Jon Alen,
> while I indeed consider signs to be iconic/indexical/symbolic rather than > pure icons/indices/symbols, > re: I think we need to consider them from both angles. If we deal with interpretation processes we need the pure ones. The are needed to cover the apprehension of the sign as an object, the sign copy stage that we have virtually to go through before the meaning and effect of the sign develop themselves in a given interpreter. > by contrast I view terms/propositions/arguments as sharply distinguished. > In other words, every sign is either a term, a proposition, or an argument. > As I recently summarized, every argument involves multiple propositions, and > every proposition involves multiple terms. > re: Peirce does emphasize the mode of adress in the sign - interpretant relation, not the compositionality. suggestive only/term, statement of fact/prop. yes no, and providing a reason/argument. cf: [. . . ] the diference between the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to perform. (CP 4.572) The intensional interpretant may be an argument, but the effectual interpretant may take this argument as a term that enters another process. A friend gets a stroke, after weeks you visit him. He starts talking and gives an argument in favor of the lock down (which he knows you opposed). Since you are curious about the damage done by the stroke, you do not take the argument as it is intended to be, instead you take the whole argument as a term, that, as indexically connected with the utterer, proves to be a proposition, that enters an argument with the conclusion: At first sight the damage at the least is limited. > * A term can be a hypothetic (monadic), a categorical (dyadic), or > a relative (triadic or higher). > * A proposition can be either a categorical (involving two monadic > terms) or a relative (involving at least one dyadic or higher term). > * An argument is always a relative (involving two or more > propositions) > JAS: In other words, we do not construct arguments from propositions, we prescind propositions from arguments. I like this one very much! Much more powerful then my mumbling about input - output relations that are habitual, about which I talk in analysis mode. Auke CSP: I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. ... This doctrine, which is in harmony with the above theory of signs, gives a great unity to logic ... (CP 3.440, 1896) In existential graphs, the scroll corresponds to the "one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation," which is why the cut (or shading) for negation is derived from it rather than the other way around (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906). It is evident that "every proposition [is] a conditional proposition at bottom" from the fact that any EG is equivalent to the same EG in the inner close of a scroll with an empty outer close. I look forward to receiving your feedback on this, as well as on my other recent posts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 5:33 PM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote: Jon, Helmut, List, Jon wrote: JAS: At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant is the third correlate (3). However, the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and interpretant themselves, but rather their relations with the sign (CP 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent. Arranging them logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs. [Emphasis added by GR] Thank you for your favorable response to my post. I was, however, a bit taken aback by your "quibble" above that " the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and interpretant themselves , but rather their relations with the sign." I was just about to furiously plunge into my CP and EP, esp. the former which I recalled had sections titled something like "A Second Trichotomy" and "A Third Trichotomy" where I was sure my analysis would be supported. But then, a fraction of a moment later, I thought, of course Jon is right, and that is why, for example, I "corrected" Peirce's " Dicent Indexical Sinsign " to read " Dicent(ic) Indexical Sinsign." For, indeed, the adjectival form of the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies better shows their relations to the sign when naming its class, the sign itself always expressed in a noun. So in describing trichotomic sign classes, although Peirce didn't consistently do so, it seems better to characterize each sign -- as to the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies -- as iconic, indexical, or symbolic; and rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative (although one never sees the very last one, 'argumentative', for the obvious reason that only one of the 10 classes of signs is an Argument. Indeed, it has been argued, correctly I think, that there are no pure icons, indices, or symbols. The status of arguments, propositions, and terms would seem to be somewhat more problematic until you consider that as signs they are all legisigns. I hope to have more to say in regard to your other recent posts, but won't get to that today. Meanwhile, thanks for your correction. Best, Gary R "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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