Gary F., List: I did not claim "that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum bonum*," I said that according to Peirce, concrete reasonableness is the *summum bonum* and utter determinacy is the state that the universe *would *reach as an ideal limit in the infinite future, but never actually *will *reach. This follows from his statement in KS, as quoted during your 10-minute presentation, that "the first of all logical principles is that the indeterminate should determine itself as best it may" (EP 2:324). The corresponding "perfect knowledge" is what an infinite community *would *believe after infinite inquiry--again, an ideal limit, not an actual achievement.
Of course, the choice of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum* is not at all arbitrary. Peirce describes it as "a state of things that *reasonably recommends itself in itself* aside from any ulterior consideration" (CP 5.130, EP 2:201, 1903), "the state of things which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason" (CP 1.611, EP 2:253, 1903), and "that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason" (CP 1.191, EP 2:260, 1903). In summary, "The only desirable object which is quite satisfactory in itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it, is the reasonable itself. I do not mean to put this forward as a demonstration; because, like all demonstrations about such matters, it would be a mere quibble, a sheaf of fallacies. I maintain simply that it is an experiential truth" (CP 8.140, EP 2:60, 1901). As we have discussed in the past, I understand "the perfect sign" that Peirce describes in EP 2:545n25 (1906) to be the entire universe; "perfect" in this context is roughly synonymous with "complete," not "flawless." As a quasi-mind, he says that it "must evidently have, like anything else, its special qualities of susceptibility to determination"; or as he puts it elsewhere, "The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906). As such, it is constantly becoming *more *determinate, which is not at all synonymous with being "increasingly mindless." Again, the ideal limit of *utter *determinacy will never *actually *be reached--"an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future" (CP 6.33, EP 1:297, 1891). Best I can tell, Peirce's "reduction to three of the possible sentiments toward the whole of the universe" is not a trichotomy in accordance with his three categories. Instead, it is an application of a mathematical/logical principle that he discusses in several other writings--any sequence is either elliptical, parabolic, or hyperbolic based on whether the closed curve representing it in projective geometry intersects the line representing infinity at zero, one, or two points. I discuss this in detail, including its implications for time and cosmology, in sections 6-7 of my "Temporal Synechism" paper. As I said before, our reasoning/learning *about *the universe is recursive, but the *overall *process of semiosis is hyperbolic--from the dynamical object through the sign toward the final interpretant, just like time flows from the past through the present toward the future. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 8:44 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of > his life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else > *should* share the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum > bonum*, or is *better* than a less determinate state of things, *or* that > the universe really tends to move in that direction. > > The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly > arbitrary. It would also entail the death of *semiosis* (along with > everything that has any life in it), and since all thought and all > knowledge is in signs, it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what > you mean by “perfect knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to > the “perfect sign” as Peirce describes it > <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm#onesign>? If the perfect sign is a > “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be > increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook? > > Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t > the ideal *summum bonum* also be evolving? > > The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will > lead the greater community closer to the whole truth is a psychological > characteristic that can’t be reasonably extrapolated to the ultimate > purpose of the universe — or even to the esthetic ideal of pragmatism, in > my opinion. It’s a concession by Peirce to linear thinking. And I think his > reduction to three of the possible sentiments toward the whole of the > universe one instance where he “forces divisions to a Procrustean bed of > trichotomy” (CP1.568). > > Love, gary > > Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg > > } Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description > whatever. [Peirce, CP 7.119] { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> >
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