Edwina, List, Just a word for now since, as I just wrote to Jon, I've run out of time before I set off for my trip abroad. You wrote:
ET: I don't think that the term 'patriarchy' merits the 'we are now superior to this idea' sneers and condescension one sometimes associates with the term. I think one should look at the system-of-patriarchy as a rational means of organizing a population of a particular size and a particular economic mode. I don't think the issue here is the origins of patriarchy, which I think you've nicely outlined in the remainder of your post. Rather, the concern is what patriarchy has wrought in our times. I obviously can't get into this now, but will offer for now this quote from a widely cited article on the topic. https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/america-is-still-a-patriarchy/265428/ In fact—my interpretation of the facts—the United States, like every society in the world, remains a patriarchy: they are ruled by men. That is not just because every country <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm> (except Rwanda) has a majority-male national parliament, and it is despite the handful of countries <http://iwl.rutgers.edu/documents/njwomencount/womenHeadsofStates.pdf> with women heads of state. It is a systemic characteristic that combines dynamics at the level of the family, the economy, the culture and the political arena. Top political <http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/elective.pdf> and economic <http://www.catalyst.org/publication/433/women-on-boards> leaders are the low-hanging fruit of patriarchy statistics. But they probably are in the end the most important—the telling pattern is that the higher you look, the maler it gets. If a society really had a stable, female-dominated power structure for an extended period of time even I would eventually question whether it was really still a patriarchy. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 7:16 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, Gene, Mary, list > > I don't think that the term 'patriarchy' merits the 'we are now superior > to this idea' sneers and condescension one sometimes associates with the > term. I think one should look at the system-of-patriarchy as a rational > means of organizing a population of a particular size and a particular > economic mode. > > That is - hunting and gathering economies are SMALL - around 30 people in > a band. Their economic mode is just that: hunting 'what is there' and > gathering 'what is there'. These people do not own the land or its goods. > When they've 'eaten their way out of a terrain', they must migrate. The > metaphysical or religious ideology is animism - with multiple spirits and > multiple gods. And, neither patriarch or matriarchy - because, again, this > economic mode is not based on land or goods ownership or production. And it > can only support SMALL populations. > > Horticulture and pastoral nomadism - emerges in biomes where the land > enables SOME agriculture and SOME small scale ownership of animals. The > populations remain small but are larger than the H&G - possibly in the > hundreds and thousands. Patriarchy is found among pastoral nomadism. Why? > Because the economy is based around the work-of-the-men. > > And that's the key. Any society must socially and politically privilege > whichever gender or group provides the economic infrastructure of the > group. So- a pastoral nomadic economy, which requires the men to herd and > control the animals - will be patriarchal. It will also be patrilineal - > for the, eg, cattle, must be passed on to the next generation 'as a whole', > not split up into one cow here and one cow there. So, the eldest son will > inherit the whole herd. > > Religious? Multiple gods. Polytheism. > > The next larger societal mode will be settled agriculture - an > economic mode that requires inherited and stable land bases, ownership of > domesticated animals, and a lot of hard physical labour. So again, quite > naturally, it will be patriarchal and patrilineal. Nothing mean or > subversive about it - but a logical, rational social decision. And - with > this economic mode, you get the capacity to support large populations in > the hundreds of thousands. AND - you then get monotheism...one supreme god. > > Edwina > > > > On Thu 30/05/19 6:50 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Gene, Mary, List, > > Gene quoted me: > > Gary R: “one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ (the > Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the Father > through God the Son.” > > GR: I imagine that there are at least some Christians--especially those > who think along the Trinitarian lines I've outlined--who might say and > believe something like this. In addition, in many progressive communities > and churches such as mine, Riverside Church in Manhattan, one is not at all > unlikely to hear words like "Mother-Father God" coming from the pulpit > (btw, the Senior Minister is a woman, Amy Butler), and to hear prayers > where 'Creator' substitutes for 'Father', etc. The patriarchy is seen to be > the problematic 'thing' which it is. > > GH: Peirce’s first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay, saw through father-son > patriarchalism, and grasped how it abstracted the mother, the third part of > a family trinity, to ethereal spirit. And “ Mary as the Mother of God” > and “the Holy Family” remain alienating veils, as Ludwig Feuerbach pointed > out, masking through abstraction the earthly family. > > GR: Fay was perhaps more than anything else a feminist in her public life. > I don't know whether she "saw through" anything, while a growing sense of > patriarchy was dawning on especially English and American women in her day. > > More to the substantive point, there is a tendency