John, List:
While your continued employment of over-the-top rhetoric is regrettable, I
sincerely appreciate you making explicit the assumptions underlying all of
your recent argumentation. They confirm the fundamental misunderstanding
of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar that I have been pointing out
repeatedly.
JFS: 1. In every triad, the First represents something in the universe of
possibility. The Second, in actuality. The Third, in necessity.
It is not clear what "triad" means in this context. My best guess that it
is intended to be synonymous with *trichotomy*--i.e., each of the three
divisions of Signs in 1903 (resulting in ten classes) or the ten divisions
of Signs in 1906-1908 (resulting in 66 classes). If so, then the word
"represents" is incorrect; rather, each correlate and relation *is *a
constituent of either the first Universe of Possibles, the second Universe
of Existents, or the third Universe of Necessitants (EP 2:478-481; 1908).
JFS: 2. Every sign that is a First can refer only to possible objects (in
the universe of Possibility).
It is not clear what "sign that is a First" means in this context. A
Qualisign (1903) or Mark/Tone/Potisign (1908) is a Sign that is a Possible *in
itself*, while an Abstractive (1908) is a Sign whose *Dynamic Object* is a
Possible--i.e., a Sign that *refers to* something "in the universe of
Possibility." However, the discussion lately has been primarily about the
nature of a Rheme (1903) or Seme (1906-1908), which is a Sign whose *relation
to its (Final) Interpretant* is a Possible. I suspect that the following
definition may be causing some confusion.
CSP: A *Rheme *is a sign which, *for its Interpretant*, is a sign of
qualitative possibility, that is, is *understood *as representing such and
such a kind of possible Object. (CP 2.250, EP 2:292; 1903, bold added)
Note carefully that Peirce *did not* say that a Rheme "can refer only to
possible objects"; again, that would be a statement about the *Object *that
the Sign *denotes*. Instead, what I quoted here is a statement about the
Sign's *relation *to the *Interpretant *that it *signifies*. This is
confirmed by Peirce's subsequent definitions of the two classes of Rhematic
Indices, as well as the corresponding examples supplied by the CP editors.
CSP: ... a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign [*e.g.*, a spontaneous cry] is any
object of direct experience so far as it directs attention to an Object by
which its presence is caused ... a Rhematic Indexical Legisign [*e.g.*, a
demonstrative pronoun] is any general type or law, however established,
which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its Object in
such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object. (CP 2.256&259, EP
2:294; 1903)
Drawing attention to something actual is *denoting* that Object, which is
the function of an Index (EP 2:306-307; 1904); and a Rheme obviously *can *be
an Index, so it is *false *that a Rheme "can refer only to possible
objects." Of course, "Seme" is even broader than "Rheme," since Peirce
defined it as "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an
object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538;
1906)--so it *also *can be an Index, and thus can refer to *actual *Objects.
JFS: A First can never, by itself, refer to any particular object in the
universe of actuality.
I assume that "First" is intended to mean "Seme" in this context. If so,
then there is a sense in which this statement is correct--a Seme can never, *by
itself*, refer to any *particular *object in the universe of actuality. In
fact, within a given Sign System, I consider the Immediate Object of a Seme
to be whatever it *possibly could* denote in accordance with its
definition, which is its Immediate Interpretant. However, when a Seme
serves as *the subject of a Proposition*--an Index that denotes an
Object--then it *can *(and often does) refer to a particular object in the
universe of actuality. That is *precisely *why, in order to understand a
Proposition, an interpreter must have *previous *Collateral Experience
(direct or indirect) with the Dynamic Object of *each and every one* of its
constituent Semes (subjects).
JFS: But as a possibility, it may be used to describe something actual
that has been independently determined by some Index (which is a Second).
An Index is an Existent according to its relation to its (Dynamic) Object,
but it can be a Necessitant according to the divisions that come *earlier *in
the "order of determination" (e.g., Legisign/Type), and a Possible
according to the divisions that come *later *(e.g., Rheme/Seme). In other
words, an Index is not *necessarily* a Sinsign/Token and a Proposition; and
since an Index can *never *be an Argument, *any *Index that is not a
Proposition *must *be a Seme. When I point at my car and say, "That is my
car," both my pointing finger and the demonstrative pronoun are grammatical
and logical *subjects *of the Proposition that I utter--i.e., Indexical
Semes referring to a particular object in the universe of actuality.
JFS: Points #1 and #2 are definitions in Peirce's system of categories,
which is the foundation of his semeiotic. If any contradiction is inserted
or implied, the foundation collapses.
As demonstrated above, #1 and #2 as stated are *not *Peirce's definitions;
in fact, *they *contradict basic principles of his Semeiotic. A Sign that
is a Possible/Existent/Necessitant ("First/Second/Third") according to *one
*trichotomy ("triad") is *not *constrained to *also *being a member of
the *same
*Universe ("Category") in *every *trichotomy ("triad"). A Seme can serve
as a substitute for *any *Dynamic Object, whether a Possible (as an
Abstractive), an Existent (as a Concretive), or a Necessitant (as a
Collective); and it can be related to that Dynamic Object by resemblance
(as an Icon), by a direct connection (as an Index), or by a habit (as a
Symbol).
JFS: The derivation of the contradiction can be summarized in three points:
Repeating the same claims over and over, making only minor adjustments with
each iteration, seems unlikely to render them more persuasive. In any
case, it is *false *that a Seme can *only *represent a possibility; it
is *false
*that a grammatical subject *must *refer to something that actually exists;
and it is *false *that a grammatical subject is a Pheme (Proposition),
since "every English sentence that states a proposition must have a
grammatical subject and a grammatical predicate ... A grammatical subject
by itself is not a syntactically correct English sentence" (JFS
<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-03/msg00116.html>).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sun, Mar 24, 2019 at 5:05 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:
> Jon AS and Gary R,
>
> > JAS: The new thread title is alarmist hyperbole.
