Auke, List: I remain reluctant to classify any *real *signs as pure icons, indices, or symbols. Consider these comments by Peirce.
CSP: It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very character signified. For this reason, it is the mathematical sign par excellence. But in denotation it is wanting. It gives no assurance that any such object as it represents really exists. The index on the other hand does this most perfectly, actually bringing to the interpreter the experience of the very object denoted. But it is quite wanting in signification unless it involves an iconic part. (EP 2:307, 1904) A pure icon would signify something without denoting anything, while a pure index would denote something without signifying anything. In other words, a pure icon would have an interpretant but no object, while a pure index would have an object but no interpretant. By definition, a sign has *both *denotation and signification--a genuine triadic relation with *both *an object and an interpretant--so no *real* sign is a pure icon or a pure index. I suppose that a quality in itself as a *possible *form (1ns), not *actually *inhering in any matter (2ns), could be considered a pure icon. However, in my view it cannot be a *sign*, because it cannot *represent *something else as its object; it can only *present* itself. Moreover, every *real *index "involves an iconic part" and every *real* symbol involves both indexical and iconic parts. AvB: The intensional interpretant may be an argument, but the effectual interpretant may take this argument as a term that enters another process. A friend gets a stroke, after weeks you visit him. He starts talking and gives an argument in favor of the lock down (which he knows you opposed). Since you are curious about the damage done by the stroke, you do not take the argument as it is intended to be, instead you take the whole argument as a term, that, as indexically connected with the utterer, proves to be a proposition, that enters an argument with the conclusion: At first sight the damage at the least is limited. In this example, I would identify the friend's argument as the sign token being analyzed, not the intentional interpretant or any other interpretant. Instead, the intentional interpretant is the effect that my friend *intends *the argument to have on me, and which it *necessarily would *have on me under ideal circumstances (from my friend's perspective)--i.e., the final interpretant--which is presumably the habit-change of supporting the lockdown (new belief) rather than opposing it (old belief). The effectual interpretant is the effect that the argument *actually does *have on me on this occasion--i.e., the dynamical interpretant--which is the habit-change of adopting the new belief that the damage from the stroke is limited. JAS: In other words, we do not *construct *arguments from propositions, we *prescind *propositions from arguments. AvB: I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my mumbling about input - output relations that are habitual, about which I talk in analysis mode. I am glad that we have found something on which we can agree. I also want to acknowledge that different analyses--even of the same phenomena--often have different purposes, and reach different conclusions accordingly. I do not wish to create the wrong impression that I think my analysis is "right" and others are "wrong," they are just different. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 3:55 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alen, > > while I indeed consider signs to be iconic/indexical/symbolic rather than > pure icons/indices/symbols, > > re: I think we need to consider them from both angles. If we deal with > interpretation processes we need the pure ones. The are needed to cover the > apprehension of the sign as an object, the sign copy stage that we have > virtually to go through before the meaning and effect of the sign develop > themselves in a given interpreter. > > by contrast I view terms/propositions/arguments as sharply > distinguished. In other words, every sign is *either *a term, a > proposition, or an argument. As I recently summarized, every argument > *involves *multiple propositions, and every proposition *involves *multiple > terms. > > re: Peirce does emphasize the mode of adress in the sign - interpretant > relation, not the compositionality. suggestive only/term, statement of > fact/prop. yes no, and providing a reason/argument. > > cf: [. . . ] the diference between the Term, the Proposition, and the > Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much > consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to > perform. (CP 4.572) > > The intensional interpretant may be an argument, but the effectual > interpretant may take this argument as a term that enters another process. > A friend gets a stroke, after weeks you visit him. He starts talking and > gives an argument in favor of the lock down (which he knows you opposed). > Since you are curious about the damage done by the stroke, you do not take > the argument as it is intended to be, instead you take the whole argument > as a term, that, as indexically connected with the utterer, proves to be a > proposition, that enters an argument with the conclusion: At first sight > the damage at the least is limited. > > > - A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or a > relative (triadic or higher). > - A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic > terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term). > - An argument is always a relative (involving two or more propositions) > > JAS: In other words, we do not *construct *arguments from propositions, > we *prescind *propositions from arguments. > I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my mumbling about input > - output relations that are habitual, about which I talk in analysis mode. > > Auke >
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