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}JAS, list
We've been through this before. I would add, that, just as my
readings of Peirce are my interpretation, that your readings are your
interpretation - even though you never acknowledge this fact.
And, Peirce's objective idealism is not, in my reading, the same as
'pure idealism'. It is hylomorphic - and hylomorphism is NOT dualism
[as you suggest - what an astounding suggestion!! ] but is monist -
as Peirce says in his reference to hylopathy.
Aristotle's 'form' is comparable to Mind' - and, you are ignoring
Peirce's explicit statement, which I repeat:
"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are drive to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism" 6.24 my emphasis]. "
And MY interpretation is that Peirce rejects that the two, Mind and
Matter, are independent of each other; or that either is primordial.
That is, MY interpretation is different from YOUR interpretation [and
again - there is no direct path from the text to either of us; we are
both interpretors]….
He chooses, not idealism, but objective idealism - and that
corresponds to his 'some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism'.
Which means that the two, Mind and Matter, are correlates and work
together. ... that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws.
And as you quote, CSP: Synechism, even in its less stalwart forms,
can never abide dualism, properly so called. ... In particular, the
synechist will not admit that physical and psychical phenomena are
entirely distinct,--
Exactly. The two, Mind and Matter are correlates ...'some form of
hylopathy, otherwise called monism".
I don't think there is anything more to be said about our two
different interpretations.
Edwina
On Fri 24/09/21 4:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: 'Mind', in my view, doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but
only within a hylomorphic correlation of both Mind and Matter [this
is basic Peirce/Aristotle]. ... I don't give any priority to Mind or
Matter; again, they are hylomorphic correlates.
Hylomorphism is indeed basic Aristotle, but as Gary R. pointed out,
it is certainly not basic Peirce. I am not aware of any passage in
the latter's voluminous writings where he explicitly affirms that
neither mind nor matter is primordial, let alone states or implies
that they are "hylomorphic correlates." As John Sowa has requested,
"For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact
quotations."
In fact, since Aristotelian hylomorphism is the doctrine that every
substance is a composite of matter and form (not mind), it is usually
characterized as a type of dualism. By contrast, Peirce endorses
"hylopathy" as the sole alternative to dualism, immediately adding
that it is "otherwise called monism" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292, 1891).
ET: NOTE: he rejects ALL three of these answers to how the two,
Mind and Matter, work together.
Peirce does no such thing. Here is what he actually writes.
CSP: The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to
scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose
that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason--an ultimate,
inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any
theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable. Neutralism
is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as Ockham's
razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed
than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of
substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws. (CP 6.24, EP 1:292-293, 1891)
He explicitly rejects materialism and neutralism, and then
explicitly affirms idealism; specifically, objective idealism as
distinguished from the pure idealism of Plato, the subjective
idealism of Berkeley, and the absolute idealism of Hegel. Moreover,
he also explicitly affirms idealism without the adjective "objective"
in these other exact quotations (bold added).
CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of
disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this
disparateness is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar
kind of matter, or else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is
it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of
matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in
materialism, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on
the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely
under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity
& to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are
brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. (R 936:3, no date)
CSP: I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and
of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a
Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere
specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, EP 1:312, 1892)
According to his own testimony, Peirce believed that "matter is a
peculiar sort of mind"--"effete mind," "mere specialized and
partially deadened mind"--which by his own definitions is idealism;
and he did not believe that "mind is peculiar kind of matter," which
by his own definitions is materialism. He also rejected any type of
dualism, including Aristotelian hylomorphism, in accordance with his
synechism.
CSP: Synechism, even in its less stalwart forms, can never abide
dualism, properly so called. ... In particular, the synechist will
not admit that physical and psychical phenomena are entirely
distinct,--whether as belonging to different categories of substance,
or as entirely separate sides of one shield,--but will insist that all
phenomena are of one character, though some are more mental and
spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike
present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows them to
be, nay, makes them to be teleological, or purposive. (CP 7.570, EP
2:2, 1893)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 3:02 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R, list
This is your opinion [and I know a few others on the list do share
it with you] but I disagree with your interpretation. No-one on this
list has defined 'objective idealism' - but it is NOT the same as
'idealism'. This is what Peirce wrote:
"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are drive to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism" 6.24 my emphasis].
