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}JAS, list

        You are missing my point - which is that Peirce stated, explicitly
and frequently, that there is nothing outside of the universe. He's
quite explicit. [6.490, 6.214]. You, on the other hand, reject
Peirce's view on this and instead, focus on the nature of the Sign,
which refers to an Object outside of itself. You then take as an
axiom that 'the Universe is A Sign - and consider that there IS an
'object' outside of the universe-as-a-Sign, , which you term as
'God'. 

        I consider this a misinterpretation of Peirce. First, I consider
that you reject his outline that there is nothing outside of the
Universe. And second, I consider that you reject his outline of the
semiosic Sign, where the Object must itself function as a Sign.
[1.538]. If this Object, in the semiosic process, must ALSO function
as a Sign, then, it is within the Universe.

        The Universe is an ongoing semiosic process and consists of Signs -
which refer to Signs [which are understood as Objects] but all are
within the Universe. As Peirce says - there is NOTHING outside of the
Universe. That means, of course, that there is no 'transcendence' and
no God-reality outside of the Universe.

        I am aware that your theism is deep and personal and I am not
interested in intruding on that - so, we'll simply have to do our
usual which is to 'agree to disagree'.

        Edwina
 On Wed 15/05/19  6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite
clear on that - repeatedly.
 I obviously have a different interpretation of the cited passages
(CP 6.490, CP 6.214).  For one thing, Peirce  explicitly stated that
the Universe is a Sign ("a vast representamen"); but if there is
nothing outside the Universe, then the Universe as a whole cannot be
a Sign, because ...
 ET:  As Peirce notes, "Every sign stands for an object independent
of itself ...  
 Again, the only way to escape the conclusion of my Semeiotic
Argumentation is to disagree with Peirce by rejecting one or both of
the premisses--in this case, by denying that the Universe is a Sign. 
Moreover, Peirce explicitly stated his belief that God is "Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience" and " a Being not
immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole
Creator of every content of them without exception."  These
descriptions directly contradict the claim that there is nothing
outside the Universe, so the latter clearly cannot be a "Peircean
axiom."
  ET:  ... but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that
object is itself of the nature of sign or thought. For the sign does
not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must
be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of a
thought or of a sign" 1.538.
 Indeed--and that is how Peirce characterized God! 
 CSP:  If a pragmaticist is asked what he means by the word "God," he
can only say that just as long acquaintance with a man of great
character may deeply influence one's whole manner of conduct, so that
a glance at his portrait may make a difference, just as almost living
with Dr. Johnson enabled poor Boswell to write an immortal book and a
really sublime book, just as long study of the works of Aristotle may
make him an acquaintance, so if contemplation and study of the
physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct
analogous to the influence of a great man's works or conversation,
then that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that  any
human attribute is literally applicable--is what he means by "God."
Of course, various great theologians explain that one cannot
attribute reason to God, nor perception (which always involves an
element of surprise and of learning what one did not know), and, in
short, that his "mind" is necessarily so unlike ours, that
some--though wrongly--high in the church say that it is only
negatively, as being entirely different from everything else, that we
can attach any meaning to the Name. This is not so; because the
discoveries of science, their enabling us to  predict what will be
the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot
think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought,
as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
 CSP:  But I had better add that I do  not mean by God a being merely
"immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every
content of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical
facts, and the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. 
For the argument that I am to consider; and which, by the way, I will
designate as 'The Neglected Argument,' would not be true of any other
being than God.   But I do not, by 'God,' mean, with some writers, a
being so inscrutable that nothing at all can be known of Him.  I
suppose most of our knowledge of Him must be by similitudes.  Thus,
He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular Existent
(meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to
brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so
opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely
say that He is a Spirit, or Mind. (R 843:26-27; 1908) 
 God is an "analogue of a mind" such that "we can catch a fragment of
His Thought," and "He is so much like a mind ... that we may loosely
say that He is a Spirit, or Mind."  Moreover, in the first passage,
notice the parallels that Peirce drew between different Signs of
persons--a portrait as a Sign of "a man of great character,"
Boswell's "really sublime book" as a Sign of Dr. Johnson, "the works
of Aristotle" as a Sign of their author, and finally "the
physico-psychical universe" as a Sign of God.  In each case, the Sign
 conveys knowledge of the person.  And in the second passage, besides
affirming the transcendence of God as previously quoted, Peirce also
succinctly explained why he argued for the Reality of God, rather
than the existence of God.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 3:31 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[3]> wrote:
        List

        I agree with John Sowa's suggestion - the universe as a sign of
itself. There is NOTHING outside of the universe; Peirce was quite
clear on that - repeatedly. [6.490, 6.214.."The initial condition,
before the universe existed, was not a state of pure abstract being.
On the contrary it was a state of just nothing at all, not even a
state of emptiness, for even emptiness is something" 

         Therefore, for JAS to posit that 'because a sign requires an
external object, and the Universe is a 'Sign', THEN, this external
Object must 'be God' - contradicts the Peircean axiom that there is
nothing outside of the Universe. 

        Furthermore, the Sign, that triad, certainly does require an
external Object, but, why can't that external Object be within the
semiosic Universe, i.e., part of the semiosic process? That is, any
particular triadic Sign A is interactive with another triadic Sign B
-IN the universe. that 'other triadic Sign'B' is an Object to A.
Again - according to Peirce, there is nothing outside of the
Universe. Therefore, I disagree with JAS's view that there IS 'a
reality outside the Universe, aka God'. Instead, I see the Universe
as a massive semiosic process, a function of the operation of
Mind-as-Matter, increasing in complexity within the operations of the
three categorical modes.  

        As Peirce notes, "Every sign stands for an object independent of
itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that
object is itself of the nature of sign or thought. For the sign does
not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must
be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of a
thought or of a sign" 1.538.  My interpretation of this is that the
OBJECT of a SIGN is 'itself a sign or thought . This means - to me -
that it is part of the whole semiosic process. It is not outside; it
is not transcendent. Therefore - I disagree with the view of JAS who
posits a transcendent God as the Object of the semiosic Universe.

        Edwina Taborsky 


Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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