Stephen, list, You wrote: There is an inherent flaw or contradiction in Peirce's distinction between the words scientific and intelligence. To be scientific requires a mentality which is quite clear to those who possess it but not to those who do not.
In the context of discussing "Logic, in its general sense [but] another name for semeiotic," Peirce remarks that 'a "scientific" intelligence' is "an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227, 1897). So, it would appear that possessing a scientific intelligence is, for Peirce, not an extraordinary thing. Admittedly, he's discussing "abstractive observation" and "positive science" here, but, rereading his definition out of context for a change (it's a rather frequently quoted fragment, so I've read it any number times as it succinctly outlines logic as semeiotic, including, for example, its division into "pure grammar," "logic proper," [critical logic], and "pure rhetoric"), since the only intelligence Peirce singles out as *not* potentially capable of "learning by experience" (which includes the observation of signs) is God's, since, he remarks, God "should possess an intuitive intelligence superseding reason," it occurred to me that Peirce's definition doesn't preclude at least some animals--perhaps even some plants--from possessing a "scientific" intelligence. That sounds strange at first, but note that Peirce puts "scientific" in scare quotes in his definition. In that sense, all of biological nature is capable of learning, evolving. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 11:18 AM Stephen Curtiss Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > There is an inherent flaw or contradiction in Peirce's distinction between > the words scientific and intelligence. To be scientific requires a > mentality which is quite clear to those who possess it but not to those who > do not. Intelligence must cover a wide but accurate realm consisting of > most sentient beings. We could call it universal in a way none would apply > to the idea of scientific intelligence. Peirce must have been flummoxed by > this distinction as I believe he had universal themes in mind such as the > end of things as agape. Surely this was not limited to the very exclusion > he implicitly and perhaps abhorred in Christian orthodox theology. > Pragmaticism was and remains a universal methodology for all not the > province of those who can deal with graphs and formulae. > > I shall not expect a reply and need none. You know what I think and it has > no apparent landing place in this environment. And no I do not wish an > argument. What I say is either correct of not. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > > On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 10:31 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Jon, Gary R, John, list, >> >> JAS: … Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to encompass *all >> *kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative Grammar. Again, it >> is *normative *because it studies "what *must be* the characters of all >> signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an >> intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897, >> emphasis in original). >> >> Peirce emphasized “must be,” but he does *not* refer to “normative” >> science at all in the passage you quote. You put the “normative” label on >> what Peirce says here, and when you do that — especially in the phrase >> “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” — you water down the signification of the >> word to the point where it almost evaporates. A *normative* science for >> Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is >> one whose essence is to *make dualistic judgments* distinguishing good >> from bad, true from false, right from wrong, etc. What Peirce is referring >> to here is not normative science but, more broadly, *positive* science >> (as opposed to mathematics, which deals with hypothetical objects and thus >> does not learn from experience of the actual world). Here’s the context: >> >> [[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only >> another name for *semiotic* (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or >> formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” >> or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, >> and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to >> naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and >> therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must be* the >> characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to >> say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. ] CP 2.227] >> >> *Logic as Semeiotic* is Logic in this *broad* sense. Logic as *normative* >> , i.e. logical Critic, is one of three branches of that, as Peirce explains: >> >> [[ The speculative rhetoric that we are speaking of is a branch of the >> analytical study of the essential conditions to which all signs are >> subject,— a science named *semeiotics*, though identified by many >> thinkers with logic. In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, and rhetoric >> were felt to be akin and to make up a rounded whole called the *trivium*. >> This feeling was just; for the three disciplines named correspond to the >> three essential branches of semeiotics, of which the first, called >> *speculative >> grammar* by Duns Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a >> sign; the second, the leading part of logic, best termed *speculative >> critic*, studies the ways in which a sign can be related to the object >> independent of it that it represents; while the third is the *speculative >> rhetoric* just mentioned. ] EP2:326 ] >> >> Belluci quotes a similar passage in which logic (in the narrow sense) is >> named as a “department” of semeiotic: >> >> [[ it will be necessary for the present and for a long time to come to >> regard logic, not as a distinct science, but as only a department of the >> science of the general constitution of signs,— the physiology of signs,— >> cenoscopic semeiotics. For if we roughly define a sign as a medium of >> communication, a piece of concerted music is a sign, and so is a word or >> signal of command. Now logic has no positive concern with either of these >> kinds of signs, but it must concern itself with them negatively in defining >> the kind of signs it does deal with; and it is not likely that in our time >> there will be anybody to study the general physiology of the non-logical >> signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R >> 499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ] >> >> Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic >> meneiotics — not that semeiotics *replaces* logic, but that it >> supervenes on logic. Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in Peirce’s >> classification, Semeiotic *replaces* Logic as a normative science. It is >> more accurate to say that Logic in the broad or “general” sense is >> coterminous with Semeiotic, and Logic in the narrow sense (Critic) is the >> normative part of that. None of the passages that you have quoted in >> defense of that claim even *mention* “semeiotic”, or any variant >> spelling of it, or any equivalent term such as “theory of signs,” in >> connection with Logic as a normative science. “Normative Logic as >> Semeiotic” is a chimera of your own invention, Jon. >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* 8-Mar-19 22:30 >> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism >> >> >> >> John, List: >> >> >> >> JFS: Formal semeiotic is an application of logic to semeiotic. That >> application establishes for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns >> and their use in analyzing any whatever for the purpose of mapping the >> results to logic. >> >> >> >> I agree with the first sentence, but not the second. The Categories are >> established by applying formal/mathematical logic to phenomena as we >> observe them *in their 1ns*, as they *appear*. Once we begin studying >> phenomena *in their 2ns*, in relation to *ends*, we are engaged in >> Normative Science rather than Phenomenology. *Every *Sign has an >> end--to represent something--so applying formal/mathematical logic to Signs >> is the first branch of Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to >> encompass *all *kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative >> Grammar. Again, it is *normative *because it studies "what *must be* the >> characters of all signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to >> say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. >> 1897, emphasis in original). >> >> … >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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