So- he acknowledges two 'realities' to deal with: Mind and Matter.
He rejects that they are "two radically different kinds of substance'
and instead, opts for monism, or 'some form of hylopathy'. What does
this mean? How do these two 'non-radically different kinds of
substance' work together and why does he define their relation as one
of monism?
Then, he goes on and deals with the LAWS of each 'substance', Mind
and Matter, and asks "Then the question arises whether physical laws
on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken:
a] as independent …[of each other]
b] the physical law as primordial with the psychical as
derived.ie..materialism
c] the psychical law as primordial with the physical as
derived...ie idealism.
NOTE: he rejects ALL three of these answers to how the two, Mind and
Matter, work together. Instead, he posits
d] Objective Idealism - which is that hylomorphic monism, where
'Matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".
That is Matter-is-Mind; and Mind-is-Matter.
The two 'substances' and their laws work together; neither is
independent of the other; neither is primordial; they are hylopathic
monism.
That's my interpretation - and I remind you, that all of our
readings, yours and mine, are, because of the triadic nature of
semiosis - interpretations, not dyadic Truths straight from
Peirce-to-the-Reader.
Edwina
On Fri 24/09/21 3:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com [4]
sent:
Edwina, Jack, List,
ET: Yes, my focus is dialectical and embedded. 'Mind', in my view,
doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but only within a hylomorphic
correlation of both Mind and Matter [this is basic
Peirce/Aristotle].
GR: Well, you've certainly made it clear that this is your view.
Unfortunately, it is not Peirce's view. As has been argued here by
myself and others, Peirce's view is that of 'objective idealism'.
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws." 1891 | The Architecture of Theories | W 8:105-6; CP
6.24-5
GR: Your insistence that your view is "basic Peirce" is contradicted
by the many discussions of objective idealism in articles (e.gs [5].
"Peirce's Objective Idealism: A Defense," by Claudine Tiercelin, in
Transactions and Nicholas Guardiano's, "The intelligibility of
Peirce's metaphysics of objective idealism") as well as myriad
discussions in books (e.g. Kelly Parker's masterful The Continuity of
Peirce's Thought).
Granted, there are those scholars who find this facet of Peirce's
thought "mysterious" (as Tiercelin puts it) and worse. But to
willy-nilly claim that your view is Peirce's is simply not supported
by his own words and that host of others who agree that it is
Peirce's view that "that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws." Those words seem clear enough to many
scholars whether they agree with his view or not
ET: Yes, I can see it as 'mutually constitutive directionality...as
Peirce noted, the universe becomes more complex both materially and
'mentally'.
GR: Which is merely to say that Peirce was an evolutionist (some
would say "of a peculiar stripe").
ET: I don't give any priority to Mind or Matter; again, they are
hylomorphic correlates.
GR: Fine. That is *your* view; but, again, it is not every scholar's
view; and it is arguably not Peirce's which, again, is that "matter
is effete mind."
ET: I have no comment on JAS's outline.[I might be accused of some
kind of emotional derangement akin to being an anti-vaxxer!!!
GR: Please reread my post. No one is accusing anyone of anything.
Best,
Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
BEAUTY AND TERROR
JUST KEEP GOING
NO FEELING IS FINAL”
― RAINER MARIA RILKE
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 12:11 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jack, list
Yes, my focus is dialectical and embedded. 'Mind', in my view,
doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but only within a hylomorphic
correlation of both Mind and Matter [this is basic
Peirce/Aristotle].
Yes, I can see it as 'mutually constitutive directionality...as
Peirce noted, the universe becomes more complex both materially and
'mentally'.
I don't give any priority to Mind or Matter; again, they are
hylomorphic correlates.
I have no comment on JAS's outline.[I might be accused of some kind
of emotional derangement akin to being an anti-vaxxer!!!
Edwina
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5] http://e.gs
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