Edwina, List: ET: Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he did NOT say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as primordial; and the physical as derived.
On the contrary, he plainly stated that he DID accept this. According to the text, once dualism is dismissed in favor of monism, there are three remaining options--neutralism, materialism, and idealism. Three paragraphs follow; the first *rejects *materialism, the second *rejects *neutralism, and the third *endorses* (objective) idealism. Just previously (CP 6.23), Peirce had equated the mental law or law of mind with the law of habit, and had contrasted it with the *absolute *and *exact *nature of physical law. Therefore, "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" is just another way of characterizing "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism." ET: Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and I'm not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. The adjective "objective" distinguishes Peirce's "Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) from the *subjective *idealism of Berkeley and others, which holds that there is *only *mind; i.e., there is no such thing as matter *at all*. In other words, Peirce affirmed the *reality *of matter; however, his statements that "matter is effete mind" and that matter is "mere specialized and partially deadened mind" both entail that mind is *more fundamental* than matter; i.e., "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism." Rejecting this requires embracing one of the other three alternatives--dualism, with matter and mind as "two radically different kinds of substance"; neutralism, with matter and mind "both primordial"; or materialism, with "the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as primordial." Deacon's subtitle suggests that unlike Peirce, he adheres to the last of these. Regards, Jon S. On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:49 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and I'm > not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between > 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. I don't object to the term of > 'idealism' in the phrase of 'objective idealism' - but I DO object to any > notion that this term means that either Mind or Matter is primordial. > > Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the > psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he did NOT > say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as primordial; and the > physical as derived. > > Instead, he wrote" the one intelligible theory of the universe is that of > objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate bits becoming > physical laws". This is absolutely not the same as idealism; there is no > mention of primordial and no mention of mind as privileged. > > And - you haven't referenced 2.322 as I asked. I can't find that section > and certainly, Peirce didn't insert the categories in brackets. > > As for whether or not my views are 'absurd' - I don't think I need such > terms applied to me. My interpretation of Peirce is different from yours. > Period. > > Edwina > > On Sat 03/08/19 11:38 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I feel that your view of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than > 'objective idealism' is in line with your own personal theism. > > > I feel that your view of Peirce, with its absurd claim that objective > idealism is somehow not a species of idealism, is in line with your own > personal atheism. > > ET: Now - whether these views are also similar to those of Peirce - is a > matter for debate. > > > No, again, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of CP > 6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism; > specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as > primordial" and "that matter is effete mind." > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:27 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> I cannot find that section in 2.322 where Peirce inserts, in brackets >> that, eg, 'consciousness' is [1ns]...etc - and I disagree with such an >> insertion. Firstness is feeling, without consciousness - which requires a >> separation of the experience such that one can be conscious of it. A >> paramecium 'feels', i.e., is in a state of 1ns, but is not conscious of it. >> >> I also disagree that 'pure mind' is 3ns. Thirdness is a specific aspect >> of time and space and habit-formation. It is not a pre-existent [prior to >> space and time, ie, material embodiment] set of laws or mind. >> >> The more I read your comments and your inserts - I feel that your view of >> Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than 'objective idealism' is in line >> with your own personal theism. Now - whether these views are also similar >> to those of Peirce - is a matter for debate. You, of course, consider them >> similar. I consider them very dissimilar. So- that's where it's at. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Sat 03/08/19 11:00 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Helmut, List: >> >> On the contrary, according to Peirce, the necessary being of pure mind >> (3ns) does not require time, space, or matter. >> >> CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in >> the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction >> [2ns] and no quality [1ns], no matter [2ns], no consciousness [1ns], no >> space and no time, but just nothing at all. Not determinately nothing. For >> that which is determinately not A supposes the being of A in some mode. >> Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, >> Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol [3ns]. >> That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. >> (EP 2:322; 1904) >> >> >> CSP: Thus, He [God] is so much like a mind [3ns], and so little like a >> singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing >> subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents [2ns],) >> and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility [1ns], that we may >> loosely say that He is a Spirit, or Mind [3ns]. (R 843:27[5]; 1908) >> >> >> CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens >> necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be >> given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since >> all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every >> previous time. (CP 6.490; 1908) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 5:32 PM Helmut Raulien < h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> >>> List, >>> >>> I think, Edwina is right, because anything that happens, like an action >>> of a mind, requires time, and time needs a scale, and a scale needs >>> boundary conditions. These may be a standstill on one side, and light >>> velocity, or something else, maybe infinity, on the other. So i guess, >>> there cannot be a mind at work (at some certain, or any, speed) without the >>> concept of standstill or effeteness, which would be matter. Also, a mind >>> does not only require time, but space too, and space and matter are two >>> things that, according to Einstein, are prerequisites for each other, as >>> you, I forgot who, already have mentioned. >>> >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >>
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