Helmut, List:

I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that would warrant such an
interpretation. Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of
representing or (more generally) mediating establishes that any one sign is
determined by its two objects (genuine = dynamical, degenerate = immediate)
and determines its three interpretants (genuine = final, degenerate =
dynamical, doubly degenerate = immediate). Again, I understand
the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the concrete
manifestations of the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants in *human *
semiosis.

I also discuss the intentional/effectual/communicational interpretants in
my *Semiotica *paper (link below). Peirce evidently changed his mind about
the first of these soon after introducing them (EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9)--"I
have thus omitted the *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is
betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as
it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it
is in no sense the interpretant of *that *sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). In
other words, since the intentional interpretant is "a determination of the
mind of the utterer," it cannot be an interpretant of the sign being
analyzed; instead, it must be the dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign
of the same object. On the other hand, since the effectual interpretant is
"a determination of the mind of the interpreter," it clearly corresponds to
the dynamical interpretant of the sign being analyzed; and since the
communicational interpretant is "a determination of that mind into which
the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
communication should take place," I argue that it must be *internal *to the
sign being analyzed and thus corresponds to the immediate interpretant. The
final interpretant is absent here, because this is an analysis of a
discrete "event of semiosis" as an *ens rationis* prescinded from the real
and continuous process.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:24 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
>  we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the
> interpretant into
>
> -immediate, dynamical, final
>
> -emotional, energetic, logical
>
> -intentional, effectual, communicational.
>
> Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns?
>
> And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in
> which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical.
>
> Best, Helmut
> *Gesendet:* Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr
> *Von:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *An:* "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
> Helmut, List:
>
>
> HR: But why are there more than three interpretants?
>
>
> There are *not *more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of
> naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce
> scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into
> immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being
> relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin,
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to
> agree with this "received view."
>
> One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are *orthogonal *to the
> immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP
> 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the *actual *effect of
> a sign on an interpreter--its *dynamical *interpretant--is either a
> feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my *Semiotica
> *paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (
> https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only
> texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of
> emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various
> manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these
> are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as
> "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final
> interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of signs in general.
>
> Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's *intentions*.
> Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am
> merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his
> own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes (
> https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=asburyjournal),
> "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the
> study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to
> be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may
> be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous
> and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and
> achievement may coincide more often than not."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
>
>> John, List,
>>
>> I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted
>> somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it
>> is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very
>> complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s
>> appleman).
>>
>> From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness
>> has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and
>> with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three
>> interpretants?
>>
>> I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has
>> two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of
>> dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also
>> categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and
>> secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts
>> are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.
>>
>> Like this, there are three times three interpretants.
>>
>> Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng.
>>
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Reply via email to