Dear Gary, list,
To my open mind and eyes, all that appears to be metaphysical rubbish. Perhaps not so obvious, then.. Best wishes, Jerry R On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 10:53 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, John, List, > > JAS: ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable > detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical > analysis of a proposition. > JFS: No. Definitely not. > > > Again, the evidence says otherwise. Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain > that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is > of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, > but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite," > such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown > into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection" > that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908). > Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried > analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it > to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). > > It is clear for those with mind open and eyes to see that the evidence > says that ""the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever > there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the > proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its > interpreter is requisite," such that "*everything in a proposition that > possibly can should be thrown into the subjects*, leaving the pure > predicate a mere form of connection" that is "'*continuous*' or > 'self-containing" (emphasis added). > > Best, > > Gary > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 8:16 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> John S., List: >> >> With sincere respect, I believe that we are now at the point where we >> will simply have to accept our disagreement and move on. Peirce did not >> introduce the concept of the Continuous Predicate until 1908, so anything >> that he wrote about Propositions prior to that reflects a different >> analysis--presumably the same one adopted in modern predicate logic, which >> you continue to advocate. >> >> JFS: EGs with pegs that are not attached to any line of identity >> represent predicates. >> >> >> No, in my view they represent Semes (or Subjects); the *only *predicate >> represented in Existential Graphs is the *Continuous* Predicate, which >> corresponds to *continuous *Lines of Identity., >> >> JFS: After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because it was simpler >> and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', 'triad'... for both >> predicates and quasi-predicates. >> >> >> No, he continued to use "Seme" in all subsequent Sign taxonomies to name >> the Possible member of the division according to the Nature of the >> Influence of the Sign, corresponding to its relation with its Final >> Interpretant. >> >> JFS: In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of predicate and >> quasi-predicate. >> >> >> No, he explicitly used "Seme" for "anything which serves for any purpose >> as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a >> representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906); in particular, "the Subject or >> Object of a sentence" (R 295:[28]; 1906). >> >> JFS: The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word 'seme' may be >> replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi-predicate". >> >> >> No, it shows that if anything, the word "Seme" may be replaced by a word >> that means "Subject." >> >> JAS: ... there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable >> detail what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical >> analysis of a proposition. >> JFS: No. Definitely not. >> >> >> Again, the evidence says otherwise. Peirce plainly stated to Jourdain >> that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is >> of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, >> but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite," >> such that "everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown >> into the subjects, leaving the pure predicate a mere form of connection" >> that is "'*continuous*' or 'self-containing'" (NEM 3:885; 1908). >> Likewise, Peirce plainly stated to Welby that "when we have carried >> analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it >> to its ultimate elements" (SS 72; 1908). >> >> >> JFS: His existential graphs and diagrammatic reasoning are the most >> elegant and powerful basis for his logical analyses. In fact, they're >> superior to the systems by Frege, Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen. >> >> >> No one is disputing this; the difference is in how we interpret the >> elements of Existential Graphs when analyzing the Propositions that they >> diagram. >> >> JFS: This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and >> logical subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs ... >> >> >> On the contrary, it actually maps perfectly to them--each individual Seme >> is an Index of a Subject, and the continuous Lines of Identity constitute >> an Icon of the Continuous Predicate. >> >> JFS: The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb >> 'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with the verb >> 'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal." >> >> >> No, it would classify "mammal," "breathing," and "oxygen" as Subjects; >> and "_____ is in the relation of _____ to _____" as the Continuous >> Predicate. The first blank is Designative (quantified noun), while the >> other two blanks are Descriptive (verb and common noun). