Gary R, list
I continue to disagree with your and JAS's interpretation. You have
both set up a primordial Mind, [what is its ultimate source??] which
then articulates itself within Matter.
My reading of Peirce is that 'objective idealism' means that Mind is
not primordial but emerges with Matter as Matter emerges after the
first chaos. Mind emerges as evolving habits within 'the material
Object' .
I consider that Peirce has explained this well -
1] Primordial - in his analysis of 'the beginning- the primordial
state was 'Nothing'. Not a primordial Mind. But - nothing. See 6.217
and218. Here, he rejects Hegel's privileging of reason and discusses
instead that the primordial is "It is the germinal nothing, in which
the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such it is
absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless
possibility. There is no compulsion and now law. It is boundless
freedom" 6.217. This means - to my reading - that there is no
Primordial Mind. And no primordial Matter. There is just Nothing.
- in another "the initial condition, before the universe existed,
was not a state of pure abstract being. On the contrary, it was a
state of just nothing at all, not even a state of emptiness, for even
emptiness is something" 6.215
- "the original potentiality is the Aristotelian matter or
indeterminacy from which the universe is formed" 6.206. [Note: my
reading of this is that Aristotelian matter is not similar to
Peircean 2ns, but more comparable to a potentiality]
- the universe began "in the utter vagueness of completely
undetermined and dimensionless potentiality" 6.193.
2] The Emergence of Matter and Mind - Peirce outlines - in this
section and in 1.412 [A guess at the riddle] - the emergence of
organized matter. "Out of the womb of indeterminancy we must say that
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which
we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have
been a second flash...then there would have come other successions
ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to
take them ever strengthening themselves until the events would have
been bound together into something like a continuous flow" [1.412]
I read the above as explaining that Mind as habit emerges with
Matter; neither is primordial and both co-evolve. I read this
co-emergence and co-evolution also in 7.514-5.
3] The Co-Evolution of Matter and Mind -"But if the laws of nature
are still in process of evolution from a state of things, in the
infinitely distant past in which there were no laws," 7.514] [Note -
I read this to be that there is no primordial Mind but that it evolved
with Matter].
- "But if the laws of nature are results of evolution, this
evolution must proceed according to some principle; and this
principles will itself be of the nature of a law. But it must be such
a law that it can evolve or develop itself" 7.515. [I read this to
mean that Mind as habits evolves/self-develops with Matter.
Therefore, it is not primordial.
-Then, there's Peirce's synechism, which rejects the separation of
Mind and Matter - 'the synechist will not admit that physical and
psychical phenomena are entirely distinct - whether as belonging to
different categories of substance, or as entirely separate sides of
one shield - but will insist that all phenomena are of one character,
though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and
regular". 7.570. [I read this to mean that Mind is not primordial;
and matter is not primordial].
4] Objective Idealism. When Peirce is discussing, in 6.24, the
nature of Mind and Matter - and he asks whether "physical laws on the
one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken " as
independent, [neutralism] or with the physical law alone as
primordial [materialism] or with the psychical law alone as
primordial [idealism].
My reading is that he rejects all three. Instead - he posits
'objective idealism' which accepts that both Mind and Matter are real
and not identical but - has neither Mind nor Matter as independent of
each other and therefore, neither as primordial -but as co-dependent
and co-evolving. If neither is primordial then, how do they come to
be? As he says, 'matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws" 6.24.
And - since I also accept his cosmology where there is Nothing,
neither Matter nor Mind, that is primordial, then - when Peirce
writes that 'matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws ' - I interpret this to mean that Mind only emerges and
exists as Matter and Matter only emerges and exists as an
articulation of Mind - . They co-emerged from potentiality/chaos -
and co-evolve. I think that Peirce outlines this co-emergence quite
well in his outline.
That's why I disagree with the interpretation of Peirce that sees
Mind as primordial.
Edwina
On Mon 05/08/19 12:37 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon, Edwina, list,
JAS wrote: "In summary, in 1891-1892, Peirce labeled his own basic
metaphysical doctrine as idealism--specifically, a
Schelling-fashioned idealism; objective idealism, as opposed to
subjective idealism."
