Gary R., Auke, Helmut, List: GR: I did not suggest that "the nature of the Sign itself is *more significant* than the other two," but that it was *as *significant, and that it appeared to me that both you and Gary F were minimizing its significance.
AvB: I do not know where your idea comes form, i.e. that talk in terms of sign aspects is giving s special value to the first sign trichotomy. The genesis of this entire series of posts was a comment by Helmut. HR: isnt it so, that in the context of sign classification a sign is either a quali-, sin-, or legisign, all of which may or may not have the adjective "rhematic"? So, in this context, "a rheme" is not regarded as a sign, but "rhematic" is regarded as an adjective, a trait of a sign resp. its interpretant relation? Leaving this context, but still to be in accord with it , I would propose saying, that a rheme or seme (I havent got the difference) "is" not a sign, but can function as a sign, if it is perceived, and then this sign "is" rhematic, but "is" a quali-, sin-, or legisign, but not "is a rheme"? The mistake is thinking that it is somehow inappropriate to call a Sign a "Rheme," and that being "rhematic" is rather a trait or aspect of a Sign, which can only *properly *be classified as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign within the 1903 taxonomy. If that is not your view, then I apologize for misunderstanding; we may be more or less on the same page after all. GR: You stated that I am making a "mistake" in maximizing the significance of the Sign as Sign. Not so. Rather, it appears to me that you and Gary F are making a mistake in minimizing its significance. AvB: What is the sense of making distinctions between different type of signs on the basis of sign aspects (whether kept hidden or spelled out), if those aspects do not play a role in the interpretation process? The division according to the nature of the Sign itself is not *necessarily *relevant to *every* analysis of Signs and semeiosis; as always, it depends on the *purpose* of the analysis. Lately I have been focusing primarily on the Sign's relation to its (Final) Interpretant, so *for my current purpose* it is sufficient (and perfectly legitimate) to classify all Signs as Semes, Propositions, or Arguments. Again, unlike Icon/Index/Symbol, I do not see any viable basis for treating *this *trichotomy as a matter of degree; *every* Sign is properly assigned to *exactly one* of those three classes, because their definitions are mutually exclusive. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 9:04 AM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I said that I'd leave you and/or Gary F the last word, but I feel I must > answer this post which asserts that I'm mistaken in my analysis. > > Jon wrote: > > > JAS: My point--and what I take to be Gary F.'s point, as well--is that it > is a mistake to *overemphasize *Peirce's usage of adjectives vs. nouns in > naming the Sign classes, as if the division according to the nature of the > Sign itself is somehow *more significant* than the other two. A Rhematic > Indexical Legisign is just as much a Rheme and an Index as it is a Legisign. > > > I did not suggest that "the nature of the Sign itself is *more > significant* than the other two," but that it was *as* significant, and > that it appeared to me that both you and Gary F were minimizing its > significance. Indeed, rather than "overemphasizing" the usage of adjectives > vs nouns in naming the Sign classes, I was merely pointing out that, > however you name a sign class (whatever the order and use of adjectives or > nouns, as I clearly stated), that the significance of "sign in itself" > ought be considered. > > JAS: A Qualisign (Tone) is a Sign, a Sinsign (Token) is a Sign, and a > Legisign (Type) is a Sign. An Icon is a Sign, an Index is a Sign, and a > Symbol is a Sign. A Rheme (Seme) is a Sign, a Dicisign (Proposition) is a > Sign, and an Argument is a Sign. > > > The question I have been addressing is not whether or not each of these is > a sign (*they all are*), but whether each sign *qua* sSign is a > qualisign, sinsign, or legisign (again, while you appear not to be, I have > been limiting the discussion to "Nomenclature, etc.") That is all. Not that > the question of the Sign as Sign has *more* significance (where did I > even hint at that?) than the sign's relation to its Interpretant or Object, > but that it *has* significance. > > You stated that I am making a "mistake" in maximizing the significance of > the Sign as Sign. Not so. Rather, it appears to me that you and Gary F are > making a mistake in minimizing its significance. > > Best, > > Gary R > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > >>
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