List: The minor premise of my recently posted "Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God" is based not only on Peirce's explicit assertion that "the Universe is a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193; 1903), but also on his statements elsewhere that "the entire universe ... is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n1, EP 2:394; 1906) and that "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36; c. 1904). Since the latter is from a still-unpublished manuscript, I decided to revisit the context in which he presented it, just to make sure that I have not been misapplying it.
CSP: Now the purpose of a sign is that it shall be interpreted. The interpretation of it is again a sign. So that the whole purpose of a sign, as such, is to determine a new sign; and the whole purport of a sign lies in the character of its intended interpretation. But in order that a sign should produce another sign, it is necessary that it should in some sense (not necessarily in this or that technical sense, but in some sense,) influence or act upon something external to itself. It is only in doing so that it can get itself interpreted. Consequently, the whole purport of any sign lies in the intended character of its external action or influence. This external influence is of different kinds in different cases. (R 1476:34-35) Peirce proceeded to discuss causing a physical event and exciting a certain quality of feeling as examples. I take these to be what he would later call Exertions and Feelings, respectively, as Dynamic Interpretants that are *not *further Instances of Signs (cf. CP 4.536; 1906). He then continued ... CSP: Of course, there is no exhaustion of energy as if work were done. The process rather reminds one of the reproduction of a population,--sufficiently so, indeed, to furnish a convenient store of metaphors requisite for the expression of its relations. Naturally, such metaphors, greatly serviceable though they are, are like edge-tools, not to be entrusted to babies or to fools or to the immature. There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems increases the aptness of that simile. It is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign; so that, most connections resulting from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a second in so far as this is "married" to a third. Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is the interpretation of either premiss as married to the other; and of this sort are all the principal translation-processes of thought. (R 1476:36) Peirce's comparison of the "science of semeiotics" to what he elsewhere and repeatedly quoted his father Benjamin calling "the science which draws necessary conclusions" is striking--he claimed that its results, including this particular "theorem," are only matters of opinion to the same extent as those of mathematics. That leads me to wonder what its hypothetical "postulates" might be, and how this "theorem" can be "proved" from them. As far as I can tell, neither Peirce's own writings nor the secondary literature (so far) have ever directly addressed such questions. In any case, Peirce proposed "reproduction of a population" as a metaphor for the *process *by which a Sign influences "something external to itself" in order to "produce another Sign"--namely, *semiosis*, in which a Token determines a Quasi-mind to a Dynamic Interpretant. Hence the primary means of connecting Signs that he had in mind was "successive pairings," where one Sign "interprets" two others as "married"; and his example to illustrate this was the conclusion of a syllogistic Argument as the "offspring" of its "married" premises. (In order to avoid a lengthy digression, I will postpone further discussion of this notion to a forthcoming post.) Peirce then added ... CSP: In the light of the above theorem, we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign; and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from marriages with the thoughts of other persons. So the thought-life of a social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected. The entire interpretation of thought must consist in the results of thought's action outside of thought; either in all these results or in some of them. What, then, does thought affect outside itself? (R 1476:36) This plainly affirms that "the entire body of all thought is a sign" (singular), the result of "marriages" among the Signs (plural) that serve as thoughts in different individual (Quasi-)minds. Again, "we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). However, thought is by no means *all *that there is; on the contrary, something "external to itself" and therefore "outside of thought" is *necessary* for its interpretation. CSP: Let us consider first its effects in the physical universe. The theory that thought has no outward effects is too impossible [?] to be considered [?]. Nobody can really believe it. We must avoid also the error of the absolute idealists who, in their endeavor to account for everything by a single principle, make thought to be everything; whence it would follow that all human products are effects of thought. This theory will not do. (R 1476:37) I could not make out Peirce's handwriting in the two places where I inserted [?], but he was clearly juxtaposing thought with "the physical universe" and then affirming that the former *affects *the latter. I suspect that this is basically the same distinction that he had drawn the previous decade between mind and matter--a difference in degree, rather than in kind, such that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293; 1892). In other words, "the physical universe" is a Dynamic Interpretant of "the entire body of all thought." These seem to correspond respectively to what Peirce elsewhere called the second Universe of Brute Actuality or Existents and the third Universe of Signs or Necessitants (CP 6.455, EP 2:435 and EP 2:478-479; both 1908). He did not mention here a counterpart to the first Universe of Ideas or Possibles, but that might simply be because he broke off this particular draft after writing out three more pages that wandered in a different direction. Nevertheless, it seems that all three Universes are required for "the entire interpretation of thought," even though Peirce affirmed at the very beginning of the passage that the interpretation of a Sign "is again a sign." Recalling once more my minor premise--that the *entire *Universe is a Sign--I suggest accordingly that the third Universe is that Sign *in itself*, the *semiosic continuum* whose material parts are likewise continuous Signs; the first Universe is a *Type *of that Sign, a portion of that continuum with an inexhaustible supply of *potential *Instances; and the second Universe is an *Instance *of that Type, the discrete collection of its *actual* Instances. In my diagram, these correspond to the continuous line/plane/space for the Sign, a region within that line/plane/space for the Type, and a discrete point within that region for the Instance. Moreover, consistent with *synechism* and Gary R.'s "vector of representation" (3ns->1ns->2ns), they also line up with Peirce's cosmological account of the hierarchy of Being (CP 6.189-208; 1898)--"the clean blackboard" representing the primordial "continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (3ns), a merged group of white marks representing a "Platonic world" of real possibilities (1ns), and a "discontinuous mark" on that "whiteboard" (my term) representing our "particular actual universe of existence" (2ns). This leads me to recall two comments by Peirce that I have cited before as guiding my ongoing inquiries along these lines. CSP: Logic [i.e., semeiotic] may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs [i.e., habits]. (CP 3.429; 1896) CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical [i.e., semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. (CP 1.487; c. 1896) Speculative grammar is much more than a mere terminological exercise--it points the way toward a *scientific *metaphysics. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
