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}Gary R, list
I'm not going to get into a set of endless posts where we simply
write out the SAME Peircean sections and then, each of us, interpret
them in a different manner.
You and Jon interpret these sections to conclude that the Universe
has horizons, to so speak, both temporally and spatially, and that,
'outside' of these horizons, is the 'reality of God'.
I interpret these sections to conclude that the Universe has no
horizons and that the 'reality of Mind' is a vital component of this
Universe, as expressed within the three modal categories.
Jon interprets the Peircean axiom that the Universe is composed of
Signs AND the axiom that all Signs require an external Object to mean
that the Universe as a Sign requires an external Object, aka, God,
external to the Universe. I interpret the axiom that the Universe is
composed of Signs and that the external Object to each Sign is itself
a Sign - and is within the Universe.
These are two different interpretations of the same Peircean
sections - and I don't see the point of continuous debate. I think we
have to respect that each of us has a 'reasonable interpretation' -
different though they are.
Edwina
On Wed 15/05/19 11:33 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List,
Edwina wrote:
ET: I agree with John Sowa's suggestion - the universe as a sign of
itself. There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite
clear on that - repeatedly. [6.490, 6.214.."The initial condition,
before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract being.
On the contrary it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a
state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something"
On a number of occasions in the past, you've repeated this notion of
the initial condition of "nothing at all" before the Universe existed
without referring to Peirce's explanation of what he means by that
phrase as he develops it in the paragraphs just following 6.214.
There we read that this "is not the nothing of negation," a notion
which follows from "the logic of deduction." Rather, Peirce makes
cleat that the 'nothing' he is explicating is, rather, "the pure zero
of not having been born." "It is the germinal nothing, in which the
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. . . absolutely undefined
and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility." Rather than
following the nothing of the logic of deduction ("the nothing of
death"), his "germinal nothing" follows an abductive logic, the logic
of "potentiality," "So of potential being there was in that initial
state no lack." The result is that "nothing in particular necessarily
resulted" but that everything in general was possible (on this, see
below my discussion of 6.490 which you also referenced).
Here are the relevant passages starting with 6.214 with the ideas
I've just abstracted above put in boldface:
6.214. . . The initial condition, before the universe existed, was
not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary it was a state of
just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even emptiness
is something. CP 6.215 . . . We start, then, with nothing, pure zero.
But this is not the nothing of negation. For not means other than,
and other is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such
it implies a first; while the present pure zero is prior to every
first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes
second to, or after, everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of
not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion,
outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed . As such, it is
absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless
possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless
freedom. CP 6.217 So of potential being there was in that initial
state no lack. CP 6.218 Now the question arises, what necessarily
resulted from that state of things? But the only sane answer is that
where freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily
resulted. The logic may be that of. . . hypothetic inference. CP
6.219 I say that nothing necessarily resulted from the Nothing of
boundless freedom. That is, nothing according to deductive logic. But
such is not the logic of freedom or possibility. The logic of freedom,
or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. And so become the
somethings of this particular Universe (of which others are
possible).
Edwina continued:
ET: Therefore, for JAS to posit that 'because a sign requires an
external object, and the Universe is a 'Sign', THEN, this external
Object must 'be God' - contradicts the Peircean axiom that there is
nothing outside of the Universe.
Let's consider this in consideration of "a perfect cosmology of the
three universe" discussed in 6.490. We again begin at a state of
'nility' which Peirce says that we cannot conceive of; however, we
can "conceive that there should be a mind that could conceive it"
(boldface added). What/whose would that mind be? Peirce then takes up
the notion of "super-order" and "super-habit." Every existential
being (not every reality) requires a super-order for "to suppose a
thing to have any particular character is to suppose a conditional
proposition to be true of it, which proposition would express some
kind of superorder." On the other hand, a "state in which there
should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever would be . . a state
of nility." "So in that state there must then have been a tohu bohu
of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true
universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of everything
conceivable." And so there must have been "a little undifferentiated
tendency to take super-habits. But such a state must tend to increase
itself." Again, I put these ideas in boldface in the relevant passages
beginning with 6.4590.
6.490 Now imagine, in such vague way as such a thing can be
imagined, a perfect cosmology of the three universes. . . . That
perfect cosmology must therefore show that the whole history of the
three universes, as it has been and is to be, would follow from a
premiss which would not suppose them to exist at all. Moreover, such
premiss must in actual fact be true. But that premiss must represent
a state of things in which the three universes were completely nil.
Consequently, whether in time or not, the three universes must
actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter
nothingness. We cannot ourselves conceive of such a state of nility;
but we can easily conceive that there should be a mind that could
conceive it, since, after all, no contradiction can be involved in
mere non-existence. A state in which there should be absolutely no
super-order whatsoever would be such a state of nility. For all Being
involves some kind of super-order. For example, to suppose a thing to
have any particular character is to suppose a conditional proposition
to be true of it, which proposition would express some kind of
superorder, as any formulation of a general fact does. To suppose
[for example for] it to have elasticity of volume is to suppose that
if it were subjected to pressure its volume would diminish until at a
certain point the full pressure was attained within and without its
periphery. This is a super-order, a law expressible by a differential
equation. Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any general
state of things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit.
In that state of absolute nility. . . of which nothing whatever
affirmative or negative was true universally. There must have been,
therefore, a little of everything conceivable. There must have been
here and there a little undifferentiated tendency to take
super-habits. But such a state must tend to increase itself. For a
tendency to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits,
must increase the tendency to act in that way. Now substitute in this
general statement for "tendency to act in any way" a tendency to take
habits, and we see that that tendency would grow. It would also
become differentiated in various ways. . .
CP 6.491 Among the many pertinent considerations which have been
crowded out of this article, I may just mention that it could have
been shown that the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so
isolated a conclusion as it may seem.
Again, in regard to "the hypothesis of God's Reality," consider that
some Mind (not ours) must have been able to conceive niility. This is
quite different from your claim that there was no Mind before the
Universe came into being and that the "three categorical modes. .
.operate as Mind" and further that "Peirce specifically says that the
term Mind is an analogy with the term of 'God'." " Where does he say
this?
You continued:
I disagree with JAS's view that there IS 'a reality outside the
Universe, aka God'. Instead, I see the Universe as a massive semiosic
process, a function of the operation of Mind-as-Matter, increasing in
complexity within the operations of the three categorical modes.
But both Jon and I have been arguing that the idea that there is "a
reality outside the Universe, aka God" is Peirce's. Jon has
repeatedly outlined that argument with which I am mainly in
agreement. His excellent analysis of Peirce's early cosmology,
including the further developments in Peirce's thinking on the matter
(including much that follows from the Blackboard analogy in the 1898
Cambridge House Lectures) is offered in "A Neglected Additament:
Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God"
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187 [1]
Best,
Gary R
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[1] https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187
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