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:12 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >> >>> Jon AS, list >>> >>> I changed the subject line to emphasize the conclusion. >>> >>> To see the evolution of Peirce's ideas, look at the chronological >>> developments. In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way >>> that is inconsistent with what he wrote in 1906: >>> >>> > An Index or Seme is a Representamen whose Representative character >>> > consists in it's being an individual Second... (EP 2:274) >>> >>> But note what he had written in 1902 (CP 2.320): >>> >>> > A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a >>> > proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although >>> > the portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. But the >>> > proper name so nearly approximates to the nature of an Index, that >>> > this might suffice to give an idea of an informational Index. >>> >>> A portrait plus an index asserts a proposition (dicisign). In effect, >>> the image is used as a kind of predicate. In that same paragraph, >>> he introduced the word 'quasi-predicate' for images used in this way: >>> >>> > A better example is a photograph. The mere print does not, in itself, >>> > convey any information. But the fact, that it is virtually a section >>> > of rays projected from an object otherwise known, renders it a >>> Dicisign. >>> > Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes, >>> > is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object. >>> > It is not, perhaps, sufficiently brought out in the present analysis. >>> > It will be remarked that this connection of the print, which is the >>> > quasi-predicate of the photograph, with the section of the rays, >>> > which is the quasi-subject, is the Syntax of the Dicisign; >>> >>> By referring to EGs, Peirce emphasizes the similarity between the >>> iconic structure of an EG and images of any kind. EGs with pegs >>> that are not attached to any line of identity represent predicates. >>> The act of attachment is "a further determination" that converts >>> a predicate or a quasi-predicate into a dicisign (proposition). >>> >>> Chronology: >>> >>> 1902: An image is a quasi-predicate when it combines with an index >>> or quasi-index to state a proposition (dicisign). >>> >>> 1903: An index and a seme are synonymous. That is very different >>> from his definition of 1906. That implies that (a) Peirce's >>> terminology was unstable, and (b) the ethics of terminology >>> does not apply to unstable terms. >>> >>> 1906: A seme is a widening (generalization) of predicate to include >>> percepts and other image-like signs when used as predicates. >>> In effect, seme means "predicate or quasi-predicate". >>> >>> Interpretation: With the prefix 'quasi-', Peirce modified the word >>> 'predicate' for images used as predicates. In 1903, he introduced >>> the word 'seme' as a synonym for index. But that made it redundant. >>> >>> When he was writing the Monist article in 1906, he wanted a single >>> word for both predicates and quasi-predicates. So he dusted off >>> the word 'seme'. After 1906, he didn't use the word 'seme' because >>> it was simpler and clearer to use his favorite words 'monad', 'dyad', >>> 'triad'... for both predicates and quasi-predicates. >>> >>> Summary: Peirce used the word 'predicate' for examples in logic >>> and ordinary language. He used 'quasi-predicate' for images used >>> as predicates. In 1906, he used 'seme' as a generalization of >>> predicate and quasi-predicate. >>> >>> Conclusion: The evidence from 1906 and later shows that the word >>> 'seme' may be replaced by a word that means "predicate or quasi- >>> predicate". Therefore, the word 'predicate' may be generalized >>> to include every use of 'quasi-predicate'. That eliminates any >>> need for the word 'seme'. >>> >>> See below for comments about the quotations from 1906 and 1908. >>> >>> John >>> ______________________________________________________________________ >>> >>> JAS >>> > there is a late passage ... that spells out in considerable detail >>> > what Peirce ultimately considered to be the "proper" logical analysis >>> > of a proposition. In his letter of December 5, 1908 to Jourdain... >>> >>> No. Definitely not. His existential graphs and diagrammatic >>> reasoning are the most elegant and powerful basis for his logical >>> analyses. In fact, they're superior to the systems by Frege, >>> Russell, Whitehead, and even Gentzen. See the slides for "Peirce, >>> Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry": >>> http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf >>> >>> In the letter to Jourdain, Peirce was writing for a reader who >>> was familiar with Aristotelian syllogisms, as taught in textbooks >>> from the 13th c. to the early 20th c: >>> >>> > A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more >>> > ways than one... The result is that everything in a proposition that >>> > possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the pure >>> > predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses (as a >>> > character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation _____ to _____ ,' 'and' >>> > = 'is at once _____ and _____ ,' etc. ... (NEM 