Jon, John, List, JAS: ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis of a proposition. JFS: No. Definitely not.
Again, the evidence says otherwise. Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite," such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908). Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence says that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite," such that "*everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing" (emphasis added). Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > John S., List: > > With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we will > simply have to accept our disagreement and move on. Peirce did not > introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything > that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different > analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which > you continue to advocate. > > JFS: EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity > represent predicates. > > > No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate > represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which > corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity., > > JFS: After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler and > clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both > predicates and quasi-predicates. > > > No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name > the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the > Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final > Interpretant. > > JFS: In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and > quasi-predicate. > > > No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose > as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a > representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or > Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906). > > JFS: The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be > replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate". > > > No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word > that means "Subject." > > JAS: ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable > detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical > analysis of a proposition. > JFS: No. Definitely not. > > > Again, the evidence says otherwise. Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain > that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is > of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, > but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite," > such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown > into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection" > that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908). > Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried > analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it > to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). > > > JFS: His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most > elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses. In fact, they're > superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen. > > > No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the > elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they > diagram. > > JFS: This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical > subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ... > > > On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme > is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute > an Icon of the Continuous Predicate. > > JFS: The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb > 'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with the verb > 'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal." > > > No, it would classify "mammal," "breathing," and "oxygen" as Subjects; and > "_____ is in the relation of _____ to _____" as the Continuous Predicate. > The first blank is Designative (quantified noun), while the other two > blanks are Descriptive (verb and common noun). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:12 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> Jon AS, list >> >> I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion. >> >> To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological >> developments. In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way >> that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906: >> >> > An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character >> > consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274) >> >> But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320): >> >> > A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a >> > proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although >> > the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the >> > proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that >> > this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index. >> >> A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign). In effect, >> the image is used as a kind of predicate. In that same paragraph, >> he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way: >> >> > A better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in itself, >> > convey any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section >> > of rays projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a Dicisign. >> > Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes, >> > is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object. >> > It is not, perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis. >> > It will be remarked that this connection of the print, which is the >> > quasi-predicate of the photograph, with the section of the rays, >> > which is the quasi-subject, is the Syntax of the Dicisign; >> >> By referring to EGs, Peirce emphasizes the similarity between the >> iconic structure of an EG and images of any kind. EGs with pegs >> that are not attached to any line of identity represent predicates. >> The act of attachment is "a further determination" that converts >> a predicate or a quasi-predicate into a dicisign (proposition). >> >> Chronology: >> >> 1902: An image is a quasi-predicate when it combines with an index >> or quasi-index to state a proposition (dicisign). >> >> 1903: An index and a seme are synonymous. That is very different >> from his definition of 1906. That implies that (a) Peirce's >> terminology was unstable, and (b) the ethics of terminology >> does not apply to unstable terms. >> >> 1906: A seme is a widening (generalization) of predicate to include >> percepts and other image-like signs when used as predicates. >> In effect, seme means "predicate or quasi-predicate". >> >> Interpretation: With the prefix 'quasi-', Peirce modified the word >> 'predicate' for images used as predicates. In 1903, he introduced >> the word 'seme' as a synonym for index. But that made it redundant. >> >> When he was writing the Monist article in 1906, he wanted a single >> word for both predicates and quasi-predicates. So he dusted off >> the word 'seme'. After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because >> it was simpler and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', >> 'triad'... for