It should be obvious from my own previous messages in this thread on
the topic that I fully concur with Jon's conclusion in general and in
the particulars he outlined. Indeed, we have both been making the
same points based on many of the same quotations (JAS adding a few
which I did not reproduce), making exactly the same argument, and
arriving at exactly the same conclusion.
I might add that I do not know of any others in the secondary
literature who argue any differently. If I'm mistaken about this,
please provide sources and quotations which contradict what Jon and I
have been arguing.
As I've repeatedly said in this thread, one may disagree with Peirce
on this matter of 'objective idealism', but it is clear from the
source material, that what Jon and I have been arguing amounts to
little more than a paraphrase of Peirce's position in the matter.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies LaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Mon, Aug 5, 2019 at 12:11 AM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Edwina, List:
I just discovered that I sent this to Edwina only earlier today; I
meant to send it to the List.
ET: I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an
interpretation of Peirce's words".
Your objection is noted. My point is that any careful and
fair-minded comparison of your words with Peirce's reveals that what
you are expressing is inconsistent with what he expressed, as I
demonstrate (again) below.
ET: My method is an integral part of my identity! So- you can't
split up one's 'method' from one's identity!
Freely choosing to tie your identity to your method is up to you,
but again, I intended no moral judgment--just a methodological
judgment, which is well within the bounds of scholarly discourse.
Your assertions simply do not match up with Peirce's texts.
ET: And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict
him' - I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I
am 'misreading' them. I disagree.
You claim that Peirce's objective idealism is not a form of
idealism. The relevant texts themselves plainly indicate that
according to Peirce himself, his objective idealism is a form of
idealism. Therefore, you assign views to Peirce that directly
contradict his own words, presumably because you are misreading them.
ET: You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'?
I've been a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes
and societal organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it.
Then why was it only after I introduced that term into the
conversation that you began claiming that it is what Peirce meant by
"idealism" (with no adjective) in CP 6.24? Note that I brought it up
in response to your demand for a reason why Peirce called his position
"objective idealism" in CP 6.25, rather than just "idealism." I have
also pointed out that he did call it simply "idealism" in R 936:3,
and "a Schelling-fashioned idealism" in CP 6.102.
ET: You, however, still haven't explained 'objective idealism as
you interpret it - instead you are using Peirce's definition of
'idealism' - which is NOT, in my view, the same as 'objective
idealism'.
This is more evidence of poor reading comprehension, since I have
explained Peirce's objective idealism multiple times now. Let me
spell it out for you in full.
*In CP 6.24, Peirce identified four broad alternatives for a
basic metaphysical doctrine--dualism, neutralism, materialism, and
idealism.
*Each of these candidates stipulates a different relationship
between physical and psychical laws; i.e., between matter and mind.
*The doctrine that matter and mind are "two radically different
kinds of substance" is dualism, which Peirce explicitly rejected.
*The doctrine that physical and psychical laws are "independent"
and "on a par," and thus "both primordial," is neutralism; and Peirce
invoked Ockham's Razor to dismiss it.
*According to R 936:3, synechism also rules out both dualism and
neutralism, because the acknowledged "disparateness" of matter and
mind "is a mere matter of degree."
*Put another way, "the synechist will not admit that physical and
psychical phenomena are entirely distinct--whether as belonging to
different categories of substance [dualism], or as entirely separate
sides of one shield [neutralism],--but will insist that all phenomena
are of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous,
others more material and regular" (CP 7.570).
*The doctrine that "the psychical law [is] derived and special,
the physical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "mind is a
peculiar kind of matter"--is materialism.
*The doctrine that "the physical law [is] derived and special,
the psychical law alone [is] primordial"--i.e., that "matter is a
peculiar kind of mind"--is idealism.
* Peirce explicitly rejected materialism in CP 6.24 and
associated it with nominalism in R 936:3, which in both cases left
idealism as the only remaining option.
