Robert, Edwina, List: I continue to be puzzled by the special authority that is seemingly being given to quotations from R 1345 (c. 1896), as if it were Peirce's definitive text on any subject that it addresses, overriding anything that he wrote before it or after it. Is there a good reason for treating it this way?
In any case, here it reflects a peculiar usage of "representamen" that applies to all three correlates of "the triad," the name of which is "representation" (not "sign"). What Peirce would later call "phanerons" or "prebits" are divided categorially into *quales *(1ns); *reagents *(2ns), which can either act as agents or be acted upon as patients; and *representamens *(3ns), which can serve as either "vehicles of meaning," "natural objects," or interpretants. Reagents can always be prescinded from representamens, and quales can always be prescinded from reagents and from representamens. Hence, although Peirce omits any distinct science of phenomenology or phaneroscopy from the preliminary classifications that he presents in this particular manuscript, he is clearly employing what he would eventually identify as phenomenological or phaneroscopic analysis. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:40 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Robert, list > > That's an excellent outline of the triad and the definition of the > Representamen. and of the Intentional Interpretant and the need for the > Commens. And by the way, this section from Peirce includes a definition of > the Dynamic Object, which is, exactly as I've said before, not an external > object on its own, but is "the dynamical object does not mean something out > of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but > including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual > Experience' EP2:478 > > Exactly as I've previously outlined. I won't comment on the other issues > because I think I've made my views quite clear many times before - and they > are not in line with those of Gary R, JAS or Gary F - and this thread > hasn't been set up as a discussion but as a debate. > > Edwina > > On Sun 24/10/21 6:40 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent: > > Gary R, List, > I refer to the definition of the representamen (the number 76 of > https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM) resituated in > its original broader context on page 34 of MS 1345: > > > MS1345_034 > > ",entation [1] <#m_578724956437646480__ftn1> ; and an object which forms > one of such a triad and has for his characteristics is called a > Representamen. > > Art.8 Division 7. A Quale can, as such, be considered from only one point > of view. > > A Reagent can be considered from two formal points of view, > namely, as affected by the reaction, and so as Patient, and as affecting > the complementary factor, and so as Agent. > > 'A Representamen can be considered from three formal points of > view, namely, first as the substance of the representation, or the Vehicle > of the Meaning, which is common to the three representamens of the > triad, second as the quasi agent in the representation, conformity to > which its Truth, that is, as the Natural Object, and third, as the > quasi-patient in the representation, or that whether modification makes it > Intelligence, and this may be called the Interpretant. Thus, in looking > at a map, the map itself is the Vehicle, the country represented in the > Natural > Object, and the idea excited in the mind is the Interpretant.' (partie > reproduite > en def 76) > > Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its > intellectual characteristic neglected; and both representamen and reagent > may be considered as quales, their relative character being neglected. This > we do, for example, when we say that the word man has three letters." > > From this definition, it follows that the "intentional interpretant" > ("here is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the > mind of the utterer", EP2 478 ) not being observable, cannot be a Natural > Object. It can only give place to endless inquiries, except perhaps that > science evolving, it allows to read in the brain of the utterer objective > characters of the determination of this mind. > > Indeed, > > "The point to remember is, that whatever we say of ideas as they are in > consciousness is said of something unknowable in its immediacy. The only > thought that is really present to us is a thought we can neither think > about nor talk about. "Of thine eye I am eyebeam," says the Sphinx. We have > no reason to deny the dicta of introspection, but we have to remember that > they are all results of association, are all theoretical, bits of > instinctive psychology. We accept them, but not as literally true; only as > expressive of the impression which has naturally been made upon our > understanding. "( CP 7.425)[emphasize mine} > > If this is the case for introspection, it is, a fortiori, the case for > extrospection! > > A famous example is provided by the misadventure of Ferdinand de Saussure > > "In a letter dated July 14, 1906, Ferdinand de Saussure, after several > months of research devoted to the study of the Saturnian, this enigmatic > verse which does not obey any known scheme of classical metrics and of > which he believes he has finally succeeded in piercing the mystery, writes > in a state of excitement: > > '..I can announce to you that I now hold the victory on all the line. I > have spent two months interrogating the monster, and groping against it, > but for the last three days I have been using only heavy artillery [...] it > is through alliteration that I have managed to hold the key to the > Saturnian, which is more complicated than we imagined. The whole phenomenon > of alliteration [...] that we noticed in Saturnian, is only an > insignificant part of a more general phenomenon, or rather absolutely > total. The totality of the syllables of each Saturnian verse obeys a law of > alliteration, from the first syllable to the last; and without a single > consonant [...] a single vowel [...] a single quantity of vowel, is > scrupulously taken into account. The result is so surprising that one is > inclined to wonder above all how the authors of these verses [...] could > have had the time to indulge in such a headache: for it is a real Chinese > game...' > The euphoria of the discovery will be followed by uncertainty, > discouragement and even - we can guess it by reading the correspondence of > the master with his disciple and confidant Antoine Meillet - a form of > weariness which, in spite of the state of progress of his investigation > with, in total, a hundred of handwritten notebooks devoted to the subject, > will make him give up the publication of his research, definitively > abandoned in 1909" > > This is an example of impossible research because no scientific criteria > can be applied to it, notably the simple verification that its object > exists as a natural object. Saussure's Chinese game was nothing more than > an intellectual construction that did not resist the evaluation of his > peers, and for good reason, no one could hold the rules of this game. > > Consequently, it seems to me that those "on and off this List" who think > that the goal "in the case of a written text is always to correctly > discern the author's (intentional interpreter's) intended meaning as > expressed in the text" (Gary R), are in fact proposing to us that we play > a Chinese fantasmatic game, the rules of which they have long been trying > to establish. > > Regards, > Robert Marty > ------------------------------ > > [1] <#m_578724956437646480__ftnref1> Word cut (probably the word > Representation). The previous page is not included in MS 1345. > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ > >
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