John, List: JFS: Formal semeiotic is an application of logic to semeiotic. That application establishes for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns and their use in analyzing any whatever for the purpose of mapping the results to logic.
I agree with the first sentence, but not the second. The Categories are established by applying formal/mathematical logic to phenomena as we observe them *in their 1ns*, as they *appear*. Once we begin studying phenomena *in their 2ns*, in relation to *ends*, we are engaged in Normative Science rather than Phenomenology. *Every *Sign has an end--to represent something--so applying formal/mathematical logic to Signs is the first branch of Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to encompass *all *kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative Grammar. Again, it is *normative *because it studies "what *must be* the characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897, emphasis in original). JFS: But I added that branch in order to emphasize that formal semeiotic, without the discipline of ethics, is a *prerequisite* for the normative sciences. I second Gary R.'s request for specific citations or quotations of passages where you interpret Peirce as somehow endorsing this notion. On the contrary, as far as I can tell, he consistently maintained--at least in his later years--that self-controlled thinking is a species of conduct, which is why ethics is a prerequisite for *all three branches* of Logic as Semeiotic. JFS: In the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol, it's a second. That implies it should be grouped with the second item Pheme, not the first item Seme. It is not a Second, it is an Existent--the divisions of Signs are ultimately according to the Universes, not the Categories--and Peirce's "rule of determination" means that an Index can be *either *a Proposition (Pheme) or a Seme, just not an Argument. JFS: Peirce explicitly said that a single line, by itself has a clear meaning: "There exists something." That is a proposition -- a kind of Pheme. Fair enough; in the Sign System of EGs, a scribed Line of Identity--or any other Graph-instance, for that matter--is indeed an Instance of a Proposition, although I would translate it as "something is identical to something." I want you to know that I have come to understand EGs a lot better over the last few weeks, in no small part due to our (admittedly sometimes contentious) exchanges during that time, which always prompted me to do further reading and thinking. As I have said before, I am not afraid to make and correct mistakes on-List; I firmly believe that we humans *always *learn more from one failure than we *ever *could from a multitude of successes. As Peirce put it, "in scientific inquiry, as in other enterprises, the maxim holds, *Nothing hazard, nothing gain*" (EP 2:410; 1907). JFS: To confirm this point, note that any logical subject, by itself, is a monad attached to a line of identity. If the monad is -car, the logical subject asserts the proposition "There is a car." Now you lost me again. A monad attached to a Line of Identity is *also *an Instance of a Proposition, *not *a logical subject; and by definition a logical subject is a *part *of a Proposition, so it cannot by itself *assert *a Proposition. Again, *any *Graph-instance is an Instance of a Proposition--even a Spot whose Pegs are *not *attached to any Lines of Identity, as Peirce himself explained. CSP: Namely, every “Simple Graph”, or “Spot”, that is to say, every graph that is not composed of other graphs, unless, indeed, it be a “Medad” (i.e. unless it be, in itself, a complete assertion, such as “rains”, meaning “it rains”, and as such has no subject), ought to carry at a point of its periphery to be decided upon by convention, a heavy dot to denote quite indefinitely, each of its subjects. Thus, “•dies” will naturally mean “Something dies”, this something being denoted by the dot; and •kills• will naturally mean “Something kills something”, the left-hand dot denoting the killer, and the right-hand one the killed ... These heavy dots attached to spots and indefinitely denoting their different subjects are called the “pegs” of the spots. (R 670:8-9; 1911 June 9) On this analysis, "•car" is an Instance of the Proposition, "something is a car," and its logical subject is *indefinite*; namely, "something." Since it is a *subject*, "something" cannot possibly be a *predicate*; so what kind of Sign is it? It is a *Seme*. If we attach a Line of Identity to the Peg, the result is an Instance of the Proposition, "something is identical to something that is a car," which at first glance has *two *indefinite subjects; namely, "something" and "something." However, since the Proposition itself *asserts their identity*, there really is still just *one *logical subject, represented by two Instances of the same Type. Again, it cannot possibly be a *predicate*; so what kind of Sign is it? Again, it is a *Seme*. Now please consider Peirce's alternative analysis of a Proposition that throws everything possible into the subject. I realized while thinking about this example that instead of treating a