*According to CP 6.25, "The one intelligible theory of the
universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind,
inveterate habits becoming physical laws."
*According to R 936:3, "if, on the other hand, matter is nothing
but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as
to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of
forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating
theory of idealism."
*These two statements are directly parallel, confirming that
objective idealism is a form of idealism; but it is distinguished
from subjective idealism, which denies the reality of matter
altogether.
*Peirce elsewhere described his metaphysics as "a
Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere
specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP 1:312).
In summary, in 1891-1892, Peirce labeled his own basic metaphysical
doctrine as idealism--specifically, a Schelling-fashioned idealism;
objective idealism, as opposed to subjective idealism.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 3:04 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[2]> wrote:
JAS, list
I object to your view that my analysis of Peirce is not "an
interpretation of Peirce's words". I have pointed out how I derive
this analysis - from his texts. All you have the right to say - is
that you disagree and that YOUR interpretation is different. You have
no authoritative right to declare that your interpretation - and
that's what it is - an interpretation - is the RIGHT one.
To say that one sticks to one's views by 'tenacity' rather than by
using 'the scientific method' is of course a description of my
character - and is a character flaw - and it is a trivial sidestep to
say - oh, no, I'm not speaking about YOU personally, only about your
method'. My method is an integral part of my identity! So- you can't
split up one's 'method' from one's identity!
And - I don't 'assign views to Peirce that 'directly contradict him'
- I've pointed out the texts - and your response is only that I am
'misreading' them. I disagree.
Yes, I consider it unacceptable that you rewrote John Sowa's words,
and inserted my name, to make it seem as if he was referring to me. I
think I do have the right to comment on this - and need not wait for
John Sowa to comment. If you considered that his words referred to
any and all - then, you should have left them unchanged and not
inserted my name or changed the pronouns.
You now suggest that I've never heard of 'subjective idealism'? I've
been a professor for 30+ years, dealing in cognitive processes and
societal organization - and I assure you - I've heard of it. You,
however, still haven't explained 'objective idealism as you interpret
it - instead you are using Peirce's definition of 'idealism' - which
is NOT, in my view, the same as 'objective idealism'.
As I said - you and I interpret Peirce very differently. I don't
think that you have the right to say more than this - i.e., I don't
think that you have the right to declare that I am misreading, that
my views have 'no basis in the actual text'; and so on. All I can
say about your analysis - is that I disagree and provide the texts
which I feel support my interpretation. And all you can do - is
exactly the same. But I don't think that either of us has the right
to be a 'final judge' of the 'truth' of each interpretation.
Edwina
On Sun 04/08/19 3:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words ...
The problem is that your position is not an "interpretation of
Peirce's words," because it has no basis in his actual text.
ET: The difference between us is 'hubris' ...
No, it is (apparently) basic reading comprehension.
ET: ... you declare that mine is false and maintained only by a
character flaw of mine [tenacity rather than the use of reason -
which you maintain that you hold].
I said nothing whatsoever about your character, only about your
method. I am criticizing your specific claims, not attacking you as
a person.
ET: What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion?
Like anyone else on the List, I have the authority/right to express
my opinion here, as long as it is related to Peirce. What gives you
the authority/right to assign views to him that directly contradict
his own statements?
ET: I reject your moving into ad hominem.
I reject your accusation of ad hominem. Again, I have never
resorted to attacking anyone personally; instead, I have consistently
stuck to the substance, refuting unsupported assertions with verbatim
quotations from Peirce, as I do again below.
ET: And I object to your misuse of the words of John Sowa - which
were directed against you - and rewriting them to make it seem as if
he wrote them against me.
John Sowa can speak for himself if he honestly thinks that I misused
his words. For one thing, why would you suggest that they were
"directed against" me or any other individual? On the contrary, I
understood them to be expressing general principles by which he
believes that all of us should abide. Otherwise, he would be
advocating a double standard; why would the "ground rules" be
different for me than for anyone else? Some additional comments of
his from a few weeks back seems relevant here, as well.
JFS: Open debate in any and every community is always important ...