in all religions that > I know of to employ symbols pointing to the noumenal, to the Holy, to God. > But it's important not to confuse the finger pointing to the moon with that > which it only indicates. And while fundamentalism involves just that > confusion and conflation, not all religious people are so confused. This is > especially important, I think, as one because more critically aware of such > problematics as our patriarchal history. Meanwhile, folk like me have not > found it necessary to throw the baby (God) out with the bathwater (what > needs to be radically rethought and reconstructed in religion). > > There's not much in history (both East and West with few exceptions) which > is not to some considerable extent patriarchal, for example, nearly all > institutions, including most religious ones as well as religion more > generally speaking (with such exceptions as certain--but not all--primal > indigenous religions). Some of us who are, for example, members of one of > the monotheistic religions are today dealing with this history as best we > can. Religious symbolism is--as all symbolism is and must be-- interpreted, > and that interpretation can grow, deepen; or, contrariwise and even > perversely, it can rigidify, for example, to aim at excluding those who > don't conform to its dogmas. > > GH: And apart from obvious patriarchalism, there is also the obvious > anthropocentrism. The human family as religious model, though perhaps a > good starter for relational thinking for the anthropocentric humans > predominant today, is simply too confined, too human-all-too-human, to > provide a basis for a sustainable religion. > > As you've suggested, anthropocentrism--and perhaps especially the > relations within the human family--quasi-necessarily plays an important > role in the creation and development of religions East and West. Peirce > suggested that it was natural and necessary that we conceive of God as at > least in some ways like a person, although even that conception is, of > course, itself symbolic--as so much of religion is. Yet, as Peirce argued, > "symbols grow," and, as Gary Fuhrman put it in a recent blog post titled > "Do Symbols Grow?" > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2019/05/do-symbols-grow/ "as new meanings for a > symbol develop, old ones fall away and die." And we can establish our > social 'would-bes' in the direction of the worst meanings falling away and > dying while the best are nurtured and grow. > > GH: The idea that “Man is made in God’s Image” is a conceit of human > exceptionalism, a product of the historical development of the > anthropocentric mentality. If you grant a creator, all living beings are > made in the creator’s image, except for that human subset of > anthropocentric humans, who are made from their own idolatry. Nietzsche > asked, “Which is it: is man one of God’s blunders, or is God one of man’s > blunders?” ( Twilight of the Idols, 1889). Sadly, both may be true. > > > Feuerbach, who not only influenced the problematic Nietzsche, who, in my > opinion, one ought to have outgrown by the time one leaves ones > intellectual adolescence when nihilist intellectual brilliance had been so > seductive. Yes, Feuerbach influenced not only Nietzsche but also that > arch-antiSemite. Wagner (read his thoroughly disgusting essay "The Jew in > Music" if you have any doubt of that), Hitler's favorite composer. And > Nietzsche appears to have been the Nazis' favorite philosopher. Übermensch > indeed! > > So, we have lost our innocence if we ever had it. Were those > 'hunter-gatherers' you so admire, Gene, really so pure of heart? Whether > the answer is yes or no, we will most certainly never be hunter-gatherers > again. All we can hope to do is to try to correct some of the errors which > led to our blood-stained history. Oh, sure, one can point to the > Inquisition and the bloody crusades, but Mao, Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot, > etc., etc. tortured and murdered millions--and not in the name of God. > And the misuse of religion by politicians, for example, is patent, perhaps > most especially in the USA. > > In the Christian church which I attend, Riverside Church > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riverside_Church > we interpret the Gospel as strongly suggesting that we ought act together > towards achieving social justice in our communities and beyond. Riverside > is an inter-faith, inter-racial, LGBTQ welcoming place where one might hear > a sermon by a Rabbi one Sunday, an Imam another, a gay or transgender > Christian minister another, etc. Here are some of our social justice > ministries and initiatives: > > *Maranatha ministry: fostering greater understanding of the LGBTQ > community. I am on a committee which awards three scholarships to LGBTQ > college students actively working within their educational institutions to > this end. > *Prison Ministry: supporting incarcerated men and women to obtain justice > and services within the New York State prison system. > *Coming Home: empowering those men and women who have been imprisoned and > need support and opportunities to reenter their communities. > *Beloved Earth: helping the community to become good stewards of the Earth > (we plant trees and do much more). > *Sojourners: works with immigrants in detention centers > > And there are other social-justice initiatives including a nationwide > anti-gun violence program. > > As for the Holy Spirit, as a Person of the Trinity, She more than anything > else represents a personification of the Love between the other two Persons > of the Trinity involving the idea of the possibility of our living this > love in our human relations as we come more and more to consecrate our > lives to truly valuing the lives around us, and the Earth which is surely > our Mother. The patriarchal grip can be broken in religion, but not by > disparaging it out of hand. And, further, it is possible to have, as it > seems to me that Peirce did, a conception of science which is neither naive > nor at odds with science. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > [image: Blocked image] > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Virus-free. > www.avg.com > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > <#m_2263757470306986122_m_2171887739816374760_m_2705391265061657376_m_-3462966683689809655_m_-4989017599109446781_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 5:15 PM Eugene Halton <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> > wrote: > >> Gary R: “one might argue that God (Abba) is transcendent while Christ >> (the Word) is immanent, and as Christians say, we come to know God the >> Father through God the Son.” >> >> Peirce’s first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay, saw through >> father-son patriarchalism, and grasped how it abstracted the mother, the >> third part of a family trinity, to ethereal spirit. And “Mary as the >> Mother of God” and “the Holy Family” remain alienating veils, as Ludwig >> Feuerbach pointed out, masking through abstraction the earthly family. >> >> And apart from obvious patriarchalism, there is also the obvious >> anthropocentrism. The human family as religious model, though perhaps a >> good starter for relational thinking for the anthropocentric humans >> predominant today, is simply too confined, too human-all-too-human, to >> provide a basis for a sustainable religion. >> >> The idea that “Man is made in God’s Image” is a conceit of human >> exceptionalism, a product of the historical development of the >> anthropocentric mentality. If you grant a creator, all living beings are >> made in the creator’s image, except for that human subset of >> anthropocentric humans, who are made from their own idolatry. Nietzsche >> asked, “Which is it: is man one of God’s blunders, or is God one of man’s >> blunders?” (Twilight of the Idols, 1889). Sadly, both may be true. >> >> Gene Halton >> >> On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 3:55 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> In an earlier message in this thread I suggested that in order to avoid >>> confusion, when speaking of trinity without explicit religious >>> underpinnings that we type the 't' lowercase, but that we capitalize it >>> when referring to the Trinity of theology. In my message below, Trinity >>> is almost always capitalized since it means to relate to Peirce's religious >>> metaphysics in conjunction with his cosmological views, not entirely >>> separate as I see it. In any case, those who are adverse to theology might >>> consider skipping reading this post. >>> >>> I'm going to be traveling abroad with perhaps limited Internet access >>> beginning this weekend through the 12th of June, but before I left, I did >>> want to ask a question that came to mind again regarding Peirce's religious >>> metaphysics (his cosmological theology, if I may so phrase it). I hinted at >>> it earlier, but now would like to deepen the question. >>> >>> It seems to me that, on the one hand, Peirce suggested, and you have >>> argued in your Signs paper, Jon (as suggested by the Blackboard metaphor in >>> the last of the 1898 lectures) that 'before' this Universe came into being, >>> 'before' there was anything Existent (so 'before' Time, 'before' the >>> so-called Big Bang), that God, from all the Platonic possibilities, >>> that is, from all imaginable and unimaginable essential Platonic forms >>> which might possibly be involved in the creation of some Universe (the >>> Blackboard metaphor, if I finally have it right), that on a kind of subset >>> of that Blackboard of ur-continuity--so upon a kind of Whiteboard--He >>> scribed those potential qualities and characters which would factor in >>> the creation of this Universe. (Btw, as I understand Peirce, this is not >>> the only possible universe the Scriber might create, and Peirce hints at a >>> kind of multiverse theory, one which seems to me quite different from most >>> modern versions of such theories.) >>> >>> However, you also quoted Peirce to the effect that God is >>> creating this Universe continuously, that the world was not created on >>> some particularly busy day several thousands of years ago, as Genesis (and, >>> mutatis mutandis, the Whiteboard metaphor) would have it, but is happening >>> now and will be happening until the World's end. >>> >>> It seems to me that in consideration of the ur-Continuity of the >>> Blackboard from which God selected those Platonic characters ('Platonic' is >>> Peirce's word in this context) which would be inscribed on 'our' >>> Whiteboard, that that Person is, if I understand you correctly, the >>> semeiotic Object of this Universe, the Creator of the vast evolving Symbol >>> which is this Cosmos, our Universe. >>> >>> But, in consideration of the continuous creation occurring now, it >>> seems to me that if God the Father is not immanent in this Universe then >>> that continuous creation must be the ongoing work of He who is God with >>> the Father but who is not the Father, that is, Christ. And this is one >>> of the reasons that I introduced this thread on trinity (there are, of >>> course, others). >>> >>> [Note: I have already pointed to some thinkers having a trinitarian view >>> of the cosmos which is not specifically Christian or even, for that matter, >>> necessarily religious (although, personally, I don't see how a trinitarian >>> view of the cosmos wouldn't lead to a Trinitarian and, so, religious one, >>> while the religion need not be Christianity according to some advocates of >>> trinitarian thinking).] >>> >>> For now this