Gary F, Jon AS, Gary R, Phyllis, et al.
Sometimes, such as when I'm done thinking about a philosophical question, I look at the time and wonder where it went. I didn't write anything down, and I didn't talk to anyone about it. Gary F's question takes the following form: are my unuttered thoughts during this period internal sign tokens? Consider a set of similar cases: A. I'm lost in thought, but occasionally muttering to myself. There is no one around to hear it, and I'm not even noticing that I'm quietly muttering. B. I'm lost in thought and sketching a diagram. The diagram is something of a mess, and my thoughts are rather confused. I consider several changes that I might make, perhaps adding lines here, erasing some there, but I don't make the all of the changes considered. After an hour of doodling, I take the sheet of paper and throw it away. I don't come back to it later, nor does anyone else read it. Whatever answer we give to your question about internal signs, I think the explanations should flow naturally to cover cases A and B. Similarly, the explanations should fit variations on A and B where someone else comes along and says, "you're muttering" what are you saying and I say "oh it's nothing" or, conversely, I reflect and offer an explanation of my thoughts. So, too, for the case of the diagram on the piece of paper when someone pulls it out of the trash and asks what I was thinking about when making the figure, and I give similar responses. What is clear is that patterns of thought unuttered today may, at some point in the future, be uttered. As such, the analysis of those unuttered thoughts should account for the future possible forms in which they might be expressed verbally, in writing or in some other form of action. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Saturday, November 6, 2021 8:04:29 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al., Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway token furnishes one example. My question was whether an unuttered, internal thought is a token. (I take “uttering” to be synonymous with “externalizing”, so I can’t say that an internal thought is an “utterance” as Jon does.) In a physiological context, specifically that of dynamic systems theory, I would say that it is probably a token of a type which is an attractor in the state space of the brain. Such attractors tend to be reiterated many times, but some of them are “strange” so that no two iterations are exactly alike, and naturally they all differ in time of occurrence, so I think the type/token distinction applies. Momentary brain events are not necessarily tokens conforming to any type, not even to a chronic condition such as epilepsy or bipolar disorder. They may be random occurrences. But a thought, I would think, would always belong to a type of a semiotic nature: it would be a signal as opposed to noise, or an attractor in a meaning space<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm>. Even a spontaneous thought can turn out to be significant, or can find itself adapted to some purpose, as all creative artists know. Come to think of it, this may be relevant to the question Gary posted the other day, whether to regard the universe as a narrative (Raposa) or an argument (Peirce<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#qarg>). A narrative is basically a representation of a sequence of events which is not necessarily meaningful in any way. An argument, on the other hand, represents a logical relation of consequence. Peirce says that the universe is “a great symbol of God's purpose”; an argument must have (and must represent) an element of purposefulness that a narrative can do without. Peirce’s assertion that the universe is an argument implies that it has a purpose. I’m inclined to associate this assertion with the 19th-century optimism which is also expressed in his belief that the universe was progressing in a definite direction, reflected anthropomorphically in a progress toward “concrete reasonableness.” As a 21st-century post-Peircean, I can’t honestly say that I share those beliefs. Nor do I believe that every event is significant. However, I notice that the term narrative, as used nowadays in the psychological and social sciences, has itself taken on an implication of purposefulness. We use our “narratives” to make sense of our lives and the lives of others, to discern the connections between actions and events. This is a natural development because we know that our actions have consequences and we would like to know what they are. Even when our actions do not have conscious purposes<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/sdg.htm#x02>, they have motivations or intentions which can be read as natural signs or tokens of some type of “purpose”, or as intimations of Thirdness in the universe. Consequently I think that in calling the universe a narrative, Raposa is not denying that the universe is an argument or has a purpose, he is merely leaving that question open. A kind of agnosticism, perhaps. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 5-Nov-21 20:53 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens Gary R., Phyllis, List: GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway token is ... I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is not a token in the semeiotic sense, and its type is not a type in the semeiotic sense. The English term "subway token" is a type, and each individual instance where and when "subway token" is written, spoken, thought of, or otherwise embodied is a token of that type. GR: ... but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought? The type is whatever definitely significant form is embodied by the unexpressed thought-token, whether words in a language, an image, a diagram, etc. The object is whatever the unexpressed thought-token denotes, i.e., that which it is about. GR: Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than the dream, I would expect). Even though the events that take place in a dream are not real, the dream itself is still an actual thought-token. After all, the events that take place in a fictional narrative are not real, but the spoken or written story is still an actual text-token. GR: What if it were a random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the expression has it. It would still be a token of a type, an individual embodiment of a definitely significant form; and it would still be about something other than itself, namely, its object. It would also be a dynamical interpretant of the (quasi-)mind that thinks it, which consists of all the signs that have previously determined it--a system of connected signs that constitutes one sign and thus can determine one such interpretant. GR: Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be better to focus on the process of semiosis rather than on the terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. I have gradually come to agree with James Liszka (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that a concentration on classifying signs is misplaced, and that it is indeed more fruitful to analyze the process of semiosis, especially having taken the position that the former are discrete entia rationis while the latter is a real continuum. However, I strongly believe that the proper use of the terminology forged in speculative grammar is indispensable for that task, as demonstrated by the recent on-List cases of misapplying the type/token distinction to objects of signs rather than signs themselves. GR: In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I agree, which is why I have tried to standardize some of the terminology in my own usage where Peirce himself clearly was experimenting with various alternatives, such as tone/token/type in lieu of the earlier qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the later potisign/actisign/famisign. Name/proposition/argument is another one, as opposed to term or rheme as the first class, dicisign as the second, and seme/pheme/delome as the full trichotomy. He is fairly consistent about immediate and dynamical for the two objects and the first two interpretants, but I tend to use final for the third interpretant rather than eventual, habitual, normal, or rational. GR: I'm eager to explore it further. Likewise, I am enjoying the conversation and look forward to further exchanges. I hope that more List members will chime in as Jack, Jeff, Mike, and now Phyllis already have. PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? These are excellent examples of signs embodied in other systems of expression, which I have tried to keep in mind throughout the discussion even though we have mostly been talking about written and spoken languages so far. A handwritten or printed score, a live performance, an audio recording, and even a person's internal recollection are all tokens of a piece of music, arguably conforming to different types of the same sign and obviously possessing very different tones. GR: But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what the object of that original sign is. Artistic signs tend to be highly iconic, which entails that they are not so much about denoting an object as about signifying an interpretant, namely, producing certain feelings as their primary effects. Accordingly, I am inclined to identify their creators' intentions as their objects, much like the author's intention in the case of a text. PC: So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study. Indeed, much more could and should be said here, so I am very interested to see what others will add to these initial remarks. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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