Helmut, List: What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined in his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of the podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper. The first number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant (3). The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or "final" as a conditional necessity (3). The third number indicates correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a triadic relation (3).
At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant is the third correlate (3). However, the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with the sign (CP 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent. Arranging them logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs. At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two objects (immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants (immediate=3.1, dynamical=3.2, final=3.3). Dividing each of these six correlates (hexad) into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial modes" of 1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again, Robert and I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and applying the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs. At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations (including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation, yielding Peirce's ten trichotomies--S (1.1.1), Oi (2.1.1), Od (2.2.1), Od-S (2.2.2), Ii (3.1.1), Id (3.2.1), S-Id (3.2.2), If, (3.3.1), S-If (3.3.2), and Od-S-If (3.3.3). Dividing each of these into possible/existent/necessitant, arranging them logically in a linear order, and applying the rule of determination results in 66 classes of signs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:09 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > List, > > I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be > applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three > interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where > you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and > so on: > > level > characters > number of characters > > 1 > (3) > 1 > 2 > (1);(2);(3) > 3 > 3 (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); > (3.1).(3.2),(3.3) > 6 > 4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); > (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3) 10 > > The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus > the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at > level 11 you have 66. > > Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign > is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to > Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense), > analysed by him up to the 3d level. > > This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that > underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, > and thus not categories, I think. > > Best, > Helmut >
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