I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
Auke > Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca: > > > Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by > stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver > its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have > missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the > dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it > would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that > the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it > as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. > > I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal > categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any > reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, > not the other way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously > the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in > connection with phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably > wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. > > Gary f. > > > > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen > Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4 > > > > Gary F., list, > > Nice summary of pheneroscopy. But that was not the issue. The issue was > whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which > phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. > > best, > > Auke > > > > > > Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca : > > > > Auke, Gary R, list, > > > > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions > > that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, > > I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but > > lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t > > claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually > > occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain > > how the content of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and > > that is the reality which might be definable as the totality of facts > > expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more than > > that, including dreams, possibilities and so on. > > > > The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments > > about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to > > discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear > > is what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, > > Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for > > the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as > > something other than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and > > metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some > > method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and > > that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. > > > > By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I > > think Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a > > terminological change (he decided there were too many other established > > uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday > > suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he > > expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as > > bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved > > will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these > > branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or > > phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is > > to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science is that > > Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. > > > > I hope this helps … > > > > > > > > Gary f. > > > > > > > > > > > > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen > > Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36 > > To: > > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4 > > > > > > > > Gary, List > > > > I wrote: > > > > Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. > > > > -- > > > > You wrote: > > > > “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a > > proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness > > but Firstness. > > > > -- > > > > In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. > > Maybe honest or single minded would have been a better choice. > > > > But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as > > propositions. And, I did apply it to the excercize. > > > > > > > > The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the > > “universal categories.” > > > > -- > > > > yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a > > role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me > > wonder what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts > > expressible in (trutfunctional) propositions? > > > > best, > > > > Auke > > > > > > > > > > Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca > > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca : > > > > > > Helmut, Auke, list, > > > > > > I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit > > > overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who > > > reacts so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose > > > the ability to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under > > > discussion. Consequently I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed > > > for driving Cathy away from the discussion; neither of them could have > > > guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would have such an effect > > > on her. > > > > > > Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the > > > other thread, because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is > > > complete: > > > > > > [[ Jon, > > > > > > CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent > > > forcing themselves upon our recognition. > > > > > > CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; > > > for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as > > > something other than the mind's creation. > > > > > > This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina: > > > > > > CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the > > > sense of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. > > > (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905) > > > > > > And here we see what the relation is between propositions and > > > reality. > > > > > > In short: Real is that what is independed of individual > > > thought. And it is because of this independence of individual thought > > > that we can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a > > > pheneroscopic excercize. ]] > > > > > > GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last > > > sentence. It is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a > > > normative science from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but > > > not normative science. “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does > > > to a proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not > > > Secondness but Firstness. > > > > > > CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of > > > Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as > > > phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, > > > 1903). > > > > > > GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic > > > consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is > > > independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual > > > thinkers does not appear in the direct consciousness of the > > > phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the > > > differences between individual minds and treats all possible minds as one > > > mind. > > > > > > CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by > > > the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in > > > any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds > > > to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I > > > reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a > > > doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind > > > are present at all times and to all minds. (CP 1.284, 1905) > > > > > > CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to > > > denote the total content of any one consciousness (for any one is > > > substantially any other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way > > > whatever, regardless of its cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905) > > > > > > GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. > > > Reality is not an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the > > > elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.” > > > > > > Gary f. > > > > > > > > > > > > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > > > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > > > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien > > > Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57 > > > To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > > > > > > List, > > > > > > > > > > > > the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read > > > it, I suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair > > > discussion, but in tribalistically separating the discussers in one group > > > of the good ones, and one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due > > > to their use of the wrong codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the > > > paradoxon of doing the same now. Though I know it sounds as if I am. That > > > is because if once this sort of manichaeism is started, it is hard to > > > stop. > > > > > > I am not completely against identity politics, but against > > > essentialism. It originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists > > > too do not pay enough attention that the defence of discriminated > > > identity groups does not switch into essentialism. > > > > > > > > > > > > Best > > > > > > Helmut > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > > > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" > > > to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > > > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > > > l...@list.iupui.edu mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L > > > in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at > > > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > > > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary > > > Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to > > REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > > l...@list.iupui.edu mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in > > the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at > > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary > > Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