problematic of both an ur-creation leading to the putative >>> 'Big Bang' and an ongoing continuous creation is resolved in my mind in >>> imagining that while the First Person of the Trinity (God the Father) is >>> not immanent in the Universe, is not Himself actively and continuously >>> creating it, that the Second Person is (whom some, notably Matthew Fox >>> and Richard Rohr, have referred to as the Cosmic Christ), and that this is >>> the consequence of the communication between the First and Second Persons >>> via the Third, viz., the Holy Spirit. I understand this to be expression of >>> the (evolutionary) Love of all three Persons of the Trinity for God's >>> creation and for humankind, Man having been made in His image. >>> >>> It seems to me that Peirce analyses this trichotomically (i.e., >>> tri-categorially) and semiotically. However, I'm now suggesting that >>> his pure categorial analysis speaks to the ur-creation (where there are 'as >>> yet' no signs as such) while the semeiotic analysis concerns itself >>> specifically with the on-going creation. In this regard, it also comes to >>> mind, perhaps not completely irrelevantly, that in Peirce's Classification >>> of Sciences that Phenomenology (yielding the three Universal Categories) >>> precedes Logic as Semeiotic, and that Pure Mathematics precedes them both. >>> >>> Now you've already noted that this way of thinking--that is, imagining >>> God, as the Second Person of the Trinity, that is Christ, immanent in and >>> continuing God, as the First Person, the Father's creation, and in >>> communion with Him through the Holy Spirit--is something you really haven't >>> (or, really, even want to) entertain given your conservative Christian >>> views. But I do not see how God can be both completely 'apart' from His >>> Creation and yet also 'continuously creating' it. So, again, for me seeing >>> God as Three-in-One and distinguishing the 'roles' (so to speak) of the >>> three Persons provides something of an answer to the question I've posed. >>> >>> I was introduced to the notion of the Cosmic Christ decades ago while >>> reading Meister Eckhart's writings and sermons which led me to Fox's work, >>> especially, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ. I 'rediscovered' the >>> concept and had it reinforced in the past few years through Rohr's ongoing >>> work. I hope it's clear that I see it as an uniquely powerful idea, >>> especially within the context of Peirce cosmological musings. Peirce, as I >>> understand him, was not a conservative Christian. It seems to me, then, >>> that his positing Three Universal Categories and Three Universes of >>> Experience might have made the idea of God the Creator of this Universe >>> offering to it His Son, the Cosmic Christ at work today, plausible to him. >>> It also helps reconcile, at least for me, his proto-cosmic thinking in the >>> 1898 Cambridge House lectures with the several semeiotic analyses you've >>> been considering and from which you've been extensively quoting, and helps >>> answer the question of how God can be both apart from His creation and yet >>> continually creating it. >>> >>> Of course, Peirce was generally opposed to theology (although not to >>> religious metaphysics, the distinction not yet clear to me); and, indeed, >>> religious experience doesn't require theology. >>> >>> As I noted in an early post in this thread, despite what I just wrote as >>> a Christian, I do not myself see the trinity idea as limited to Christian >>> theology and, in fact, imagine that it might prove valuable in helping >>> bridge the divide between religion and science, Peirce's desideratum. I >>> hope to take up that more general view of trinity in future posts. >>> >>> For now I'd be interested in what thoughts you might have on this view >>> of the Trinity. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> >>> Gary Richmond >>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>> Communication Studies >>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 1:36 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary F., List: >>>> >>>> Your previous message came through to me as plain text, rather than >>>> HTML; and my reply went out as HTML, rather than plain text; so I guess >>>> that we will just have to chalk up those formatting issues to >>>> cyber-gremlins. :-) >>>> >>>> GF: Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed >>>> by a sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign >>>> because the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign >>>> to “tell about it.” >>>> >>>> >>>> Thank you for clarifying this. Rather than knowledge vs. acquaintance, >>>> I associate it with (1) the Interpretant that a Sign signifies and (2) >>>> the Object that a Sign denotes. In a Proposition, these are >>>> represented by (1) the continuous predicate, expressing the relation among >>>> the subjects, which is all that the Proposition itself conveys; and >>>> (2) the subjects themselves, which require previous Collateral >>>> Experience or current Collateral Observation in order to be understood by >>>> an interpreter. What remains unclear to me is why you seem to think that >>>> such Collateral Experience/Observation cannot be entirely mediated by other >>>> Signs. If even a Percept is a Seme (Sign) that Retroductively produces >>>> a Perceptual Judgment, which is a Proposition (Sign), how can we gain >>>> acquaintance with anything in a way that is not entirely mediated by >>>> Signs? >>>> >>>> GF: ... knowledge is the goal of the positive sciences which practice >>>> inductive hypothesis-testing, while belief is defined pragmatically as >>>> a cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. >>>> >>>> >>>> I do not agree with this restriction of knowledge, nor its sharp >>>> differentiation from