Gary F., List: I have been wondering exactly "what André means by 'gradually ordered'" ever since you posted that slide.
Peirce seems to use "gradual" as a rough synonym for "continuous" when talking about change or variation, such as in NEM 2:248 (1895), CP 7.283-284 (c. 1895), and NEM 3:1076-1077 (c. 1905). However, you are probably right that here it has more to do with the root word "grade," for which Peirce provided the definition in the *Century Dictionary*--"A step, degree, or rank in any series or order; relative position or standing as regards quantity, quality, office, etc." He also prepared the entry for "graduate," which includes definitions such as "mark with degrees, regular intervals, or divisions"; "arrange or place in a series of grades or gradations"; and (as an adjective) "arranged in successive steps or degrees." Perhaps André is merely attempting to preclude the misconception that Peirce's three categories are *sequentially *ordered, as if 1ns comes first, 2ns comes second, and 3ns comes third in some sense. Instead, they are arranged by relative *complexity *as illustrated by Robert Marty's podium diagram and reflected in Peirce's specific application of phenomenological/phaneroscopic analysis to the triadic relation of representation or mediation. In that context, the sign, its object, and its interpretant are respectively a First, a Second, and a Third (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903); or put another way, the first (simplest) correlate, the second (middling) correlate, and the third (most complex) correlate (CP 2.233-237, EP 2:289-290, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 9:05 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > I think my previous post on this slide may have overemphasized the > difference between Peirce’s 1867 view of the categories and his later > “phaneroscopic” view of them, and I’d like to correct that before we leave > slide 6, which refers to Peirce’s early discovery that the “set of > genuinely universal categories is small and *gradually ordered*.” > > It may not be clear what “genuinely universal categories” are — i.e. how > they differ from other sets of categories — nor is it clear what André > means by “gradually ordered.” The next few slides (dealing with > prescission) will probably clarify this; but before we get to them, I’d > like to provide some relevant text from a letter Peirce wrote c. 1905 to a > “Signor Calderoni”: > > [[ … on May 14, 1867, after three years of almost insanely concentrated > thought, hardly interrupted even by sleep, I produced my one contribution > to philosophy in the “New List of Categories” in the Proceedings of the > American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. VII, pp. 287-298. Tell your > friend Julian that this is, if possible, even less original than my maxim > of pragmatism; and that I take pride in the entire absence of originality > in all that I have ever sought to bring to the attention of logicians and > metaphysicians. My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of > thinking. I know very well that there are other categories, those which > Hegel calls by that name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with > any list of *them.* We may classify objects according to their matter; as > wooden things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But > classification according to structure is generally more important. And it > is the same with ideas. Much as I would like to see Hegel's list of > categories reformed, I hold that a classification of the elements of > thought and consciousness according to their formal structure is more > important. I believe in inventing new philosophical words in order to avoid > the ambiguities of the familiar words. I use the word *phaneron* to mean > all that is present to the mind in any sense or in any way whatsoever, > regardless of whether it be fact or figment. I examine the phaneron and I > endeavor to sort out its elements according to the complexity of their > structure. I thus reach my three categories. ]] (CP 8.213, c. 1905). > > Peirce’s assertion that his “three categories are nothing but Hegel's > three grades of thinking” might be misleading in some ways, but it confirms > André’s > statement that they are “*gradually* ordered.” It also shows that > Peirce’s method of “reaching” his three categories did not undergo a > *complete* change when he renamed it “phaneroscopy” in 1904. > > Gary f. >
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