JAS< List I think this should be my last post in this debate [ which is not a discussion but a debate] - since I consider that JAS’s personal religious beliefs play such a large role in his analysis of Peirce - that any discussion becomes difficult.
I have only one comment on the paragraph offered by JAS: > As for CP 1.412 (1887-8), I keep pointing out that Peirce refers to "God the > Creator" earlier in the same manuscript (CP 1.362), so he is obviously not > outlining a godless cosmology in that text. In CP 6.214-219 (1898), he > unambiguously states that "nothing in particular necessarily resulted" from > the initial state of "nothing, pure zero," and then reiterates that "nothing > necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom." He also says in > the same series of lectures, "Those who express the idea to themselves by > saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously > clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, > substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem" (CP 6.199, 1898). > Note that he calls it a philosophical answer, not a theological answer. It is NOT ‘obvious that Peirce is NOT offering a ‘godless cosmology’. That was an example of process. I accept his explanation that nothing necessarily resulted from the original Nothing - because of the existence of the Three Categories, with the first one being CHANCE!! And the third one, Thirdness, functioning as a growing, adaptive changing mode!!! These two modes rule out necessity. As for the Divine creator determining…that is both a theological and philosophical answer [ akin to a belief by authority and tenacity - but is not a scientific answer. And again - I think one has to understand the semiotic process - which has nothing as a process to do with the modal complexity of the correlates but with the actual interaction of X with Y, so to speak. Ie, of one triad with another triad; of one Representamen/Sign with another Represetnamen/Sign. The process could not begin with the Dynamic Object [ what is it doing? Calling out to the world: Notice me! Notice Me!]. indeed, the external objects do not become a Dynamic Object UNTIL and UNLESS they are in interaction with a Sign/Representamen! Again - see his outline of his looking outside to check the weather. Before that connection, the weather objects are simply…objects ..and Peirce explained several times that these are ‘independent of our thought’. But once the Sign/Represetnamen within the sign vehicle connects to the external object, that object becomes a Dynamic Object, producing information/data..which the Sign/Representamen processes and moves on as an Interpretant. I don’t think that there is much more to be said on this topic. It becomes, eventually, reduced to ’tenacious beliefs’ - and without any possibility of discussion. Edwina > On Sep 27, 2024, at 11:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > The absurdity of the three universes being "absolutely necessary results of a > state of utter nothingness" is implicit in CP 6.490, which is from a draft of > the additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." After all, > Peirce's expressed purpose in that passage is to give "some hints" about "the > pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium," which he has already asserted > to be "in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" in > the very first sentence of the article itself. > > However, the absurdity is explicit in R 288, and I even bolded the key > portions in my last post. "To say that the total real is a consequence of > utter nothing without substance or appearance is absurd ... since nothing is > self-contradictory and impossible." Both here and in the Logic Notebook entry > that I also quoted--again, written at almost exactly the same time as CP > 6.490--Peirce is plainly talking about the logical requirement for Ens > necessarium as a rational explanation for the co-reality all three universes, > not just the second universe of occurrences, things, and facts; "the total > real," not just the existent. > > As for CP 1.412 (1887-8), I keep pointing out that Peirce refers to "God the > Creator" earlier in the same manuscript (CP 1.362), so he is obviously not > outlining a godless cosmology in that text. In CP 6.214-219 (1898), he > unambiguously states that "nothing in particular necessarily resulted" from > the initial state of "nothing, pure zero," and then reiterates that "nothing > necessarily resulted from the Nothing of boundless freedom." He also says in > the same series of lectures, "Those who express the idea to themselves by > saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously > clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, > substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem" (CP 6.199, 1898). > Note that he calls it a philosophical answer, not a theological answer. > > I have always acknowledged that every sign stands in a genuine triadic > relation with its (dynamical) object and its (final) interpretant. It seems > that my recent attempts at further clarification of the implications of this > within the universe, conceived as a vast semiosic continuum, have been > successful--but incorrectly perceived as a change in my position. Moreover, > the entire universe as one immense sign still requires an overall dynamical > object that is external to it, independent of it, and unaffected by it. As I > have said before, this does not in any way entail that the universe is finite > or has "boundaries," only that its dynamical object must transcend it. > > When Peirce refers to the sign/object/interpretant as First/Second/Third (CP > 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903), these are not ordinal terms, they are the results > of phaneroscopic analysis. He spells this out when describing them as the > First/Second/Third Correlates of a triadic relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, > 1903). > "The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the > simplest nature" - there is only the genuine sign. > "The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of > middling complexity" - each sign has both genuine (dynamical) and degenerate > (immediate) objects. > "The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the > most complex nature" - each sign has genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), > and doubly degenerate (immediate) interpretants. > However, the logical sequence of semiosis is from the object through the sign > toward the interpretant; the object determines the sign to determine the > interpretant. "The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two > correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the > sign" (EP 2:410, 1907). "In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; > that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an > effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in > its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is active, determining the > Interpretant without being itself thereby affected" (EP 2:544n22, 1906). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 6:11 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> JAS, list >> >> You have indeed ‘made your case’ [interpretation] that the 6.490 outline by >> Peirce is a reductio ad absurdum argument - but I disagree with your >> interpretation of that section. I think Peirce meant exactly what he wrote >> about the emergence of the universe from ’nothing’. Peirce, in my view, did >> not write that this was an ‘absurd’ statement, despite your claim that he >> did so. [and your use of quotation marks after the word ‘absurd’ - when, >> this word was NOT in the quotation from Peirce’. '. >> >> I think that you are analyzing Peirce’s argument within a Newtonian >> mechanical causality, where indeed, in the world-of-discrete objects [ the >> realm of Secondness], these discrete objects do not ‘come from nothing’. But >> cosmology isn’t referring to the classical mechanical realm of existent >> particles but to the quantum world - and Peirce’s cosmological outline [also >> in 1.412 and 6.214-219] fits in with the modern outline of Black Holes and >> the ‘Big Bang’. >> >> There is no need to describe my argument as ‘uncharitable’. Why say such a >> thing? >> >> Your original argument that ‘God’ was the Dynamic Object’ of the >> Universe-as-a-Sign [ which you defined as ONLY the Representamen - did >> change to one where you instead acknowledged that the first correlate was of >> course, connected to the other two correlates - and - within the universe. >> That is - you did admit that the Universe was not composed only of the first >> Correlate [ the Sign/ Representamen] but also - of the other two …This was >> different from your original assertion that the Universe was only the >> Representamen - and God was the DO external to the universe. Now you are >> acknowledging that other correlates - which are connected to the DOs of the >> universe, function within the universe. [Andn I also don’t agree with a >> finite universe where a DO functions external to it…] >> >> BUT - I reject your assertion that all semiosis proceeds from the Dynamic >> Object. The information contained in the DO does indeed ‘determine’ the >> nature of the information processed within the other correlates, BUT, the >> initiation of the semiosic action is not by the DO - but by the >> Representamen, as the first correlate. After all- an object or external >> stimulus doesn’t even become a DO until it is ‘connected’ to that mediatory >> Repesentamen/Sign. And that is why the Representamen/Sign is defined by >> Peirce as the First correlate, because, in the semiosic act, that process >> begins with the Representamen. >> >> “A Sign or Representamen is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic >> relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a >> Third, called its Interpretant” 2.274. >> >> And these terms of First, Second, and Third, are NOT references to the >> categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [ as some on this list >> have previously asserted] but are ordinal terms, which refer to the order of >> the semiosic process. >> >> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
