Gary R., Gary F., List: GR: There are three classes among the 10 of Sinsigns. In relation to their Interpretants they are either Rhematic (Signs 2 and 3) or *Dicent *(Sign 4). In relation to their Objects they are either Iconic (Sign 2) or Indexical (Signs 3 and 4).
The bold is my correction of something that I believe you mistyped. Since Peirce invented these terms, and clearly went back and forth between adjective and noun forms, we are also authorized to do so. In relation to their (Final) Interpretants, all Sinsigns are either Rhemes or Dicisigns. In relation to their (Dynamic) Objects, they are either Icons or Indices. Every trichotomy is a division of *Signs*, so each name therein can be properly used as a noun denoting a *class *of Signs accordingly. GR: I could continue this analysis as above, but I think it's clear that I see the above examples as instances of Peirce's using a loose shorthand kind of language at times. I find it utterly implausible that Peirce was being *unintentionally *loose in his terminology here. If he considered adjective vs. noun to be significant, he surely would have been consistent about maintaining it. But he *did not* say that a Qualisign is necessarily "iconic" and "rhematic," or that an Iconic Sinsign or Legisign is "rhematic," or that a Dicent Sinsign is "indexical"; and he *did *say that a Rhematic Symbol can just as well be called a Symbolic Rheme. GR: ... I am not convinced that such loose talk *by us* is very helpful in a careful consideration of Peirce's analysis of the trichotomic nature of each SIgn: that it has a relation to its Object (which is Iconic, Indexical, or Symbolic), a relation to its Interpretant (which is Rhematic, Dicentic, or Argumentative ... The Sign's *relation *to its (Dynamic) Object is indeed iconic, indexical, or symbolic; but the Sign *itself *is either an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *according to* the nature of that relation. The Sign's *relation *to its (Final) Interpretant is indeed rhematic, dicent, or argumentative; but the Sign *itself *is either a Rheme (Seme), a Dicisign (Proposition), or an Argument *according to* the nature of that relation. Moreover, as far as I can tell, Peirce *never *used the words "Semic" or "Delomic," and he *only *used the word "Phemic" when referring to the Sheet of Assertion in EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 7:19 PM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Gary R, > > You can call it “loose talk” if you are so inclined, but it’s not a matter > of Peirce using it “at times,” he uses it *almost all the time* in his > writings on semiotic. A quick search through those writings yields the > following count of occurrences of the noun and adjective forms: > > icon 135, icons 54; iconic 61 > > index 177, indices 76; indexical 33 > > symbol 248, symbols 125; symbolic 27 > > rheme 26, rhemes 3; rhematic 12 > > dicisign 21, dicisigns 7; dicent 18 > > argument 299, arguments 113; argumentative 2 > > > > As for seme, Peirce *never* used an adjective form, as far as I can tell. > > > > Call it “shorthand” if you like, but if it’s good enough for Peirce, it’s > good enough for me. > > Clearly, for Peirce, an icon is a sign, an index is a sign, and a symbol > is a sign. And so on. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 28-Mar-19 18:25 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic > (was Ambiguities... > > > > Gary F, Jon, Helmut, > > Gary F quoted Peirce: CP 2.250. According to the third trichotomy, a Sign > may be termed a *Rheme,* a *Dicisign* or*Dicent Sign* (that is, a > proposition or quasi-proposition), or an Argument. > > But this is "According to the third trichotomy. . ." > > The three symbolic signs, the Rheme, the Dicisign, and the Argument are > yet all three *Legisigns*. The "Sign *in itself*' is still either a > Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. > > Jon quoted Peirce: > > CSP: ... a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon ... it can only be > interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme ... > > But, again, the only Qualisign of the 10 classes, even if necessarily > rhematic (in relation to its Interpretant) or Iconic (in relation to its > Object) is yet a Qualisign *qua *sign. > > ... an Iconic Sinsign ... Being an Icon ... can only be interpreted as a > sign of essence, or Rheme ... > > There are three classes among the 10 of Sinsigns. In relation to their > Interpretants they are either Rhematic (Signs 2 and 3) or Indexical (Sign > 4). In relation to their Objects they are either Iconic (Sign 2) or > Indexical (Signs 3 and 4). But *qua* Sign in itself, they are all three > Sinsigns. > > ... a Dicent Sinsign is necessarily an Index ... > > ... an Iconic Legisign ... Being an Icon, it must be a Rheme ... > > ... a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme ... (CP 2.254-261, EP 2:294-295; > 1903) > > I could continue this analysis as above, but I think it's clear that I see > the above examples as instances of Peirce's using a loose shorthand kind of > language at times. > > But unless one is willing to deny that, as he writes: ""Signs are > divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as *the sign in itself* > is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law," then I am > not convinced that such loose talk *by us *is very helpful in a careful > consideration of Peirce's analysis of the trichotomic nature of each SIgn: > that it has a relation to its Object (which is Iconic, Indexical, or > Symbolic), a relation to its Interpretant (which is Rhematic, Dicentic, or > Argumentative: and, yes, since there is but one Argumentative sign, there's > no need to speak or write the awkward "Argumentative Symbolic > Legisign--"Argument will suffice"-- yet it remains in its relation to > itself as a Sign, a Legisign; and, mutatis mutandis for shorthand > expressions for other signs as well), and is either a Quali-, Sin- or > Legisign "according as *the sign in itself* is a mere quality, is an > actual existent, or is a general law." > > Best, > > Gary R >
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