John, List: JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different theories about time.
I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm). JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains why the first and second are related. This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as *mediation*, and it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted previously. CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7) Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are related, reflecting the *intelligibility *of that relation. Nevertheless, this answer does not require a verb that names a *triadic *relation; and although it provides a *reason *for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have been entirely accidental, not the result of *any *goal/purpose/intention at all. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 3:05 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Edwina, Jon, List, > > I'm sorry for not responding sooner to this note. But now that I finished > the article on phaneroscopy, I'm moving on to the the article on Delta > graphs. I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week. > > In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and > different theories about time. The important point about Thirdness is that > the Third is always an abstract reason (or theory) for relating the first > and second. That is why the most direct way to formalize any instance of > Thirdness is to clarify and determine that reason. And the starting point > for any such determination is to ask a question. > > The method of asking questions is as old as Socrates. Aristotle adopted > and systematized the questions -- every one of his 10 categories is the > answer to a question. The medieval Scholastics, which Peirce studied in > detail, developed many systematic methods for asking questions. If you > search for "question" in CP, you'll get over 1500 answers. I haven't > checked every one, but the ones I did check usually lead to the initial > stages of an investigation of some sort. > > As for time, questions about time do not rule out an open-ended variety of > answers, In fact, Einstein's questions about time were the starting point > of his theory of relativity. Peirce also asked questions about time and > space that indicated options that were distinctly different from Newton's > assumptions. They were closer to Einstein's, but there was much more work > to do -- as Einstein and others showed. > > There is much more to say about these issues. But the method of asking > "Why?" to begin an investigation of Thirdness is consistent with Peirce's > method of beginning any kind of investigation. Just look at the many > occurrences of the word "question" in CP. > > There are also 332 instances of 'why' and 1193 instances of 'how' in CP. > As just one example of both, note CP 2.717: > > "The distinction between the 'Why' of hypothesis and the 'How' of > induction is not very great; both ask for a statistical > syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known > conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic > inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed > the explanatory syllogism." > > Note that Peirce wrote "the 'why' of hypothesis'. Since every hypothesis > is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any Thirdness > would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains > why the first and second are related. Therefore, CP 2.717 justifies my > claim about asking a question Why about any instance of Thirdness. It is > the beginning of an investigation to determine the reason, goal, purpose, > or intention that relates the first and second. QED (Quite Easily Done). > > John >
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