Jerry - list Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound
1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is: Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is: Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads. Edwina > On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > > List: > > Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my > feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. > Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a > critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or > controversial (outside the CSP community.) > The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of > mathematics. > The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” > (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to > carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense. > That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that > is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the > implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set > of triadic relations. > > From these perspectives, I now give an examples. > When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning > interpreted as a “triadic relation”. > > “HEADACHE”. > > Or > > “ORANGE” > > How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of > interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other sense > or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.) > > In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) > (Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the triadic > relations merely adjectives? > > Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s > phrases are welcome. > > (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered > pairs” in set theory.) > (Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is > correctly remembered.) > > Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > Participle > relātus (feminine relāta <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relata#Latin>, > neuter relātum <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relatum#Latin>); first > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_first_declension>/second-declension > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_second_declension> participle > Perfect passive participle of referō <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/refero> > (having been) driven <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/driven> or carried > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/carried> back > (having been) returned <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/returned>, restored > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/restored>, repaid > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/repaid> > (having been) reported <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reported> > (having been) reconsidered <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconsidered> > >> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: >> >> List >> >> I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the >> quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as >> having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of >> Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness >> has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third >> degree. >> >> These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in >> meaning from the quotation provided by JAS >> >>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in >>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two >>> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, >>> to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the >>> immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is >>> secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R >>> 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7) >> >> The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that >> the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of >> informational content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer >> to the determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with >> the categories. That is, although JAS declares: >> >>> In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate >>> (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns) >> >> >> I continue to disagree, since this is setting up the semiotic triad and >> hexagon as having the Interpretants all in a categorical mode of Thirdness! >> But we can see from even the list of ten classes, that there is only ONE >> class where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - the Argument >> Symbolic Legisign. [See 2.234-264 and also 8.341]. All the other nine >> classes have the Interpretant in a mode of either Firstness [there are SIX >> of these] or in a mode of Secondness [ there are three of these]. >> >> With regard to the following quotation >> >> >>> CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at >>> once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and >>> to another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen >>> determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. >>> 1901-2) >> >> I consider that the triad is made up of three correlates or relations, and >> is irreducible. My reading of the above is that the mediate >> Representamen/Sign does not stand in - which suggests some kind of passive >> existence - but actually functions, in that it acts; it transforms the >> information of the Object into a meaning, an Interpretant, according to the >> knowledge base /habits, held within the Sign/Representamen in itself. >> >> I see no evidence in the many quotations provided that " the >> representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to its object and >> interpretant, it is not that relation itself.” >> >> I consider that the Sign/Representamen is a mediate node in the triadl; it >> is an active relation and its function is to do just that - mediate between >> the Object and Interpretant. Therefore - I agree that the Sign/Representamen >> can be defined as >> >>> "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object >>> and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907). >> >> And note - that Peirce says ‘of whosoever mode of being’ - which means that >> this Sign/Representamen can function in any of the modal categories - and we >> can see in the ten classes, that it is in the mode of Firstness only once, >> in the mode of Thirdness six times, and in the mode of Secondness, three >> times. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >>> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> List: >>> >>> For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of >>> a triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most >>> complex" right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, >>> object, and interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP >>> 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three >>> interpretants in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as >>> follows. >>> >>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in >>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two >>> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, >>> to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the >>> immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is >>> secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R >>> 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7) >>> >>> CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine >>> Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the >>> Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, >>> however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the >>> distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any >>> Sign. ... >>> This triplet concerns the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to >>> call it the real object, since it may be unreal. It is the object that >>> truly determines the sign. (R 339:277r&279r, 1906 Apr 2-3) >>> >>> It seems clear that the rational and normal interpretants in these passages >>> correspond directly to what Peirce calls the eventual and final >>> interpretants elsewhere, reflecting his confession "that my own conception >>> of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, >>> 1906). In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly >>> degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate >>> (2ns of 3ns). Again, these are results of phaneroscopic analysis--1ns, 2ns, >>> and 3ns are "the most universal categories of elements of all experience" >>> (CP 1.417, c. 1896), by no means limited to Peirce's various trichotomies >>> for sign classification. >>> >>> Note also that the three divisions in his best-known taxonomy are according >>> to the nature of the representamen/sign itself, its relation to its object, >>> and its relation to its interpretant (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903). The >>> representamen/sign, object, and interpretant are all correlates, not >>> relations, although they only serve as such within their genuine triadic >>> relation to each other. As