belief; after all, its standard modern philosophical >>>> definition is justified true belief. For Peirce, a true belief is one >>>> that would be maintained in the Ultimate Opinion, as a result of >>>> infinite inquiry by an infinite community; and a justified belief is >>>> one that is affirmed because it is the conclusion of a valid >>>> Argument--whether Deductive (certain), Inductive (probable), or >>>> Retroductive (plausible)--whose premisses one already believes. Put >>>> another way, a belief is justified as long as one has no good reason for >>>> genuinely doubting it. From this standpoint, knowledge consists of >>>> deliberately >>>> adopted Propositions whose corresponding habits of conduct would never >>>> be confounded by any future experience. >>>> >>>> GF: So I can say that I believe these things, meaning that I accept >>>> Bahá'í teachings generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. But I >>>> do not claim to know these things ... >>>> >>>> >>>> I assume that this is not because you do not believe those teachings >>>> to be true, but because you do not believe that you are adequately >>>> justified in believing them, since you apparently insist on "inductive >>>> hypothesis-testing" for that. As you seem to acknowledge, Peirce did not >>>> impose such a limitation; again, for him, it was sufficient that the >>>> Reality of God (for example) is the conclusion of a valid Retroductive >>>> Argument. >>>> >>>> GF: I’m sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” person is >>>> not an individual in the strict logical sense. >>>> >>>> >>>> Indeed, every "individual" person is a real general; so even if God is >>>> an "individual" person, He is still a real general. Moreover, we can >>>> have no knowledge of any "individual in the strict logical sense," >>>> because that would require it to be completely determinate ; even less >>>> so for God, since (ex hypothesi) He is "infinitely incomprehensible" >>>> (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; 1908). In fact, this limitation serves as a basis for >>>> Peirce's "extreme scholastic realism"--all Objects of knowledge are >>>> general, and some Objects of knowledge are real; therefore, some generals >>>> are real. >>>> >>>> CSP: The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or >>>> thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any >>>> time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time >>>> it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for >>>> any time, however short, does not exist at all. All, therefore, that we >>>> perceive or think, or that exists, is general. So far there is truth in the >>>> doctrine of scholastic realism. But all that exists is infinitely >>>> determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual. >>>> This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That >>>> which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be >>>> made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is >>>> never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP >>>> 3.93n; 1870) >>>> >>>> >>>> That which exists would be infinitely determinate at any hypothetical >>>> instant >>>> in time, but it is really undergoing continuous change in its >>>> relations, such that every true conception of it--i.e., every Sign for >>>> which it serves as the Dynamic Object, including all our knowledge of >>>> it--is always capable of further determination; even more so for God, >>>> since (ex hypothesi) He is real but does not exist. >>>> >>>> GF: You are also familiar with the difference between common nouns, >>>> which are names of generals, and proper nouns or names, which >>>> designate individuals such as persons. >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, they are grammatically different--but are they logically different? >>>> Both are represented in EGs by labeled Spots, and therefore correspond to >>>> general >>>> concepts; while indefinite individuals are represented by continuous Lines, >>>> each of which has an inexhaustible supply of potential branches to >>>> accommodate further determination. "Every Dicisign, as the system of >>>> Existential Graphs fully recognizes, is a further determination of an >>>> already known sign of the same object" (CP 2.320; 1903). >>>> >>>> GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had >>>> collateral experience of such names designating individuals who have >>>> written books, and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my >>>> experience of reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of >>>> that name in the reasonable expectation that I could find indices of >>>> something he had written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a >>>> text by means of which I also had collateral experience. >>>> >>>> >>>> Okay, but what was the nature of that previous Collateral Experience? >>>> Again, was it somehow not entirely mediated by other Signs? Consider >>>> a more remote example--Socrates apparently did not write anything >>>> himself, so everything that we know about him and his philosophy comes >>>> from the testimony of others. How can we nevertheless have >>>> acquaintance (in your technical sense) with Socrates? Again, why would God >>>> be any different? >>>> >>>> GF: I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s handwriting; nor do I >>>> recognize the content of the Bible as written by anyone other than human >>>> beings. >>>> >>>> >>>> Even if we set aside the theological doctrine of special revelation, I >>>> (and many others) do "claim to recognize God's handwriting" all over >>>> "the physico-psychical universe." I am disappointed that you did not >>>> specifically address my comments (and Peirce's) about direct perception >>>> of God and personal communication with Him as