wrote:
Helmut
Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.
I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I.
Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms.
Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'....seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored?
And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.
In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.
Edwina
On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, All,I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved.Helmut21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, listI think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a valid argument.
I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A single Sign. I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity?
I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?
And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.
Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these discussions.
Edwina
On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:John, Jon, ListJohn quoted Jon, then wrote:Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation> is sound.JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable. Peirce wouldnever state or accept any such claim.Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a deductive syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.
- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
- The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence that Peirce claimed this, GR]
- The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself [this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed "necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR].
John wrote:JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writingstaken from different contexts where he was focusing on differenttopics.GR: Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows Peirce's strong suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (and elsewhere) in the context of certain basic semeiotic principles.John wrote:JS: As Peirce himself said, symbols grow. Formal logic is a fossilizedversion of language. That is its greatest strength and its greatestweakness. Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this? And whose thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think further about what Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument." Personally, I am very interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm between religion and science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts tend toward that desideratum.
JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and usingthe most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at theforefront of research in the 21st c. He would not accept anyreasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,valid, and sound -- not even his own.We should all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever ways seems productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in ordinary language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this discursive reasoning ought demonstrate that point. Meanwhile, and again, a deductive syllogism is sound as long as the premises are asserted to be true, and there is nothing "anti-Peircean" about that (just consider the myriad deductive syllogisms Peirce offers in his work).
JS: Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabledhim to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a waythat enabled him to write English more precisely than almostanybody else. I have never read any commentary about anythingPeirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as theoriginal quotations by Peirce.GR: And yet you have written discursively extensively about Peirce's thought, sometimes offering supporting quotes, often not, occasionally offering EGs. I do not see any Peirce scholars "translating each statement by Peirce to an EG," etc., you included.JS: Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are hispreferred system. If you want to make any claim that resemblesthe one at the top of this note, you must translate each statementby Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and applythe EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.GR: That may be your ideal, and even were it Peirce's, again, you yourself do not do that, and it is impossible for anyone to do so on an email list.
JS: If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help. But if yourefuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.GR: I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.Again, you ought to stop this intellectual assault. "Blocking the way of inquiry is the worst possible sin." John Sowa.Best,Gary RGary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York
Virus-free. www.avg.com On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:13 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:On 5/20/2019 4:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
> is sound.
That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable. Peirce would
never state or accept any such claim.
First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
topics. The meanings of words, even for Peirce, shift subtly
from one context to another.
As Peirce himself said, symbols grow. Formal logic is a fossilized
version of language. That is its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness. Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.
Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c. He would not accept any
reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
valid, and sound -- not even his own.
Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
anybody else. I have never read any commentary about anything
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
original quotations by Peirce.
Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
preferred system. If you want to make any claim that resembles
the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.
If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help. But if you
refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.
John
Virus-free. www.avg.com
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