Peirce states repeatedly (bold added in >>> quotations below), the representamen/sign stands in or has that relation to >>> its object and interpretant, it is not that relation itself. >>> >>> CSP: A representamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at >>> once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object and >>> to another correlate, its interpretant. which is a possible representamen >>> determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. >>> 1901-2) >>> >>> CSP: A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine >>> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of >>> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic >>> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP >>> 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903) >>> >>> CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the >>> Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate >>> being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible >>> Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic >>> relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, >>> EP 2:290, 1903) >>> >>> CSP: A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on >>> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring >>> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own >>> relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904) >>> >>> CSP: As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its >>> Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. >>> (EP 2:544n22, 1906) >>> >>> CSP: A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its >>> Interpretant. (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908) >>> >>> Again, although that relation can be called "representing," I prefer to >>> call it "mediating" because Peirce more generally defines a sign as >>> "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object >>> and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907). >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 5:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>> Jerry, List: >>>> >>>> I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here >>>> and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the >>>> origins of the 'triadic relations'"? From what are we seeking to >>>> distinguish Peirce's semeiotic? What do you have in mind as semantic >>>> aspects of the triadic relations? >>>> >>>> My understanding is that the immediate object and immediate interpretant >>>> are internal to the sign, while the dynamical object, dynamical >>>> interpretant, and final interpretant are external to the sign. Presumably, >>>> that is why Peirce's late taxonomies for sign classification include >>>> separate trichotomies for the sign's dyadic relations with the latter >>>> three correlates, but not the former two. >>>> >>>> Regarding where syntax originates and resides, this passage seems relevant. >>>> >>>> CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest >>>> Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It >>>> rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. >>>> But I must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be >>>> truly expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that >>>> the Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and >>>> Predicate as the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed >>>> Abel." This is identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by >>>> Cain": It is only the grammatical dress that is different. Other things >>>> being equal, everybody will prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; >>>> but why is it simpler? Because in putting the cause before the effect, it >>>> in that respect diagrammatizes the truth. What are the Subjects of this >>>> Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not only a Subject of the Proposition, >>>> but is the principal Subject of the Assertion which a historian would >>>> naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on >>>> one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in >>>> causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed murder upon, is a >>>> third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without extraneous >>>> experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is >>>> left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is true >>>> that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a >>>> babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of >>>> exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with the >>>> flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as >>>> to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can >>>> be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. >>>> (R 664, 1910) >>>> >>>> The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three >>>> words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and >>>> Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to >>>> understand--and exactly one predicate, a pure or continuous predicate that >>>> "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) >>>> only by its syntax. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be >>>> separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this >>>> approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we >>>> have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we >>>> have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, >>>> I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it >>>> (https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates). >>>> >>>> In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of >>>> indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite >>>> individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous >>>> predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the >>>> arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for >>>> negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of >>>> discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines >>>> increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more >>>> definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate >>>> (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has >>>> two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for >>>> representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as >>>> I have noted previously). >>>> >>>> When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine >>>> triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is >>>> the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling >>>> complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot >>>> is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are >>>> genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, >>>> and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly >>>> degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the >>>> dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the >>>> sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to >>>> the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, >>>> 1906). Again ... >>>> >>>> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, >>>> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both >>>> determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines >>>> the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the >>>> interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this >>>> "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates >>>> of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. >>>> (EP 2:410, 1907) >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler >>>> <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: >>>>> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >>>>> logics... >>>>>> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the >>>>>> sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >>>>>> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >>>>> >>>>> Jon: >>>>> >>>>> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >>>>> the following. >>>>> >>>>> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between >>>>> the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and >>>>> other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >>>>> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >>>>> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >>>>> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the >>>>> writer. >>>>> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >>>>> relations”? >>>>> >>>>> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >>>>> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >>>>> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >>>>> describer? >>>>> >>>>> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >>>>> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >>>>> >>>>> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >>>>> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >>>>> neither /nor? >>>>> Cheers >>>>> >>>>> Jerry >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >>> links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >>> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