candidates for the kind >>>> of Collateral Experience/Observation that would straightforwardly enable >>>> Him to be an Object of Propositions, and therefore an Object of knowledge. >>>> Here >>>> are a few other relevant passages. >>>> >>>> CSP: We have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential >>>> reaction, whether of Perception or of Exertion (the one theoretical, >>>> the other practical). These are directly hic et nunc. But we extend >>>> the category, and speak of numberless real objects with which we are not in >>>> direct reaction. We have also direct knowledge of qualities in feeling, >>>> peripheral and visceral. But we extend this category to numberless >>>> characters of which we have no immediate consciousness. (EP 2:304; 1904) >>>> >>>> >>>> Direct perception results in direct knowledge, and we can even "extend >>>> the category" to include "real objects with which we are not in direct >>>> reaction" and "characters of which we have no immediate consciousness." >>>> >>>> CSP: There is in the dictionary a word, solipsism, meaning the belief >>>> that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt such a >>>> belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when a person >>>> finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of their >>>> existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that >>>> they are all hypostatically the same ego. In like manner, when a man >>>> has that experience with which religion sets out, he has as good >>>> reason--putting aside metaphysical subtilties--to believe in the living >>>> personality of God as he has to believe in his own. Indeed, belief is >>>> a word inappropriate to such direct perception. (CP 6.436; 1893) >>>> >>>> >>>> If our social encounters with other people warrant our believing in >>>> their existence--even warrant our being quite sure of it--then direct >>>> perception of God warrants believing in His Reality. In fact, according to >>>> the last sentence, we need to substitute a different word for >>>> belief—knowledge, >>>> based on the previous excerpt? Or acquaintance, perhaps? >>>> >>>> CSP: [We] can know nothing except what we directly experience. So all >>>> that we can anyway know relates to experience. All the creations of our >>>> mind are but patchworks from experience. So that all our ideas are but >>>> ideas of real or transposed experiences. A word can mean nothing except the >>>> idea it calls up. So that we cannot even talk about anything but a >>>> knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk >>>> can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a >>>> non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy ... Where >>>> would such an idea, say as that of God, come from, if not from direct >>>> experience? Would you make it a result of some kind of reasoning, good or >>>> bad? Why, reasoning can supply the mind with nothing in the world except an >>>> estimate of the value of a statistical ratio, that is, how often certain >>>> kinds of things are found in certain combinations in the ordinary course of >>>> experience ... No: as to God, open your eyes--and your heart, which is also >>>> a perceptive organ--and you see him. (CP 6.492-493; c. 1896) >>>> >>>> >>>> Here Peirce required direct experience for all knowledge, perhaps >>>> foreshadowing his famous statement, "The elements of every concept enter >>>> into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the >>>> gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both >>>> those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP >>>> 2:241; 1903). He also denied that there is anything "absolutely >>>> unknowable," which seems to me to be another way of saying that whatever is >>>> real is knowable. He then suggested the mere idea of God as something >>>> that we could only obtain from such experience, since (inductive) >>>> reasoning can only "estimate the value of a statistical ratio." Finally, >>>> similar to what I quoted last time, he asserted that anyone is capable >>>> of directly perceiving God upon opening one's eyes and heart. Apparently >>>> you disagree with him (and me) about all of this, so we may just have to >>>> leave it at that. >>>> >>>> GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious >>>> discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on experiential >>>> evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can afford us >>>> neither acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the >>>> Creator is really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple >>>> reason that no such hypothesis is testable by observation. >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks for re-posting the quote from Peirce with your bold added. >>>> Again, I do not think that he was as strict as you seem to be about what >>>> counts as "experimental logic," "experiential evidence," and "testable by >>>> observation." After all, he explicitly considered his (Retroductive) >>>> Neglected Argument for the Reality of God to be "the First Stage of a >>>> scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest >>>> Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the >>>> self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life" (CP 6.480, EP 2:446; >>>> 1908). >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 9:20 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, list, >>>>> >>>>> My previous message, like all of my posts, was formatted in HTML, so I >>>>> think the formatting must have been lost at your end, Jon. I notice that >>>>> your latest message also seems to be in plain text. You should check the >>>>> settings of whatever software you use for email to make sure it properly >>>>> displays HTML-formatted messages instead of converting them to plain text. >>>>> >>>>> The Peircean distinction I have referred to in this thread is a >>>>> conceptual one, not merely a verbal one, and Peirce expresses it in >>>>> various >>>>> ways. Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed >>>>> by >>>>> a sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign because >>>>> the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign to >>>>> “tell >>>>> about it.” I’m sure you are familiar with the distinction, as you have >>>>> mentioned it yourself in previous posts to the list. In my statement of >>>>> the >>>>> distinction I used the word “acquaintance” for (2) because that is the >>>>> term >>>>> for it most often used by Peirce, and I chose “knowledge” for (1) because >>>>> your claim is that knowledge of God is conveyed by the Universe as >>>>> Sign. The fact that Peirce sometimes uses the more technical term >>>>> “information” for (1), and sometimes used “acquaintance” in reference to a >>>>> kind of knowledge, has no bearing on the validity of the distinction. You >>>>> can find most (but not all) of the texts where Peirce makes the >>>>> distinction >>>>> by searching for the word “collateral”, but I see no need to copy them all >>>>> here. >>>>> >>>>> JAS: If "God" is indeed "the definable proper name," then might it >>>>> not also be the exception to the rule that acquaintance with the >>>>> Object of a Sign requires Collateral Experience/Observation? >>>>> >>>>> GF: Quite possibly; and that would explain why “knowledge of God” is >>>>> indeed exceptional, and not at all like our knowledge of Peirce or any >>>>> person who has existed. But that would not be what I call positive >>>>> knowledge, in the usual Peircean sense of “positive,” the sense in which >>>>> mathematics is not a positive science but logic and semiotics are >>>>> positive sciences. As I mentioned earlier, I distinguish between >>>>> knowing and believing, not on the basis of one being more “certain” >>>>> than the other, but in the sense that knowledge is the goal of the >>>>> positive sciences which practice inductive hypothesis-testing, while >>>>> belief is defined pragmatically as a cognitive habit which guides >>>>> actual conduct. The essential difference between science and religion, as >>>>> I >>>>> use those words, is that science aims at theoretical knowledge in the >>>>> sense I’m using here, while religion aims at guiding the practical conduct >>>>> of its believers. Looking at them this way, religion and science are >>>>> not opposed but complementary. Scientists have a core belief that the >>>>> universe is intelligible, which guides their practice of science; >>>>> religious >>>>> believers cannot actually conduct themselves in the real world or live up >>>>> to their religious ideals without applying some factual knowledge >>>>> which is not given by revelation. As Einstein put it, religion without >>>>> science is blind, and science without religion is lame. >>>>> >>>>> JAS: I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces [in the >>>>> observable Universe]; I see His "fingerprints" all over the Universe, and >>>>> I >>>>> also consider certain writings to be revelations from God Himself. >>>>> Perhaps >>>>> this is where faith comes into play, another theological rather than >>>>> philosophical issue. >>>>> >>>>> GF: As I explained a few messages back, God being the Creator of the >>>>> whole Universe means that it’s not honest to claim some aspects of >>>>> the Universe (and not others) as reflecting the attributes of God. To >>>>> believe that God is benign is indeed a matter of faith. The religion >>>>> I subscribe to, which we call “the Bahá'í Faith”, likewise sees all >>>>> created >>>>> things as signs of a benign God, and considers certain scriptures to be >>>>> specially “revealed” by God through individuals singled out to serve that >>>>> purpose. So I can say that I believe these things, meaning that I >>>>> accept Bahá'í teachings generally as guiding principles for my own >>>>> conduct. >>>>> But I do not claim to know these things — except in a Bahá'í context, >>>>> where the verb “know” often means “have faith in”. (I have occasionally >>>>> seen scriptures that use the word “Know” in the imperative, which would be >>>>> nonsense in a non-religious context, because you can’t order someone >>>>> (or will yourself) to have factual knowledge.) In every other >>>>> context, including the Peirce list, I use the words “know” and “knowledge” >>>>> only in reference to factual and fallible cognition. It is in this sense >>>>> that I pronounce the Creator to be unknowable. By the way, I can also >>>>> affirm the unknowability of God in a Bahá'í context, but not in the same >>>>> sense, because Bahá'í belief is that He is unknowable “in His Essence”, >>>>> which leaves a loophole for revelation. But I promised not to say anything >>>>> about theology, and I hope this will suffice to illustrate my rather >>>>> strict >>>>> distinction between belief and knowledge — a distinction emphasized >>>>> more by me than by Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such >>>>> as real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens >>>>> of Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the >>>>> Creator is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a >>>>> proper name, and not a general. >>>>> >>>>> JAS: On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists >>>>> is individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are >>>>> essentially the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person is >>>>> only a particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892). Accordingly, if >>>>> God is a real person Who does not exist, then He is not an individual, >>>>> but a real general. >>>>> >>>>> GF: Here you are equivocating on the use of the term individual. I’m >>>>> sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” person is not an >>>>> individual in the strict logical sense. You are also familiar with the >>>>> difference between common nouns, which are names of generals, and proper >>>>> nouns or names, which designate individuals such as persons. Since >>>>> “God” is, as Peirce says, a proper name, God is an individual person — >>>>> unless, as per your suggestion above, “God” is an exception to the >>>>> usual grammatical rule. Normally a proper name refers to an Individual, as >>>>> Peirce affirms in this passage that you yourself quoted: >>>>> >>>>> CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is >>>>> existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent individual >>>>> knowledge of the individual it names. It is then, and then only, a >>>>> genuine Index. The next time one meets with it, one regards it as an Icon >>>>> of that Index. The habitual acquaintance with it having been acquired, it >>>>> becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant represents it as an Icon of an Index >>>>> of >>>>> the Individual named. (CP 2.329; 1903) >>>>> >>>>> JAS: What was the "percept or other equivalent individual knowledge" >>>>> that was "existentially connected" with Peirce's name in that initial >>>>> encounter? >>>>> >>>>> GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had >>>>> collateral experience of such names designating individuals who have >>>>> written books, and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my >>>>> experience of reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of >>>>> that name in the reasonable expectation that I could find indices of >>>>> something he had written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a >>>>> text by means of which I also had collateral experience. Need I go on? or >>>>> point out that none of this collateral experience applies to the proper >>>>> name “God”? Having seen images of many of his manuscripts, I can honestly >>>>> say that I recognize Peirce’s handwriting. I cannot honestly claim to >>>>> recognize God’s handwriting; nor do I recognize the content of the Bible >>>>> as >>>>> written by anyone other than human beings. Authors can bear witness to the >>>>> feeling of being inspired, I can even say that myself, but I have no >>>>> experience of other authors being inspired, only of the testimony >>>>> that they choose to express in that form. >>>>> >>>>> Here again is the passage of which I highlighted parts in bold which >>>>> did not come through to your screen. I hope you can see it this time. >>>>> >>>>> [CSP:[ As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if >>>>> that principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be accepted, the >>>>> equivocal language will soon disappear. For realis and realitas are >>>>> not ancient words. They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the >>>>> thirteenth century, and the meaning they were intended to express is >>>>> perfectly clear. That is real which has such and such characters, >>>>> whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, >>>>> that is the sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word . Now, just >>>>> as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits >>>>> of conduct, the nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable >>>>> habits and not quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental >>>>> circumstances, and in that sense may be said to be destined; so, >>>>> thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, tends to the >>>>> fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will >>>>> be >>>>> the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole >>>>> generations >>>>> may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, >>>>> as every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter >>>>> the truth of which he seriously discusses, then, according to the >>>>> adopted definition of “real,” the state of things which will be believed >>>>> in >>>>> that ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will >>>>> be general. Consequently, some general objects are real. (Of course, >>>>> nobody ever thought that all generals were real; but the scholastics >>>>> used to assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite >>>>> no, experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay >>>>> just there , and not in holding that generals could be real.) One is >>>>> struck with the inexactitude of thought even of analysts of power, when >>>>> they touch upon modes of being. One will meet, for example, the virtual >>>>> assumption that what is relative to thought cannot be real. But why not, >>>>> exactly? Red is relative to sight, but the fact that this or that is >>>>> in that relation to vision that we call being red is not itself >>>>> relative to sight; it is a real fact. ] CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343 ] >>>>> >>>>> GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious >>>>> discussion” must employ an experimental logic which relies on experiential >>>>> evidence. Now, the psychophysical Universe as Sign can afford us >>>>> neither acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the >>>>> Creator is really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple >>>>> reason that no such hypothesis is testable by observation. >>>>> >>>>> Gary f. >>>>> >>>> > [image: Blocked image] > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > Virus-free. > www.avg.com > <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> > <#m_2263757470306986122_m_2171887739816374760_m_2705391265061657376_m_-3462966683689809655_m_-4989017599109446781_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> > > >
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