Gary F., List: Thank you for this remarkably concise and lucid explanation of why it is important to recognize phaneroscopy as a distinct science, and why Peirce situates it where he does within his overall classification. I find the following statement to be especially illuminating, and I have bolded the key phrase within it.
GF: Logic and metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing *that does not presuppose them*, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. It is another helpful reminder to me as someone who has a tendency to jump straight into logic/semeiotic and metaphysics. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 9:13 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Auke, Gary R, list, > > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that > are *publicly* verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, > I do so *honestly* if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but > lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t > claim *veracity* for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream *actually > occurred* and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain > how the *content* of the dream relates to any reality *external* to it; > and *that* is the reality which might be definable as the totality of > facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more > than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on. > > The focus of phaneroscopy on what *appears* precludes any judgments about > (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern > the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can *appear* is > what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, > Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for > the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as > something *other* than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and > metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some > method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and > that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. > > By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think > Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a > terminological change (he decided there were too many other established > uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday > suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he > expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as > bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved > will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these > branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or > phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is > to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of *what the science is* that > Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. > > I hope this helps … > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *Auke van Breemen > *Sent:* 18-Jun-21 08:36 > *To:* > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4 > > > > Gary, List > > I wrote: > > Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. > > -- > > You wrote: > > “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, > because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. > > -- > > In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe > honest or single minded would have been a better choice. > > But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. > And, I did apply it to the excercize. > > The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal > categories.” > > -- > > yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in > reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder > what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in > (trutfunctional) propositions? > > best, > > Auke > > Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca: > > Helmut, Auke, list, > > I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): > it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently > to a *word* (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus > on the *object* of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently > I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away > from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of > the word “embodied” would have such an effect on her. > > Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, > because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete: > > [[ Jon, > > CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing > themselves upon our recognition. > > CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real > is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something *other > *than the mind's creation. > > This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina: > > CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is *real*, in the sense of > being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, > EP 2:343, 1905) > > And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality. > > In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is > because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about > the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]] > > GF: This is all accurate and to the point, *except* your last sentence. > It is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative > science from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive *but not > normative* science. “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to > a proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not > Secondness but Firstness. > > CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their > immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, > treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903). > > GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic > consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is > independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual > thinkers *does not appear in the direct consciousness* of the > phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the > differences between individual minds and treats all possible minds as > *one* mind. > > CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the *phaneron;* and by the > *phaneron* I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in > any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds > to any real thing or not. If you ask present *when,* and to *whose* mind, > I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a > doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are > present at all times and to all minds. (CP 1.284, 1905) > > CSP: I propose to use the word *Phaneron* as a proper name to denote the > total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any > other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of > its cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905) > > GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not > an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the > phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.” > > Gary f. > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *Helmut Raulien > *Sent:* 17-Jun-21 02:57 > *To:* jonalanschm...@gmail.com > > List, > the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I > suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in > tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, > and one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the > wrong codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the > same now. Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this > sort of manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop. > > I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. > It originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay > enough attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not > switch into essentialism. > Best > > Helmut > >
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