both predicates and quasi-predicates. >> >> Summary: Peirce used the word 'predicate' for examples in logic >> and ordinary language. He used 'quasi-predicate' for images used >> as predicates. In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of >> predicate and quasi-predicate. >> >> Conclusion: The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word >> 'seme' may be replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi- >> predicate". Therefore, the word 'predicate' may be generalized >> to include every use of 'quasi-predicate'. That eliminates any >> need for the word 'seme'. >> >> See below for comments about the quotations from 1906 and 1908. >> >> John >> ______________________________________________________________________ >> >> JAS >> > there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable detail >> > what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis >> > of a proposition. In his letter of December 5, 1908 to Jourdain... >> >> No. Definitely not. His existential graphs and diagrammatic >> reasoning are the most elegant and powerful basis for his logical >> analyses. In fact, they're superior to the systems by Frege, >> Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen. See the slides for "Peirce, >> Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry": >> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf >> >> In the letter to Jourdain, Peirce was writing for a reader who >> was familiar with Aristotelian syllogisms, as taught in textbooks >> from the 13th c. to the early 20th c: >> >> > A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more >> > ways than one... The result is that everything in a proposition that >> > possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure >> > predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a >> > character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _____ to _____ ,' 'and' >> > = 'is at once _____ and _____ ,' etc. ... (NEM 3:885-886, 1908) >> >> This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical >> subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs or his 1885 notation for >> predicate calculus. For a summary of the patterns for syllogisms, >> see slides 15 to 18 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/aristo.pdf >> >> The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb >> 'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with >> the verb 'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal." >> >> This transformation causes some "logical subjects" to become complex >> expressions, such as "oxygen-breathing animal". In the algebraic >> notation, that phrase would be represented by a monadic predicate: >> >> Define P(x) as oxygen_breathing(x) & animal(x). >> >> Such transformations are necessary for applying Aristotle's rules >> of inference. But they are unnecessary for Peirce's rules. >> >> JAS >> > the role of what he had called a Seme in 1906--such as "rose" or >> > "red"--is to serve as a substitute for any logical subject >> >> The words 'rose' and 'red' would be represented by monadic predicates: >> rose(x) and red(x). There is no need for the word 'seme'. >> >> JAS >> > one of the discarded drafts for "Prolegomena to an Apology for >> > Pragmaticism." >> > >> > CSP: The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the >> > logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any >> > kind, be it a man or a scribed character, such as H or Pb, which will >> > serve, or is supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for >> > its Object. It is a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be >> > virtually its Object. (R 295:[28-29]; 1906) >> >> Every seme (logical term) in this quotation can be mapped to >> a monadic predicate: man(x), H(x), or Pb(x). >> >> For more examples of semes, note the excerpts from CP 4.539 to 4.550: >> >> > CP 4.539: a Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception >> > or rather the Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate >> > Interpretant, is a Pheme... >> >> This implies that a percept, as an image-like pattern, is a quasi- >> predicate at the instant it's perceived. But when the image is >> connected with an index in a judgment, the quasi-predicate plus >> index states a proposition (pheme). >> >> > A late Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is >> > the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive >> > thought as determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.† >> > >> > Footnote: † I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of >> > a perceptual universe... >> >> Each percept in the complex is a quasi-predicate. The complex of >> percepts is a picture (a larger quasi-predicate), which is defined >> by a conjunction of all the quasi-percepts for its components. >> >> > Finally, and in particular, we get a Seme of that highest of all >> > Universes which is regarded as the Object of every true Proposition, >> > and which, if we name it [at] all, we call by the somewhat misleading >> > title of "The Truth." >> >> This big seme is a picture (quasi-predicate) of everything we think >> we know (our beliefs). We call that "The Truth" -- but as Peirce >> said, most of it may be true, but we never know how much is false. >> >> > CP 4.540: How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme, has for >> > its direct Dynamical Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which >> > is a Pheme [proposition]? For that is not the usual way with Semes, >> > certainly. All the examples that happen to occur to me at this moment >> > of such action of Semes are instances of Percepts, though doubtless >> > there are others. Since not all Percepts act with equal energy in >> > this way, the instances may be none the less instructive for being >> > Percepts. However, Reader, I beg you will think this matter out >> > for yourself... My opinion is that a pure perceptual Icon -- and >> > many really great psychologists have evidently thought that Perception >> > is a passing of images before the mind's eye, much as if one were >> > walking through a picture gallery... >> >> The phrase "Reader, I beg you will think this matter out" and the >> dots for another tentative passage indicate that Peirce was still >> rethinking these issues. The absence of later writings that use >> the word 'seme' suggests that he came to prefer other terminology. >> >> > CP 4.550: In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical >> > meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations >> > become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical >> > Interpretants are dynamically connected.† >> > >> > Footnote: † i.e. Mind is a propositional function of the widest >> > possible universe such that its values are the meanings of all >> > signs whose actual effects are in effective intercommunication. >> >> This seme could be a mental image (quasi-predicate) of all aspects of >> an imagined world. If represented symbolically, it would be a very >> large predicate. That world could be some individual's view of the >> actual world or some imaginary world. With indexes that relate parts >> of it to the real world, it would be a proposition that states >> everything that some individual knows. >> >
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