3:885-886, 1908) >>> >>> This method of separating a proposition into a predicate and logical >>> subjects is not meaningful for Peirce's EGs or his 1885 notation for >>> predicate calculus. For a summary of the patterns for syllogisms, >>> see slides 15 to 18 of http://jfsowa.com/talks/aristo.pdf >>> >>> The transformation that Peirce recommended would replace the verb >>> 'breathes' in the sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with >>> the verb 'is' in "Every mammal is an oxygen-breathing animal." >>> >>> This transformation causes some "logical subjects" to become complex >>> expressions, such as "oxygen-breathing animal". In the algebraic >>> notation, that phrase would be represented by a monadic predicate: >>> >>> Define P(x) as oxygen_breathing(x) & animal(x). >>> >>> Such transformations are necessary for applying Aristotle's rules >>> of inference. But they are unnecessary for Peirce's rules. >>> >>> JAS >>> > the role of what he had called a Seme in 1906--such as "rose" or >>> > "red"--is to serve as a substitute for any logical subject >>> >>> The words 'rose' and 'red' would be represented by monadic predicates: >>> rose(x) and red(x). There is no need for the word 'seme'. >>> >>> JAS >>> > one of the discarded drafts for "Prolegomena to an Apology for >>> > Pragmaticism." >>> > >>> > CSP: The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the >>> > logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any >>> > kind, be it a man or a scribed character, such as H or Pb, which will >>> > serve, or is supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for >>> > its Object. It is a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be >>> > virtually its Object. (R 295:[28-29]; 1906) >>> >>> Every seme (logical term) in this quotation can be mapped to >>> a monadic predicate: man(x), H(x), or Pb(x). >>> >>> For more examples of semes, note the excerpts from CP 4.539 to 4.550: >>> >>> > CP 4.539: a Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception >>> > or rather the Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate >>> > Interpretant, is a Pheme... >>> >>> This implies that a percept, as an image-like pattern, is a quasi- >>> predicate at the instant it's perceived. But when the image is >>> connected with an index in a judgment, the quasi-predicate plus >>> index states a proposition (pheme). >>> >>> > A late Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is >>> > the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive >>> > thought as determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.† >>> > >>> > Footnote: † I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of >>> > a perceptual universe... >>> >>> Each percept in the complex is a quasi-predicate. The complex of >>> percepts is a picture (a larger quasi-predicate), which is defined >>> by a conjunction of all the quasi-percepts for its components. >>> >>> > Finally, and in particular, we get a Seme of that highest of all >>> > Universes which is regarded as the Object of every true Proposition, >>> > and which, if we name it [at] all, we call by the somewhat misleading >>> > title of "The Truth." >>> >>> This big seme is a picture (quasi-predicate) of everything we think >>> we know (our beliefs). We call that "The Truth" -- but as Peirce >>> said, most of it may be true, but we never know how much is false. >>> >>> > CP 4.540: How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme, has for >>> > its direct Dynamical Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which >>> > is a Pheme [proposition]? For that is not the usual way with Semes, >>> > certainly. All the examples that happen to occur to me at this moment >>> > of such action of Semes are instances of Percepts, though doubtless >>> > there are others. Since not all Percepts act with equal energy in >>> > this way, the instances may be none the less instructive for being >>> > Percepts. However, Reader, I beg you will think this matter out >>> > for yourself... My opinion is that a pure perceptual Icon -- and >>> > many really great psychologists have evidently thought that Perception >>> > is a passing of images before the mind's eye, much as if one were >>> > walking through a picture gallery... >>> >>> The phrase "Reader, I beg you will think this matter out" and the >>> dots for another tentative passage indicate that Peirce was still >>> rethinking these issues. The absence of later writings that use >>> the word 'seme' suggests that he came to prefer other terminology. >>> >>> > CP 4.550: In one of the narrowest and most concrete of its logical >>> > meanings, a Mind is that Seme of The Truth, whose determinations >>> > become Immediate Interpretants of all other Signs whose Dynamical >>> > Interpretants are dynamically connected.† >>> > >>> > Footnote: † i.e. Mind is a propositional function of the widest >>> > possible universe such that its values are the meanings of all >>> > signs whose actual effects are in effective intercommunication. >>> >>> This seme could be a mental image (quasi-predicate) of all aspects of >>> an imagined world. If represented symbolically, it would be a very >>> large predicate. That world could be some individual's view of the >>> actual world or some imaginary world. With indexes that relate parts >>> of it to the real world, it would be a proposition that states >>> everything that some individual knows. >>> >>
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