BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }My comments below On Tue 21/05/19 3:27 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, Helmut, List: 1] ET: Science requires empirical evidence ... JAS: The truth of this statement depends on how we define "empirical." In the popular sense, only the Special Sciences require empirical evidence. According to Peirce, philosophy--including both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence, defined as experiential evidence of the kind that is common to anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics requires empirical evidence, in the sense that it depends upon observation. That is why he classified all of these fields as sciences. EDWINA I refer only to the sciences that require objective empirical evidence. I don't think that a pragmatic life can be lived without such objectivity. 2]ET: Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from other Propositions. In that sense, it reveals what else we must believe in accordance with what we already believe; i.e., it only provides "proof" of other pragmatic realities that are entailed by what we already have ascertained to be pragmatic realities. EDWINA So? Again - without objective evidence, then our logical analyses are irrelevant. 3] ET: My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. JAS: There is no need to shout. Indeed, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or "semeiosis" for the process, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each constituent of the process. On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign that is also a continuous "inferential process," which we describe using definite Propositions as if they were the constituent Signs of that process. That is why I reject the charge of "reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or any other Argument) is a Sign says nothing whatsoever about its complexity, except that is more complex than a Proposition, which in turn is more complex than a Seme. EDWINA I'm not shouting but emphasizing. My computer doesn't do italics or underlining very well - it somehow forgets how to shut itself off from such methods. My focus is on the action [ACTION] of the Repesentamen - and I think that we forget it is is an action. 4] ET: As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. JAS: Absolutely not; this treats the one triadic relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of three dyadic relations. If anything merits the label of "reductionism," this is it. A Sign can be classified in accordance with its own nature (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its relation to its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its relation to its Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or Seme/Pheme/Delome); these result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903 taxonomy. However, a Sign does not consist of these three relations; I consider such a notion to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar. EDWINA And I disagree. The triad is not reducible to dyads. I don't say that the Representamen CONSISTS of these three relations. I say that the Representamen, as a mediative process, engages in these three relations. See 8.335, where Peirce discusses 'In respect to their relations to their Dynamic Objects, …. 5] ET: Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one' ... JAS: So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in continuing to use it anyway. That seems rather hypocritical for someone who routinely accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even though I have conscientiously avoided using that word myself. If I claimed to be unable to come up with any other term to describe your views, would that be justification for me to start using it now? Of course not. EDWINA There is no comparison between accusing someone of outlining a semiosis that has nothing to do with Peirce [aka unPeircean whether or not you use the term] - and my opinion that your outline of Peirce is a reductionist one. I can't describe your reduction of 'plethora of signs' to 'one sign' in any other way than 'reductionist'. 6] ET: In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. JAS: There is nothing "backwards" about reasoning from true premisses to a necessary conclusion; that is the nature of deductive argumentations in general, and syllogisms in particular. In this summary, you conveniently left out the minor premiss, that the entire Universe is a Sign. Denying that premiss warrants denying the conclusion; but given that additional premiss, if every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, then it necessarily follows that the Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. EDWINA: I'm talking about backwards reasoning as moving from a CONCLUSION to premises. Your conclusion is that there IS a God - and your backwards reasoning is that I] the Universe is a sign; and ii] all signs must refer to external objects; and so therefore...your conclusion is valid. But - your conclusion, in my view, came first.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:16 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: Helmut
Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms. Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'....seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored? And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law. In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. Edwina On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [4] sent: Edwina, All, I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved. Helmut Links: ------ [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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