monadic predicate as the most basic class of Signs, there is likewise a further analysis of it into two parts--a *hypostatically abstracted* subject and a *continuous *predicate. On this analysis, "•car" is an Instance of the Proposition, "something belongs to the class of car," which has *two *logical subjects; namely, "something" and "car." Again, since these are *subjects*, they cannot possibly be *predicates*; so what kind of Signs are they? Again, they are *Semes*--and *this *is the most basic class of Signs, because it *cannot *be analyzed into anything else; a Seme can *only *be "married" by continuous predicates to *other *Semes in Propositions. That is the upshot of my post last night about using different colors for Spot labels. There is *always *a continuous predicate *embedded within* a Spot, but it is ignored (or at least overlooked) in the usual translations that simply employ the copula. As both Aristotle and Peirce recognized, in this context "is" can have *three different meanings*, depending on the nature of the Dynamic Object of the Spot--"possesses the character of" for an Abstractive, "is identical to" = "possesses *all *the characters of" for a Concretive, or "belongs to the class of" = "possesses the *common* characters of *every*" for a Collective. In fact, this highlights once more the difference between a Rheme and a Seme. "_____ is a car" or even "_____ belongs to the class of car" is a Rheme, an *incomplete *Proposition because a subject is missing; but "car" by itself, without the copula or continuous predicate, is a Seme. I will ask again, because you have not yet addressed it--if Peirce considered "Seme" to be *synonymous *with "Rheme," "predicate," "quasi-predicate," and/or "term," why on earth did he blatantly violate his own ethics of terminology by introducing that new word? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:03 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Gary R and Jon AS, > > Two comments on your comments. > > GR > > I would deeply question your placing semeiotics below phaneroscopy > > in such a diagram--applications of normative logic can occur in > > any science save mathematics. > > That's true. But all the data of *every* science comes from some > observation -- even if it's just an observation of a meter reading. > > But I admit that normative logic is necessary for testing all the > hypotheses of both science and everyday life. Therefore, I added > one change to my previous diagram: the word 'formal' to make > Formal semeiotic the result of formal logic applied to the raw > data of phaneroscopy. See the attached cspsci.png. > > I also added a dotted line to connect Formal Logic to Normative > Science. That indicates that formal semeiotic is a prerequisite > for normative science. That point is confirmed in the selection > of Peirce's writings that follow CP 1.180 - 1.202. > > > Semeiotic replaces Logic as the third branch of Normative Science, > > rather than being the sole branch of Phenomenology. > > No! Formal logic, like all branches of pure mathematics, is pure > possibility. It has no actual content of any kind. Formal semeiotic > is an application of logic to semeiotic. That application establishes > for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns and their use in > analyzing any whatever for the purpose of mapping the results to logic. > > Peirce did not show formal semeiotic as a branch under phenomenology > because there is nothing else to distinguish it from: Most people > who draw tree diagrams make at least two branches. But I added > that branch in order to emphasize that formal semeiotic, without > the discipline of ethics, is a *prerequisite* for the normative > sciences. > > > The diagram shows Sowa's classification of the sciences, not Peirce's. > > In the latter, Semeiotic replaces Logic. > > No. formal logic is never replaced by anything. Please look at > the Commens excerpts for the many occurrences of 'formal Logic' > in Peirce's writings. > > > What should we call the class of Signs to which such an Index belongs > > Good question. There are two sources of evidence: > > 1. In the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol, it's a second. That > implies it should be grouped with the second item Pheme, not > the first item Seme. > > 2. Since Peirce, as a logician, was always thinking about the way any > new idea was translated to EGs, note that an index is translated > to a line of identity. Peirce explicitly said that a single line, > by itself has a clear meaning: "There exists something." That is > a proposition -- a kind of Pheme. > > To confirm this point, note that any logical subject, by itself, is > a monad attached to a line of identity. If the monad is -car, the > logical subject asserts the proposition "There is a car." The phrase > "There is" would be appropriate for a act of pointing by any index. > > Note that I admitted that Gary made a valid criticism, and I was > happy to make an appropriate change to the diagram. I anybody > can find anything in that diagram that should be revised, I'd > be happy to make the change. > > John >
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