Vincinius, List, VR: I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little. Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament" and "firstness for the final interpretant"?
This is an idiosyncratic request on my part, but lately my mind has been awash with abstract terminology. I often read the discourse on this list and wonder if contributors shouldn't have to furnish practical analogies in order to clarify their use of terms, because trying to ground some of these concepts is not easy when everyone seems to be using a similar code with different meanings in various places. Best Jack ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Vinicius Romanini <vinir...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 3:37 PM To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Dear colleagues, This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for a while now. My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's. Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than post or ante Peircean, anyway. I will restrict my comment to sign qua sign, or the proper representamen. In my opinion, a truly pragmatic account of signhood must consider not only how the sign is perceived but also how it ought to be experienced in the long run. I mean that we must take into account the final interpretant, which is the sign as it is destined to be interpreted. Roughly, A genuine qualisign has firstness both for the representamen and the final interpretant. A genuine sinsign has secondness both for the representamen and the final interpretant. A genuine legising has thirdness both for the representamen and the final interpretant. I think the above is plain. A replica is a degenerate legisign that has thirdness for the representamen but secondness for the final interpretant. Replicas are well understood too. I call holisigns those degenerate legisigns that have thirdness for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. I call altersings those degenerate sinsigns that have secondness for the representamen but firstness for the final interpretant. Holisigns are ephemeral patterns. They are patterns but tend to dissolve in experience as qualitative effects. A dune might be seen as a holisign as its shape continuously changes until it vanishes. The melody of jazz music is another example. If you gaze at the clouds in the sky, holisigns will appear in a multitude of changing patterns. A wave in itself is a holisign. General qualities, such as temperature, are holisigns. Altersigns are gentle signs of otherness. They do not have the lasting friction and brute forte of sinsigns. They pop up in perception but dissolve themselves as possibilities. Altersings are instantiations of holisigns as much as sinsigns are instantiations of legisigns. What we perceive of a holisign at any moment is an altersign. It is any alternative configuration of a pattern, if you want. The perceived feeling of a temperature is an altersign. In fact, it is the embodiment of the holisign. Holisings and altersigns are very important to the semeiotic of art. I believe these distinctions are important for the grounding and presentation of the representamen. Others will be necessary if we go up towards representation and communication. Such considerations that can help render semeiotic intelligible and useful, at least as I understand it. All the best, Vinicius Em sex., 5 de nov. de 2021 às 21:51, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> escreveu: Gary R., Phyllis, List: GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway token is ... I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token of that type. GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought? The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it is about. GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the dream, I would expect). Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream itself is still an actual thought-token. After all, the events that take place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written story is still an actual text-token. GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the expression has it. It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant. GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be better to focus on the process of semiosis rather than on the terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on classifying signs is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze the process of semiosis, especially having taken the position that the former are discrete entia rationis while the latter is a real continuum. However, I strongly believe that the proper use of the terminology forged in speculative grammar is indispensable for that task, as demonstrated by the recent on-List cases of misapplying the type/token distinction to objects of signs rather than signs themselves. GR: In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I agree, which is why I have tried to standardize some of the terminology in my own usage where Peirce himself clearly was experimenting with various alternatives, such as tone/token/type in lieu of the earlier qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the later potisign/actisign/famisign. Name/proposition/argument is another one, as opposed to term or rheme as the first class, dicisign as the second, and seme/pheme/delome as the full trichotomy. He is fairly consistent about immediate and dynamical for the two objects and the first two interpretants, but I tend to use final for the third interpretant rather than eventual, habitual, normal, or rational. GR: I'm eager to explore it further. Likewise, I am enjoying the conversation and look forward to further exchanges. I hope that more List members will chime in as Jack, Jeff, Mike, and now Phyllis already have. PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? These are excellent examples of signs embodied in other systems of expression, which I have tried to keep in mind throughout the discussion even though we have mostly been talking about written and spoken languages so far. A handwritten or printed score, a live performance, an audio recording, and even a person's internal recollection are all tokens of a piece of music, arguably conforming to different types of the same sign and obviously possessing very different tones. GR: But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what the object of that original sign is. Artistic signs tend to be highly iconic, which entails that they are not so much about denoting an object as about signifying an interpretant, namely, producing certain feelings as their primary effects. Accordingly, I am inclined to identify their creators' intentions as their objects, much like the author's intention in the case of a text. PC: So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study. Indeed, much more could and should be said here, so I am very interested to see what others will add to these initial remarks. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:24 PM Phyllis Chiasson <phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com<mailto:phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com>> wrote: My work in non-verbal inferencing patterns stems from the arts considered in light of Peirce's phenomenology. So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study. On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 3:09 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Phyllis, Jon, Gary F, List, PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? In my view it depends on whether the piece of music or dance or art object was 'reproduced' internally from something already 'composed', in which case I'd say it is a token; or if it is, shall we say, a 'spur of the moment' creation, then it is the original sign which may have tokens. But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what the object of that original sign is. And a related question: since there is obvious 'structure' even in, say, jazz improvisation (e.g., John Coltrans), or interpretive dance (Isadora Duncan), or 'action painting' (Jackson Pollock), structure that in almost all cases has its roots in previous study in the art form even if/when it diverges radically from its historically more conservative or established forms. I'm glad you've introduced the arts into this discussion, Phyllis, as there is a tendency among many -- if not most -- philosophers, semioticians, logicians, mathematicians, etc. -- to work and write as if only linguistic and mathematical signs were of interest and importance. And I've yet to be much impressed by what I've seen of work in semiotics in the arts (with a few notable exceptions, such as Martin Lefebvre) most of which is not grounded in Peircean but, rather, other schools of semiotics (again, then are exceptions, such as Claudio Guerri). But there may be work in these areas that I'm not aware of, especially as I've pretty much stopped looking for it. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:18 PM Phyllis Chiasson <phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com<mailto:phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com>> wrote: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F, Jon, List, GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly embodied here and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I utter it or not, just as a spoken or written text is embodied in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an internal sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a token? I would certainly hesitate to call it a type." That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed in language written or spoken). But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought? Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token. A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more developed way.. Jon wrote: JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because it is an individual embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same (quasi-)mind. the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an actual utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text. But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an actual utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might be put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought." Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be better to focus on the process of semiosis rather than on the terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life. I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F, and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. -- Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies School of Communications and Arts University of Sao Paulo, Brazil www.minutesemeiotic.org<http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/> www.semeiosis.com.br<http://www.semeiosis.com.br/> Skype:vinicius_romanini
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