There is no authority. Any evaluation must be based on evidence and
reasoning about the evidence ... And the methodeutic requires a
dialog. There should always be a "devil's advocate" for challenging
any claim.
No one should take it personally when someone challenges a specific
claim--especially when that challenge is accompanied by "evidence and
reasoning about the evidence," as mine has been in this case. The
method of science requires subjecting our fallible hypotheses to the
scrutiny and well-founded criticism of others.
ET: Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24
is one that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial
and matter as derived from mind.
Based on how this exchange has gone, it appears to me that you had
never even heard of "subjective idealism" until I introduced it in my
explanation of why Peirce presumably wanted to distinguish his version
of idealism from that one. Moreover, you have persistently ignored
the other relevant passage that I have quoted several times now,
which is unmistakably clear.
CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of
disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this
disparateness is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar
kind of matter, or else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is
it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of
matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in
materialism, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on
the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely
under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity
& to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are
brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. (R 936:3; no date)
The last sentence is directly parallel to how Peirce described "the
one intelligible theory of the universe" in CP 6.25--"that matter is
effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." According to
Peirce's own words, this view is "the more elevating theory of
idealism"; specifically, objective idealism that affirms the reality
of matter as "a peculiar sort of mind," rather than subjective
idealism that denies the reality of matter altogether. Both kinds of
idealism affirm "the physical law as derived and special, the
psychical law alone as primordial" (CP 6.24).
ET: But his objective idealism is very different and defines
neither as primordial but as both emerging after the 'Nothing' and
the indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in complexity and are never
separate or 'individual' ... My meaning is that Matter only exists
when it is organized into laws by Mind; and Mind only exists when it
is organizing Matter into laws.
This is not Peirce's objective idealism, it is your own construct,
which for some reason you wish to ascribe to him. Again, CP 6.24-25
says nothing whatsoever about a fifth alternative to dualism,
neutralism, materialism, and idealism that involves matter and mind
"co-evolving." According to that text, if neither is primordial,
then they are either "two radically different kinds of substance"
(dualism) or "independent" and "on a par" (neutralism); and Peirce
explicitly rejected both of these options.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]
On Sun, Aug 4, 2019 at 7:37 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list
I stand by my interpretation of Peirce's words - I note that you
stand by your interpretation. The difference between us is 'hubris';
you declare that your interpretation is true - while you declare that
mine is false and maintained only by a character flaw of mine
[tenacity rather than the use of reason - which you maintain that you
hold].
. What gives you the authority/right to make such an assertion? Both
of us are interpreting Peirce - and neither of us has been able to
convince the other of the validity of our views. That's as far as it
can go. I reject your moving into ad hominem. And I object to your
misuse of the words of John Sowa - which were directed against you -
and rewriting them to make it seem as if he wrote them against me.
Again- I consider that Peirce's definition of idealism in 6.24 is
one that applies to 'subjective idealism' with mind as primordial and
matter as derived from mind. But his objective idealism is very
different and defines neither as primordial but as both emerging
after the 'Nothing' and the indeterminacy [1ns]. They co-evolve in
complexity and are never separate or 'individual'.
This is not the same as Mind=Matter, and when I say that Mind
becomes Matter/Matter becomes Mind - this simple phrase, perhaps too
simple -- is not an equation of similarity or merging of identity.
My meaning is that Matter only exists when it is organized into laws
by Mind; and Mind only exists when it is organizing Matter into laws.
This does not mean, as you suggest, that I mean that Matter exists
outside of Mind; I didn't write that; I said that it exists outside
of what YOU OR I think of them - but it doesn't exist outside of
Mind.
I repeat - both of us are equal interpreters of Peirce. We haven't
been able to convince each other of the validity of our different
interpretations of Peirce. That's as far as any debate should go. I
don't see that an argument based on a self-assertion that one's
interpretation is the Truth, while the other person's interpretation
is due to their 'misreading' and 'tenacity' - is a valid argument.
Edwina
Links:
------
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[2]
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[3]
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[4] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
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