"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
JAS, list
We've been through this before. I would add, that, just as my readings of Peirce are my interpretation, that your readings are your interpretation - even though you never acknowledge this fact.
And, Peirce's objective idealism is not, in my reading, the same as 'pure idealism'. It is hylomorphic - and hylomorphism is NOT dualism [as you suggest - what an astounding suggestion!! ] but is monist - as Peirce says in his reference to hylopathy.
Aristotle's 'form' is comparable to Mind' - and, you are ignoring Peirce's explicit statement, which I repeat:
"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are drive to some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism" 6.24 my emphasis]. "
And MY interpretation is that Peirce rejects that the two, Mind and Matter, are independent of each other; or that either is primordial. That is, MY interpretation is different from YOUR interpretation [and again - there is no direct path from the text to either of us; we are both interpretors]….
He chooses, not idealism, but objective idealism - and that corresponds to his 'some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism'. Which means that the two, Mind and Matter, are correlates and work together. ... that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws.
And as you quote,
On Fri 24/09/21 4:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
Edwina, List:ET: 'Mind', in my view, doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but only within a hylomorphic correlation of both Mind and Matter [this is basic Peirce/Aristotle]. ... I don't give any priority to Mind or Matter; again, they are hylomorphic correlates.Hylomorphism is indeed basic Aristotle, but as Gary R. pointed out, it is certainly not basic Peirce. I am not aware of any passage in the latter's voluminous writings where he explicitly affirms that neither mind nor matter is primordial, let alone states or implies that they are "hylomorphic correlates." As John Sowa has requested, "For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations."In fact, since Aristotelian hylomorphism is the doctrine that every substance is a composite of matter and form (not mind), it is usually characterized as a type of dualism. By contrast, Peirce endorses "hylopathy" as the sole alternative to dualism, immediately adding that it is "otherwise called monism" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292, 1891).ET: NOTE: he rejects ALL three of these answers to how the two, Mind and Matter, work together.Peirce does no such thing. Here is what he actually writes.CSP: The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason--an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and reasonable.Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.
The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws. (CP 6.24, EP 1:292-293, 1891)He explicitly rejects materialism and neutralism, and then explicitly affirms idealism; specifically, objective idealism as distinguished from the pure idealism of Plato, the subjective idealism of Berkeley, and the absolute idealism of Hegel. Moreover, he also explicitly affirms idealism without the adjective "objective" in these other exact quotations (bold added).CSP: The paradox here has always been that mind and matter are of disparate natures. But the maxim of continuity will say: this disparateness is a mere matter of degree. Either mind is a peculiar kind of matter, or else matter is a peculiar sort of mind. Which is it? If mind is nothing but a highly complicated arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are landed in materialism, and nominalism is not much in error after all. But if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating theory of idealism. (R 936:3, no date)CSP: I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, EP 1:312, 1892)According to his own testimony, Peirce believed that "matter is a peculiar sort of mind"--"effete mind," "mere specialized and partially deadened mind"--which by his own definitions is idealism; and he did not believe that "mind is peculiar kind of matter," which by his own definitions is materialism. He also rejected any type of dualism, including Aristotelian hylomorphism, in accordance with his synechism.CSP: Synechism, even in its less stalwart forms, can never abide dualism, properly so called. ... In particular, the synechist will not admit that physical and psychical phenomena are entirely distinct,--whether as belonging to different categories of substance, or as entirely separate sides of one shield,--but will insist that all phenomena are of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows them to be, nay, makes them to be teleological, or purposive. (CP 7.570, EP 2:2, 1893)Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran ChristianOn Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 3:02 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:Gary R, list
This is your opinion [and I know a few others on the list do share it with you] but I disagree with your interpretation. No-one on this list has defined 'objective idealism' - but it is NOT the same as 'idealism'. This is what Peirce wrote:
"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are drive to some form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism" 6.24 my emphasis].
So- he acknowledges two 'realities' to deal with: Mind and Matter. He rejects that they are "two radically different kinds of substance' and instead, opts for monism, or 'some form of hylopathy'. What does this mean? How do these two 'non-radically different kinds of substance' work together and why does he define their relation as one of monism?
Then, he goes on and deals with the LAWS of each 'substance', Mind and Matter, and asks "Then the question arises whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken:
a] as independent …[of each other]
b] the physical law as primordial with the psychical as derived.ie..materialism
c] the psychical law as primordial with the physical as derived...ie idealism.
NOTE: he rejects ALL three of these answers to how the two, Mind and Matter, work together. Instead, he posits
d] Objective Idealism - which is that hylomorphic monism, where 'Matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws". That is Matter-is-Mind; and Mind-is-Matter.
The two 'substances' and their laws work together; neither is independent of the other; neither is primordial; they are hylopathic monism.
That's my interpretation - and I remind you, that all of our readings, yours and mine, are, because of the triadic nature of semiosis - interpretations, not dyadic Truths straight from Peirce-to-the-Reader.
Edwina
On Fri 24/09/21 3:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:Edwina, Jack, List,
ET: Yes, my focus is dialectical and embedded. 'Mind', in my view, doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but only within a hylomorphic correlation of both Mind and Matter [this is basic Peirce/Aristotle].
GR: Well, you've certainly made it clear that this is your view. Unfortunately, it is not Peirce's view. As has been argued here by myself and others, Peirce's view is that of 'objective idealism'.
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." 1891 | The Architecture of Theories | W 8:105-6; CP 6.24-5
GR: Your insistence that your view is "basic Peirce" is contradicted by the many discussions of objective idealism in articles (e.gs. "Peirce's Objective Idealism: A Defense," by Claudine Tiercelin, in Transactions and Nicholas Guardiano's, "The intelligibility of Peirce's metaphysics of objective idealism") as well as myriad discussions in books (e.g. Kelly Parker's masterful The Continuity of Peirce's Thought).Granted, there are those scholars who find this facet of Peirce's thought "mysterious" (as Tiercelin puts it) and worse. But to willy-nilly claim that your view is Peirce's is simply not supported by his own words and that host of others who agree that it is Peirce's view that "that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." Those words seem clear enough to many scholars whether they agree with his view or not
ET: Yes, I can see it as 'mutually constitutive directionality...as Peirce noted, the universe becomes more complex both materially and 'mentally'.
GR: Which is merely to say that Peirce was an evolutionist (some would say "of a peculiar stripe").
ET: I don't give any priority to Mind or Matter; again, they are hylomorphic correlates.
GR: Fine. That is *your* view; but, again, it is not every scholar's view; and it is arguably not Peirce's which, again, is that "matter is effete mind."ET: I have no comment on JAS's outline.[I might be accused of some kind of emotional derangement akin to being an anti-vaxxer!!!
GR: Please reread my post. No one is accusing anyone of anything.
Best,
Gary R“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria RilkeGary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New YorkOn Fri, Sep 24, 2021 at 12:11 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:Jack, list
Yes, my focus is dialectical and embedded. 'Mind', in my view, doesn't 'exist' separately as itself but only within a hylomorphic correlation of both Mind and Matter [this is basic Peirce/Aristotle].
Yes, I can see it as 'mutually constitutive directionality...as Peirce noted, the universe becomes more complex both materially and 'mentally'.
I don't give any priority to Mind or Matter; again, they are hylomorphic correlates.
I have no comment on JAS's outline.[I might be accused of some kind of emotional derangement akin to being an anti-vaxxer!!!
Edwina
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