, he would have (a) used it more often, and
(b) written much more about it.
John
-----------------------------
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----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
