Mike, List: Indeed, the online Commens Dictionary entry for 3ns ( http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/thirdness) consists of 21 Peirce quotations, none of which includes the word "intentionality." Two of them do have the word "intention," and here is the first.
CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. If two forces are combined according to the parallelogram of forces, their resultant is a real 3rd. Yet any force may, by the parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of two others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one isolated event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present in the resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. But what makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature which calls for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. Thus, intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes 3ns genuine. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7) In this excerpt, it is *intelligibility *that is essential for genuine 3ns, not intentionality; at least, not "the intention of a rational agent." Anything that occurs "by virtue of an intelligible law"-- including a spark causing gunpower to explode, as well as (presumably) graphite crystals forming in soot or those same crystals becoming diamonds under high pressure and temperature--is an example of 3ns. Peirce says much the same thing many years later. CSP: The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol. But I say the same element is in all signs. The essential thing is that it is capable of being represented. Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature. (CP 8.268, 1903) As I noted earlier in this thread (quoting that last sentence), for Peirce, although "*really being* and *being represented* are very different" (EP 2:303, c. 1901), really being and being representable--and thus being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, c. 1901). After all ... CSP: [T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906) Here is the second quotation for 3ns with the word "intention." CSP: Let us now take up being *in futuro*. As in the other cases, this is merely an avenue leading to a purer apprehension of the element it contains. An absolutely pure conception of a Category is out of the question. Being *in futuro* appears in mental forms, intentions and expectations. Memory supplies us a knowledge of the past by a sort of brute force, a quite binary action, without any reasoning. But all our knowledge of the future is obtained through the medium of something else. ... Intellectual triplicity, or Mediation, is my third category. (CP 2.86, 1902) In this excerpt, the emphasis is ultimately on *mediation*, which is what Peirce describes elsewhere as the purest conception of 3ns one can have (CP 1.530, 1903). However, the ellipsis omits a considerable amount of text, including a few examples where intention is indeed the hallmark of 3ns--a dog fetching a book for its master, a man giving a brooch to his wife, and a merchant throwing a datestone that hits a Jinee. The absence of intention *in these specific cases* would render them "purely mechanical actions," dyadic instead of triadic, 2ns rather than 3ns. Nevertheless, as already noted, there are abundant passages (like the first quotation above) where Peirce treats other ideas, where intentionality is lacking, as paradigmatic of 3ns--such as continuity, diffusion, the whole numbers, and even explosions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 4:21 PM Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi John, > > CSP: "Some of the ideas of prominent Thirdness which require closer study, > preliminary to philosophy, are Continuity, Diffusion, Growth, and > Intelligence. . . . the idea of an endless row of discrete objects, which > is the image of the system of whole numbers, contains the idea of Thirdness > in considerable prominence." (NEM 4.310, 1893-5) > > I do not see intentionality in either diffusion or the whole numbers. BTW, > an electronic search of Peirce's texts quickly turn up multiples of such > examples. > > I think I understand a point you are trying to make, but I think you could > present it more correctly. > > I'll leave the last comment to you as I am finished with this topic. > > Best, Mike > On 2/13/2024 1:50 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Mike, > > I realize that Peirce mentioned "crystals and bees" in the same sentence. > But we have to consider his classification of the sciences. Pure > mathematics comes first, and it does not depend on anything else. It > incudes all varieties, including formal or mathematical logic, discrete > math, and continuous math. And Peirce followed Aristotle in insisting that > continuous spaces (of which a line is a 1-D space) do not have points as > parts. For Aristotle and Peirce, points are markers that designate a locus > *ON *a space, but are not parts *OF* the space. > > That is the basis for Aristotle's solution to Zeno's paradox about > Achilles and the turtle, which Peirce knew very well. > > Phaneroscopy depends only on mathematics, not semeiotic. For Peirce, the > phaneron is raw, unprocessed and uninterpreted experience. (Modern > cognitive science has more to say about these issues, but it may be > deferred for analyzing what Peirce wrote.) The result of analyzing the > phaneron is expressed in linguistic terms, which depend on psychic science, > which may employ the methods of any and every science that precedes it. > That includes all previous sciences, including the physical sciences and > other psychic sciences. > > MB> I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of > Thirdness, but is not definitive of it. > > I agree that Peirce did not define 3ns in terms of intentionality. But > every example that he cited does indeed involve intentionality. Can > anybody find a single example of Thirdness in any writings by Peirce that > does not involve intentions at least at the level of a bacterium swimming > upstream in a glucose gradient. Even a description of how plants grow > would involve Thirdness in the same sense as a bacterium. > > But a description of a crystal could be stated in two ways. If you > consider the structure of the crystal as the desired final state, then a > description in those terms would be stated in *TERMINOLOGICAL *thirdness. > That may be the reason why Peirce wrote "crystals and bees". And that > answer involves something very close to intentionality: In forming a > diamond, each atom of carbon goes to a position where it minimizes the > total energy of the crystal structure. In effect, the carbon atom "wants" > to minimize energy in the same sense that a bacterium wants to ingest > glucose. > > But if you look at the way crystals actually grow in nature, each atom or > molecule in the crystal goes into its spot in the structure by principles > of 2-ness -- following the strongest forces that act upon it. Those are > *EXTERNAL *forces that act upon the atoms. That is very different from > the *INTERNAL *forces in the bacterium that govern how it behaves in the > presence of an external glucose gradient. > > Take for example the two most common carbon crystals: graphite and > diamond. At modest level of heat, such as burning wood or paper, any > unburnt carbon forms soot. If you examine that soot with a powerful > microscope, you'll find that the soot particles contain very small graphite > crystals mixed with other residues of burning. That can be explained by > the atoms clumping together in a low energy state by 2ns, not 3ns, > > But if you put the graphite under high compression at high temperatures, > you can force the carbon atoms even closer together in a state with lower > energy: diamond crystals. Those are also external forces that act upon > the carbon atoms. > > Peirce knew the chemistry of his day very well. But the atomic hypothesis > of his day and theories about crystal formation were in their infancy. > With modern theories, descriptions at the level of 2ns can explain chemical > reactions and the way atoms move in forming crystals. > > John > > ------------------------------ > *From*: "Mike Bergman" <m...@mkbergman.com> <m...@mkbergman.com> > *Sent*: 2/12/24 5:19 PM > > Hi John, > > I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of Thirdness, > but is not definitive of it. JAS just posted "Continuity represents 3ns > almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882), which I concur best captures > (with Mind) Peirce's prominent view of Thirdness, and contintuity does not > require intentionality. You might even diagram it out. > > And don't forget crystals (and atoms). > > Best, Mike > On 2/12/2024 3:59 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Mike, > > In every example and application that Peirce wrote or cited, Thirdness > involves intentionality. But intentionality is not an anthropomorphic > notion, it is biomorphic in the most fundamental sense. > > Lynn Margulis wrote that a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose > gradient is a primitive example of intentionality, and no non-living > physical system shows any kind of intentionality, I believe that Peirce > would agree, since he cited dogs, parrots, bees, and even plants at various > times. > > And by the way, viruses don't have intentions, since they're not alive. > They are signs that are interpreted by living things to produce more signs > of the same kind. > > John > > -- > __________________________________________ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __________________________________________ > >
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