John, list, I do not see that semiotic has any place in Peirce's descriptions of and explications of phenomenology. See, for example:
1902 [c.] | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Section II. Why Study Logic? | CP 2.120 If this be so, and if the scheme of classification of the sciences that has been proposed be correct, it will follow that there are but five theoretical sciences which do not more or less depend upon the science of logic. [—] The second of the five is that department of philosophy called Phenomenology, whose business it is simply to draw up an inventory of appearances without going into any investigation of their truth. [Btw, the first of the five sciences which do *not* depend on logic as semeiotic is mathematics; then, following phenomenology, the third is theoretical esthetics, the fourth is theoretical ethics, and the fifth is logic as semeiotic itself.] Changing "semiotics" to "formal semiotics" in your diagram of the classification of sciences doesn't change the fact that, in Peirce's view, phenomenology is one of the five sciences which does *not* depend on *logica docens*, normative logic, for Peirce, logic as semeiotics. Further, I do not see where in Peirce you glean the notion of a 'formal semiotic'. It's an interesting idea which I'd like to hear more about, but I do not see it in Peirce's work. Please cite a source for this notion. Further, I do not see why you insist on not naming the third normative science as Peirce did, namely, as *logic as semeiotic*. There are many places where he makes this quite clear, for example: 1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:309-11 Logic is the study of the essential nature of signs. 1908-09-09 | The Logic Notebook | MS [R] 339:322r …logic is merely the science of ideas considered as signs. 1909 | Preface | MS [R] 634:15 …it would seem proper that in the present state of knowledge logic should be regarded as coëxtensive with General Semeiotic, the *a priori* theory of signs. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 6:03 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Gary R and Jon AS, > > Two comments on your comments. > > GR > > I would deeply question your placing semeiotics below phaneroscopy > > in such a diagram--applications of normative logic can occur in > > any science save mathematics. > > That's true. But all the data of *every* science comes from some > observation -- even if it's just an observation of a meter reading. > > But I admit that normative logic is necessary for testing all the > hypotheses of both science and everyday life. Therefore, I added > one change to my previous diagram: the word 'formal' to make > Formal semeiotic the result of formal logic applied to the raw > data of phaneroscopy. See the attached cspsci.png. > > I also added a dotted line to connect Formal Logic to Normative > Science. That indicates that formal semeiotic is a prerequisite > for normative science. That point is confirmed in the selection > of Peirce's writings that follow CP 1.180 - 1.202. > > > Semeiotic replaces Logic as the third branch of Normative Science, > > rather than being the sole branch of Phenomenology. > > No! Formal logic, like all branches of pure mathematics, is pure > possibility. It has no actual content of any kind. Formal semeiotic > is an application of logic to semeiotic. That application establishes > for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns and their use in > analyzing any whatever for the purpose of mapping the results to logic. > > Peirce did not show formal semeiotic as a branch under phenomenology > because there is nothing else to distinguish it from: Most people > who draw tree diagrams make at least two branches. But I added > that branch in order to emphasize that formal semeiotic, without > the discipline of ethics, is a *prerequisite* for the normative > sciences. > > > The diagram shows Sowa's classification of the sciences, not Peirce's. > > In the latter, Semeiotic replaces Logic. > > No. formal logic is never replaced by anything. Please look at > the Commens excerpts for the many occurrences of 'formal Logic' > in Peirce's writings. > > > What should we call the class of Signs to which such an Index belongs > > Good question. There are two sources of evidence: > > 1. In the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol, it's a second. That > implies it should be grouped with the second item Pheme, not > the first item Seme. > > 2. Since Peirce, as a logician, was always thinking about the way any > new idea was translated to EGs, note that an index is translated > to a line of identity. Peirce explicitly said that a single line, > by itself has a clear meaning: "There exists something." That is > a proposition -- a kind of Pheme. > > To confirm this point, note that any logical subject, by itself, is > a monad attached to a line of identity. If the monad is -car, the > logical subject asserts the proposition "There is a car." The phrase > "There is" would be appropriate for a act of pointing by any index. > > Note that I admitted that Gary made a valid criticism, and I was > happy to make an appropriate change to the diagram. I anybody > can find anything in that diagram that should be revised, I'd > be happy to make the change. > > John > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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