List: Just for the record, here are some additional remarks about God in R 288.
CSP: Could I be assured that other men candidly and deliberately doubt any proposition which I had regarded as indubitable, that fact would inevitably cause me to doubt it too. I ought not, however, lightly to admit that they do so doubt a proposition which the most thorough criticism has left quite indubitable by myself; for there are other states of mind that can easily be mistaken for doubt. Good examples are not easily found, since the Critical Common Sensist in truth doubts more than most men, including critics. The belief in God will illustrate what is meant. It is very commonly rejected because the disbelievers do not consider the proposition in its vague irresistible sense, but find objections to too precided senses. Many do believe but reject the word in favor of the Unknowable, or something of the sort. Some have been persuaded they ought not to believe, yet do believe, some [illegible] consciously, others unconsciously. About all the theologians and the old Scotch philosophers with them committed the same mistake of too much preciding the original beliefs. (R 288:40-41[79-80[) CSP: Questioner D. But am I to be told that I mean nothing by God but the creator? *Pragmaticist*. No, I do not say that. The concept of God,--if concept be the word,--is necessarily vague in the extreme. Unless, like some pragmatists, we are to satisfy ourselves with a finite God, as I emphatically cannot, or with some other low and unworthy conception, we cannot avoid contradictions. I do not see that we can mean anything by the being of God, but a being that is indefinite. But in those respects in which a concept is vague and therefore liable to be self-contradictory, it plainly cannot be pragmaticistic meaning, and therefore should not be considered as intellectual. Possibly it would do to say that it is a rational emotion; but it really seems to belong to no recognized type of representation. (R 288:79-80[157&159]) In both these passages, Peirce again emphasizes the *vagueness *of the concept of God. In the first one, he calls it "irresistible" and suggests that people who claim to disbelieve in God are really just objecting to *precise *definitions. In the second one, he denies that God is finite, as he does in several other texts. CSP: Pragmaticism consists in recognizing all concepts as anthropomorphic; and the more causal a concept is the more anthropomorphic must the pragmaticist apprehend it. As his common sense prevents him from identifying himself with his body, so he will not think of God as immanent in the universe, though he must think that God's fulfillment of His Being in some vague sense required the Creation. The pursuit of pure heuretic science seems to him the highest mode of worship, and fully as much so in a Häckel, a Leidy, or a Laplace as in a Kelvin or an Asa Gray or a Benjamin Peirce, consciousness being no more than the skin of the mind. (R 288:82[161]) This seems to be a shorter and less detailed draft of what I quoted previously--affirming the anthropomorphism of all concepts, rejecting the immanence of God, and describing scientific inquiry as worship, even for professing unbelievers. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 26, 2024 at 5:07 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > An aspect of Peirce's writings that presents both challenges and > opportunities for scholars of his thought is the fact that so many of his > texts remain unpublished. Yesterday, I came across a passage in one such > manuscript that is highly relevant to our recent discussions about how God > as *Ens necessarium* fulfills the logical requirement for a rational > explanation of the co-realty of the three universes. It is in one of the > drafts for his series of articles on pragmaticism in *The Monist*. > > CSP: Unless we were to think reason in general futile, which neither you > reader nor I can, we have the problem before us to explain the sum total of > the real, however vaguely. To explain anything is to show it to be a > necessary consequence. To say that the total real is a consequence of utter > nothing without substance or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is > to suppose a necessary something whose mode of being transcends reality. > This is vague enough. 'Necessary being' is the equivalent of 'something,' > since nothing is self-contradictory and impossible. But a necessary being > adequate to account for the sum total of reality, however inscrutable, is > not in all respects entirely vague. > The exact logician with his bare mathematical apparatus finds it > impossible to give any thoroughgoing formal analysis of thought without > regarding it as the product of a thinking activity; and he thus sees more > clearly than another man, perhaps, the ineluctability of the conception of > creative thought. An immanent God will not answer the purpose, although it > would seem that creation must in some vague sense be needed for the > fulfillment of His being. But our idea of Him and of the mode of His being > must remain vague in the extreme (though not utterly so); and as vague, > self-contradictory. But pragmaticism is inseparable from the doctrine that > all human thought and meaning must carry the anthropomorphic stamp, > disguise it as you will. In proportion as an object is more > incomprehensible we are compelled more markedly to resort to human ideals, > social activities and passional elements to make anything out of it. If I > allowed myself to continue, I fear I should stump myself upon a theological > argument, while my only purpose is to show that pragmaticism is favorable > to religion. > I will conclude, then, with the opinion that for the pragmaticistic > logician, nature (including the [illegible] works of men) is the symbol of > God to Humanity, and pure heuretic science makes it the prayer book of an > elevating worship. (R 288:91-92[178-181], 1905) > > > This confirms what I have been suggesting for years--Peirce's statement in > CP 6.490 (1908) that "the three universes must actually be absolutely > necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" is part of a *reductio > ad absurdum*. As he states plainly here, any claim that three-category > reality somehow came into being on its own, as "a necessary consequence ... > of utter nothing ... is absurd" because "nothing is self-contradictory and > impossible." Of course, that this was his position should have been > indisputable already from what he wrote seven years earlier--"Now the > question arises, what necessarily resulted from that [initial] state of > things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless > nothing in particular necessarily resulted. ... I say that nothing > *necessarily > *resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom" (CP 6.218-219, 1898). > > Moreover, Peirce again explicitly rejects "an immanent God," but this time > he also explicitly affirms that "a necessary something ... transcends > reality," with the caveat that "creation must in some vague sense be needed > for the fulfillment of His being." As he says elsewhere, "I think we must > regard Creative Activity as an inseparable attribute of God" (CP 6.506, c. > 1906). Nevertheless, he uses the word "vaguely" or "vague" six different > times in this passage, consistent with his statements elsewhere that "'God' > is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than almost any, is > *vague*" (CP 6.494, c. 1906); and that "we must not predicate any > Attribute of God otherwise than vaguely and figuratively, since God, though > in a sense essentially intelligible, is nevertheless essentially > incomprehensible" (SWS:283, 1909). > > Finally, Peirce makes it clear that he is not interested in offering "a > theological argument," wishing only "to show that pragmaticism is favorable > to religion" because it must "resort to human ideals, social activities and > passional elements to make anything out of" God as an incomprehensible > object. He concludes by reiterating that the entire universe is one immense > sign, "the symbol of God to Humanity," and that engaging in "pure heuretic > science" is a form of worship. After all, "if contemplation and study of > the physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles of conduct > analogous to the influence of a great man's works or conversation, then > that analogue of a mind--for it is impossible to say that *any *human > attribute is *literally *applicable--is what he [the pragmaticist] means > by 'God'" (CP 6.502, c. 1906). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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