List: Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the usage of “ampliative”, starting with the citation in the Comment Dictionary.
The Commens dictionary states: News | Posted 12/03/2017 Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences> Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its premises (Collected Papers 2.623). The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and Hypothesis. Ampliative does not occur in 2.623 Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent conference where Commens provides the following statement: Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be understood in the title of this workshop. (The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.) Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence. After all, even a simple deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises! BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. The Oxford dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”. (But reasoning is a general term with many meanings Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments and arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may yield credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go beyond our data, in ways that interest us. Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP: "1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in The Works of the Rev. Hugh Binning[1] <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238>, page 579: Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both." In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term “ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root. Jon wrote: >> That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative >> but merely explicative. I continue to maintain that this is problematic. Necessary reasoning in often ampliative. Cheers Jerry > On Dec 14, 2020, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > A simple Google search confirms that there is nothing "problematic" or > "radical" about the well-established definition of "ampliative reasoning" > within the discipline of logic. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 1:01 PM Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > List, Jon: >> On Dec 14, 2020, at 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> As Peirce explains in various places, ampliative reasoning produces >> conclusions that are not already contained in or implied by the premisses. >> As such, it encompasses both abductive/retroductive reasoning and inductive >> reasoning, but not deductive reasoning. That being the case, necessary >> reasoning is by definition not ampliative but merely explicative. > Your interpretations of the term “ampliative” is problematic. > > As I read the sentences, it appears that the logic of chemistry is excluded. > > Can you be more explicit wrt the texts from which you draw such radical > conclusions? > > Do you believe that a conclusion (consequence) from a collection of premises > (antecedents) must necessarily be one syntactical interpretations of the > Latin root, ducere? (Consider, for example, the proposition, X produces Y. > If you wish, you may consider X and Y as n-dimensional vectors or other > mathematical structures.) > > Thanks for your thought - it is helpful. > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of > the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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