Jon, List,
Gary already did a great job in furnishing arguments in favor of keeping in mind, that talk about signs of course can be done shorthand, but that it is wise to keep in mind the other relata, if the focus is on one of them. Jon, I do not know where your idea comes form, i.e. that talk in terms of sign aspects is giving s special value to the first sign trichotomy. The first trichotomy only posits the possibility of a sign in actu. In order to have a description of a sign in action a pick out of all three trichotomies is needed. What is the sense of making distinctions between different type of signs on the basis of sign aspects (whether kept hidden or spelled out), if those aspects do not play a role in the interpretation process? But then we will need them all. Best, Auke Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Verzonden: vrijdag 29 maart 2019 14:35 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities... Gary R., List: GR: Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival form appears less frequently doesn't address the crucial fact that Peirce wrote:"Signs are divisible by three trichotomies ..." But notice what Peirce said all three trichotomies divide--Signs. A Qualisign (Tone) is a Sign, a Sinsign (Token) is a Sign, and a Legisign (Type) is a Sign. An Icon is a Sign, an Index is a Sign, and a Symbol is a Sign. A Rheme (Seme) is a Sign, a Dicisign (Proposition) is a Sign, and an Argument is a Sign. GR: Again, we all call such signs "Rhemes"--but Rhemes ARE Legisigns. According to the 1903 taxonomy, some Rhemes are Legisigns; others are Sinsigns, and still others are Qualisigns. Likewise, some Rhemes are Symbols; others are Indices, and still others are Icons. Any number of trichotomies can be used to classify Signs--the ten from 1906-1908 result in 66 classes of Signs, the three from 1903 produce ten classes of Signs, and any one division by itself designates three classes of Signs. GR: So, any and all symbols are legisigns. To paraphrase Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof, would it spoil some vast, eternal plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all legisigns? But further, that not all legisigns are symbols. No one is disputing any of this. My point--and what I take to be Gary F.'s point, as well--is that it is a mistake to overemphasize Peirce's usage of adjectives vs. nouns in naming the Sign classes, as if the division according to the nature of the Sign itself is somehow more significant than the other two. A Rhematic Indexical Legisign is just as much a Rheme and an Index as it is a Legisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 8:02 AM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: List, Before I sign off on this topic (pun intended), I just want to add a little something to help, I hope, get at--not what I've been arguing, since in that matter I've said pretty much all I can think of to say--but why I've been arguing for a thoughtful consideration of what Peirce calls the "the sign in itself". Take for example, the symbol. When we refer to a "symbol" we know that it will be either a rheme, a dicisign, or an argument. And conversely, and quite obviously, when we think of any of these three, at least in the back of our minds we're aware that each and all are symbols. Now, in a passage I quoted in my last post Peirce states that "any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign." So, any and all symbols are legisigns. To paraphrase Tevye in Fiddler on the Roof, would it spoil some vast, eternal plan if, when we think of symbols we also think that they are all legisigns? But further, that not all legisigns are symbols. Symbols are, in Peirce's parlance, the only "genuine" signs, but some "degenerate" signs are analyzed by him as legisigns. I mentioned sign no. 7 in my last message as an example of a legisign which is not a symbol: the Dicent Indexical Legisign ("a street cry"). But so are signs no. 5 and 6. As I see it, Peirce put a lot of thought and time and meaning into the classification of signs which appears in "Nomenclature," and I for one think we ought to reflect on why Peirce considered the types of "the sign in itself" (which, again, is either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign) as significant. OK. Now I'll drop the mic--I'm done. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 11:52 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: Jon, Gary F, Helmut, Auke,List, Gary's list of "counts of occurrences of the noun and adjectival forms of icon/iconic, index/indexical/ symbol/symbolic showing that the adjectival form appears less frequently doesn't address the crucial fact that Peirce wrote: "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason. "According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. "A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. // "A Sinsign [. . .] is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. . . // "A Legisign is a law that is a sign. [. . .] EP2:291 My response is, "So what that Peirce used what I've been referring to as the kind of 'shorthand' we all use in referring to signs?" Gary F continued: GF: Call it “shorthand” if you like, but if it’s good enough for Peirce, it’s good enough for me. It's good enough for me too. No one, not Peirce, nor me, nor you or Jon or anyone I know of, is, for example, going to refer (informally) to a rhematic sign, as Peirce does in his triangle of the 10 classes as a "Rhematic Symbolic Legisign." No, we say, simply, 'Rheme'. But Peirce analyzed it as a Legisign in "Nomenclature, etc." Again, we all call such signs "Rhemes"--but Rhemes ARE Legisigns. As Jon wrote: JAS: Since Peirce invented these terms, and clearly went back and forth between adjective and noun forms, we are also authorized to do so. OK, but that doesn't imply that, for example, all symbols (the Rheme, Dicisign, and Argument) aren't Legisigns. GF: Clearly, for Peirce, an icon is a sign, an index is a sign, and a symbol is a sign. Most certainly there are iconic signs: the Qualisign (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign, no. 1), the Sinsign (Rhematic Iconic Sinsign, no. 2) or the Legisign (a Rhematic Iconic Legisign, no. 5). NOTE: these three iconic signs represent all three types of the Sign qua sign: "according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law" (boldface added) For Sign class no. 1 it is a Qualisign, for no. 2 it is a Sinsign, for no. 5 it is a Legisign. The same sort of analysis goes for the indexical signs (4 of them). And note that sign class No. 7 is analyzed by Peirce as a Legisign. And consider what Peirce has to say about the following Sign, the first of the three symbolic signs, class no. 8 (and despite, as Jon has pointed out, Peirce will willy nilly informally (I'd argue) switch the order and the noun/adjectival facets of each Class trichotomy, here referring to Sign class no. 8 as "a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, " informally, I say, because this class: . . . is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a general term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign (boldface added). So, it looks like we will most likely have to agree to disagree on this matter. I've said all that I have to say on the topic as it relates to the matters taken up in "Nomenclature" (Jon's remarks go beyond this in consideration of later classifications. Btw, thanks, Jon, for catching my typo). I'll let either--or both--of you have the last word. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
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