Helmut, List:

HR: A sign (1) cannot determine an interpretant (3).


On the contrary, the sign not only *can*, but *always does* determine the
interpretant. One more time ...

CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and *determines the
interpretant* *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign." (EP 2:410, 1907; bold added)


This is an analysis of what happens in an individual *event of semiosis* as
prescinded from the real and continuous process. What I call Peirce's "rule
of determination"--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but
a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by
nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)--applies specifically within
the logical order of the various trichotomies for *sign classification*.
His 1903 taxonomy has three of them--for the nature of the sign itself
(qualisign/sinsign/legisign), its relation with its object
(iconic/indexical/symbolic), and its relation with its interpretant
(rheme/dicisign/argument). A qualisign can determine nothing but an icon,
which can determine nothing but a rheme; and an argument can be determined
by nothing but a symbol, which can be determined by nothing but a legisign.
The upshot is that there are only ten classes of signs, not 27 as would be
the case if all combinations were possible.

That said, Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) have much
broader application than these "categorical modes," including phaneroscopic
analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating that
yields one sign with two objects and three interpretants.

HR: Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the
determining entity.


This is also true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign,
which co-determines the dynamical interpretant--its actual effect on that
individual interpreter--along with the sign being analyzed. Hence, the *same
*sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants for different
interpreters who have different collateral experience and different habits
of interpretation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

>  Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper
> in the internet wrote:
> "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves,
> in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and
> in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a
> factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)"
>
> So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the
> relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but
> sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from
> its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say,
> that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think.
>
> Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but
> modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and,
> as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition.
> Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third"
> belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the
> difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad.
> Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or,
> as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1)
> cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the
> interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add,
> that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist
> alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so.
> Best, Helmut
>
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