Jon and other folks in this thread,
[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]
Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are
products of evolution rather than logic?
Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that landed us in the
Anthropocene!
Love, gary
Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
} Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [Daodejing 52
(Feng/English)] {
<https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>
<peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
List:
For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I am now
suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished Principles
of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised subscriptions (1894)
and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a forward, and saying that
the first volume "is devoted to the consideration of the question of where we
are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." Moreover, the text references
Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 (c. 1893), and begins to discuss
the three grades of clearness that he introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear" (1878)--which he updated to serve as chapter 16 of How to Reason: A
Critick of Arguments (1894)--and presented again in "The Logic of Relatives"
(1897). Presumably, he would have been keen to revisit them once more after
William James started popularizing pragmatism (1898).
Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with pessimism
and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he summarizes all three
with respect to cosmology and knowledge.
CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then
1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to that
same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past;
2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or
tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole;
3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite
tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future different
from that in the infinitely distant past.
These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various special
applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human knowledge. ...
Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much to
support it.
The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development toward a
destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt from which it
first set out.
The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about,
appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into disputes.
The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate settlement,
which must be called the truth.
Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding view of
the constitution of the universe.
In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy that
Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, including
materialism/physicalism and necessitarianism/determinism--additional
characteristics of our intellectual climate that are contrary to
synechism/pragmaticism.
CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact adherence
to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to designate a general
type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has discovered that the
universe consists of molecules moving about under the governance of inflexible
law, the law of energy; that that is all there is to it; and that consequently
the ideas of God, Freedom of the Soul, and Immortality are silly superstitions.
That whole type of opinion I think superficial. ...
If the Büchnerite cared to pause to listen to my answer to his question of
whether I am not in favor of Büchner and a philosophy based on facts instead of
a philosophy based on tradition, he might be somewhat surprised. For I should
tell him that, to my mind, his own opinion is based on tradition, in the most
unwholesome way possible. He converts science into an infallible Pope. ...
The Büchnerites talk of their doctrine as the "teaching of science." But it
certainly is not science; it is a philosophical doctrine, the result of a
generalization from physics. It seems to me a hasty and overconfident
generalization. ...
The Büchnerites undertake to make use of the truths of physics to answer the
questions which are the furthest removed from physics that any questions
possibly can be.
In fact, Peirce indicates in the advertisement for his ambitious Principles of
Philosophy that its first volume (out of twelve!) was "Nearly ready" and would
include "Sketch of a thoroughgoing philosophy of continuity. The great opponent
of this philosophy has been in history, and is in logic, infallibilism, whether
in its milder ecclesiastical form, or in its more dire scientistic and
materialistic apparitions." My working title for a more extensive paper based
on my 10-minute presentation is "Thoroughgoing Synechism," so I am curious
whether that sketch has survived in a manuscript somewhere. It might be R 946,
"An Outline Sketch of the Synechistic Philosophy," which contains discarded
drafts for the opening paragraphs of "Immortality in the Light of Synechism"
(EP 2:1-3, 1893). One of them states, "My own thorough-going synechism is the
doctrine that continuity rules the whole domain of experience ..."
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
/ twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