> >
> > GR: I strongly agree
>
> My word 'danger' is mild compared to the vehement denunciation that
> Peirce would pronounce if anybody would introduce a contradiction
> in his system of semeiotic. Peirce-List should be alarmed.
>
> Among Peirce's many comments about logic and metaphysics,
> > the metaphysician who is not prepared to grapple with all the
> > difficulties of modern exact logic had better put up his shutters
> > and go out of the trade. (CP 1.624)
> >
> > metaphysics ought to be founded on logic. To found logic on
> > metaphysics is a crazy scheme. (CP 2.168)
>
> In exact logic (which includes EGs), one contradiction destroys the
> entire theory. But a theory can be saved by stepping back through
> the proof to determine which assumption is at fault and replacing or
> revising that assumption.
>
> That proof (copy below) depends on three assumptions:
>
> 1. In every triad, the First represents something in the universe of
> possibility. The Second, in actuality. The Third, in necessity.
>
> 2. Every sign that is a First can refer only to possible objects
> (in the universe of Possibility). A First can never, by itself,
> refer to any particular object in the universe of actuality. But
> as a possibility, it may be used to describe something actual that
> has been independently determined by some Index (which is a Second).
>
> 3. As a widening of a Rheme and a logical Term, a Seme must include
> predicates. Peirce said it also includes percepts, icons, and
> images. But two options about other kinds of "widening" were
> being debated. Option A: Nothing else. Option B: The subject
> phrase of a sentence in English or other language.
>
> Points #1 and #2 are definitions in Peirce's system of categories,
> which is the foundation of his semeiotic. If any contradiction is
> inserted or implied, the foundation collapses.
>
> The debate so far is about two options for widening Rheme to Seme.
> Option A claims that a Seme includes only signs that Peirce had
> explicitly discussed. But option B claims that a paragraph in an
> early draft implies the subject of a sentence in ordinary language.
>
> For option A: In CP 4.538, the definition of Seme includes Term
> and Logical Term. Both of them are predicates (Firsts). That
> paragraph does not contain the ambiguous word 'subject'. And
> in CP 4.539 ff, Peirce said "A percept is a Seme" and discussed
> other image-like signs that are also Firsts: an icon in the triad
> icon, index, symbol; or a mark in the triad Mark/Tone, Token, Type.
> In 1903, Peirce used the word 'quasi-predicate' for such signs.
>
> For option B: Seme is defined in a draft that Peirce did not include
> in the final version of CP 4.538:
> > The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical
> > Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind,
> > be it a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will
> > serve or is supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute
> > for its Object. (R 295, p. 26ff)
>
> In this paragraph, the phrase "The logical Term, the Subject" implies
> a predicate, as in option A. But the remainder of the sentence seems
> to imply the subject phrase of a sentence, which would have an index
> or indexical whose object would be something in the universe of
> actuality, not possibility.
>
> Why didn't Peirce use this definition in the final version?
> Did he explicitly reject it? Did he just overlook it?
> Or did he think it might be misleading?
>
> Consider the implications: The subject of a sentence in English
> contains some word that serves as an index (a proper name) or
> some indexical words that make it refer to something that exists
> in actuality. But any sign that refers to an actual entity is
> a Second, such as an Index, Token, Actisign, or Sinsign.
>
> At this point, we have two options for resolving the debate:
>
> Option A uses the definition of Seme as a logical Term, which
> is a predicate that may occur in subject or predicate position
> of a syllogism. That option preserves the consistency of Peirce's
> semeiotic. To avoid any ambiguity about the word 'subject', he
> decided to remove that word from the final version (CP 4.538).
>
> But option B assumes that the draft version in R 295 is more
> significant than the final version in CP 4.538. It also assumes
> that the ambiguous word 'subject' should not be considered as a
> logical subject (which is a predicate), but as a reference to some
> actual existent (a Second) rather than a possibility (a First).
> This choice causes a contradiction in the foundation of the system
> of semeiotic.
>
> Which option would Peirce himself intend?
>
> As he said, "metaphysics ought to be founded on logic".
> Since option B leads to a contradiction, it's "a crazy scheme".
>
> John
> ______________________________________________________________________
>
> The derivation of the contradiction can be summarized in three points:
>
> 1. In CP 4.538, Peirce said that the triad Term, Proposition, Argument
> had to be widened, and he proposed a new triad Seme, Pheme, Delome.
> In 4.539, he discussed issues about percepts, which showed why the
> category Seme needed to go beyond purely symbolic Terms.
>
> 2. But Jon claimed that Subject would be an appropriate widening.
> He was misled by an ambiguity in the word 'subject': as a logical
> term, it's a predicate, which is a Rheme, which is a Seme; but as
> a grammatical subject, it would refer to something actual.
>
> 3. But that triad would contradict the foundation of Peirce's system.
> A Seme is a First. It represents a pure possibility, such as a
> Mark/Tone, Potisign, or Qualisign. But a grammatical subject in
> language refers to something that exists. It's a Second, such
> as a Token, Actisign, or Sinsign. To claim that a grammatical
> subject could be a Seme would mix Firstness and Secondness,
> and create a contradiction in the center of the system.
>
> The reason why Jon was misled is that the word 'subject' without
> any qualifiers is ambiguous. A Term in Aristotle's syllogisms may
> be used in either subject position or predicate position. As a
> Term without an indexical word in front (a, some, any, every...),
> it would be a predicate, which is a Seme.
>
> But a grammatical subject refers to something that exists (or is
> assumed to exist) in the Universe of Discourse. That kind of
> subject would be a Second. It would be a Pheme, not a Seme.
>
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