List:

An aspect of Peirce's writings that presents both challenges and
opportunities for scholars of his thought is the fact that so many of his
texts remain unpublished. Yesterday, I came across a passage in one such
manuscript that is highly relevant to our recent discussions about how God
as *Ens necessarium* fulfills the logical requirement for a rational
explanation of the co-realty of the three universes. It is in one of the
drafts for his series of articles on pragmaticism in *The Monist*.

CSP: Unless we were to think reason in general futile, which neither you
reader nor I can, we have the problem before us to explain the sum total of
the real, however vaguely. To explain anything is to show it to be a
necessary consequence. To say that the total real is a consequence of utter
nothing without substance or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is
to suppose a necessary something whose mode of being transcends reality.
This is vague enough. 'Necessary being' is the equivalent of 'something,'
since nothing is self-contradictory and impossible. But a necessary being
adequate to account for the sum total of reality, however inscrutable, is
not in all respects entirely vague.
The exact logician with his bare mathematical apparatus finds it impossible
to give any thoroughgoing formal analysis of thought without regarding it
as the product of a thinking activity; and he thus sees more clearly than
another man, perhaps, the ineluctability of the conception of creative
thought. An immanent God will not answer the purpose, although it would
seem that creation must in some vague sense be needed for the fulfillment
of His being. But our idea of Him and of the mode of His being must remain
vague in the extreme (though not utterly so); and as vague,
self-contradictory. But pragmaticism is inseparable from the doctrine that
all human thought and meaning must carry the anthropomorphic stamp,
disguise it as you will. In proportion as an object is more
incomprehensible we are compelled more markedly to resort to human ideals,
social activities and passional elements to make anything out of it. If I
allowed myself to continue, I fear I should stump myself upon a theological
argument, while my only purpose is to show that pragmaticism is favorable
to religion.
I will conclude, then, with the opinion that for the pragmaticistic
logician, nature (including the [illegible] works of men) is the symbol of
God to Humanity, and pure heuretic science makes it the prayer book of an
elevating worship. (R 288:91-92[178-181], 1905)


This confirms what I have been suggesting for years--Peirce's statement in
CP 6.490 (1908) that "the three universes must actually be absolutely
necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" is part of a *reductio
ad absurdum*. As he states plainly here, any claim that three-category
reality somehow came into being on its own, as "a necessary consequence ...
of utter nothing ... is absurd" because "nothing is self-contradictory and
impossible." Of course, that this was his position should have been
indisputable already from what he wrote seven years earlier--"Now the
question arises, what necessarily resulted from that [initial] state of
things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless
nothing in particular necessarily resulted. ... I say that nothing *necessarily
*resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom" (CP 6.218-219, 1898).

Moreover, Peirce again explicitly rejects "an immanent God," but this time
he also explicitly affirms that "a necessary something ... transcends
reality," with the caveat that "creation must in some vague sense be needed
for the fulfillment of His being." As he says elsewhere, "I think we must
regard Creative Activity as an inseparable attribute of God" (CP 6.506, c.
1906). Nevertheless, he uses the word "vaguely" or "vague" six different
times in this passage, consistent with his statements elsewhere that "'God'
is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than almost any, is
*vague*" (CP 6.494, c. 1906); and that "we must not predicate any Attribute
of God otherwise than vaguely and figuratively, since God, though in a
sense essentially intelligible, is nevertheless essentially
incomprehensible" (SWS:283, 1909).

Finally, Peirce makes it clear that he is not interested in offering "a
theological argument," wishing only "to show that pragmaticism is favorable
to religion" because it must "resort to human ideals, social activities and
passional elements to make anything out of" God as an incomprehensible
object. He concludes by reiterating that the entire universe is one immense
sign, "the symbol of God to Humanity," and that engaging in "pure heuretic
science" is a form of worship. After all, "if contemplation and study of
the physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct
analogous to the influence of a great man's works or conversation, then
that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that *any *human
attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he [the pragmaticist] means by
'God'" (CP 6.502, c. 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Reply via email to