Edwina, List,
there was a mistake in my post, I have written a correction afterwards. My equivalences (poss A = not nec not A, nec A = not poss not A) I now have looked up at Wikipedia "modal logic", it is correct. What stroke me, is, that "if nec A, then A". That would mean, if God is necessary, then God exists. Whether my conclusion with the complete induction is correct, I should have to dig deeper into modal logic. Meanwhile I assume, that possibility doesn´t exist, but impossibility may. For example, a homogenous mixture between a lye and an acid definitely is impossible. About existence, i think, one has to define the space of discourse, e.g. exists in this room, on this planet, in the universe. For example, it is incorrect to say, that unicorns don´t exist in the universe. Maybe once, a from aliens abducted man made career as a biologist, abducted a horse from the earth, and gene-manipulated a horn on its head, to have a unicorn for birthday-present for his daughter. This may be impossible, if aliens don´t exist, but it is possible-due-to-limited-knowledge, as we don´t know, whether aliens exist or not. So there are different kinds of possibility too. I wonder, is there a modal logic, that regards these different kinds of existence and possibility? I also think, probability should be included, then it really would become nicely complicated. I think, possibility and necessity have to do with deduction, existence with induction, and probability with abduction.
there was a mistake in my post, I have written a correction afterwards. My equivalences (poss A = not nec not A, nec A = not poss not A) I now have looked up at Wikipedia "modal logic", it is correct. What stroke me, is, that "if nec A, then A". That would mean, if God is necessary, then God exists. Whether my conclusion with the complete induction is correct, I should have to dig deeper into modal logic. Meanwhile I assume, that possibility doesn´t exist, but impossibility may. For example, a homogenous mixture between a lye and an acid definitely is impossible. About existence, i think, one has to define the space of discourse, e.g. exists in this room, on this planet, in the universe. For example, it is incorrect to say, that unicorns don´t exist in the universe. Maybe once, a from aliens abducted man made career as a biologist, abducted a horse from the earth, and gene-manipulated a horn on its head, to have a unicorn for birthday-present for his daughter. This may be impossible, if aliens don´t exist, but it is possible-due-to-limited-knowledge, as we don´t know, whether aliens exist or not. So there are different kinds of possibility too. I wonder, is there a modal logic, that regards these different kinds of existence and possibility? I also think, probability should be included, then it really would become nicely complicated. I think, possibility and necessity have to do with deduction, existence with induction, and probability with abduction.
Best regards, Helmut
10. November 2024 um 21:15
"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>
wrote:My understanding is that, for Plato, ideas/forms are abstract entities ..non-material, unchangeable; separate from matter, that act as functional forms to model the material objects in the world. But they are not merely human mental constructs [ conceptualism, nominalism] but have an agential force of their own with the world [ not reliant on human will or consciousness]….and thus, act as ‘pure morphological guides’ . The less perfect particular objects in time and space are merely copies. These Platonic ideas/Forms don’t ‘exist’ per se in time and space. Existence is confined to material existents in time and space which merely represent/express these abstract ideals. This is a clear separation of Mind and Matter.
For Peirce, on the other hand, Mind and Matter are integrated [ not identical] and the one cannot ‘exist’ without the other. Mind, as Thirdness, evolves as habits of organization [not ideal Forms] of morphological reality, within time and space - with no definite future agenda [ that’s because of the chance effects of Firstness]. The only certainty is increasing complexity and variations - and both the increasing complexity of Thirdness as well as its possible entropic dissipation [ via Firstness]. .
I’m not sure of your meanings with regard to possibility and necessity.
Edwina
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.On Nov 10, 2024, at 2:50 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
Edwina, ....., List,I don´t know, if it really is so, but i assume, that for Plato ideas and/or forms exist. For Peirce, they are possibles. In the last discussions I have learnt, that possibles and necessitants don´t exist. I am trying to illustrate this:Possibility is the absence of necessary negations. Necessity is the absence of possible negations. Absence can only be confirmed with complete induction. Complete induction can not be possible, because nobody can know all necessary negations. Therefore, complete induction does not exist. Therefore, possibility and necessity don´t exist either.Best, HelmutMike, Jeff, Lis8. November 2024 um 19:42"Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]>wrote:I think it would be an interesting if rather complex discussion -My focus would be two-fold1; I’m interested in the difference between Plato and Peirce in their analysis of How Is Knowledge generated. And used . Obviously, this includes a definition of Mind and Matter and the relationship between the two; a definition of the general and the particular . And, importantly, a definition of truth and fallibility. And- a definition of the evolution of knowledge and the reality of diversity.. I am admitting here - without full knowledge of Plato- that I am assuming that the two are very different - I could be wrong.2. Then, I’m also interested in WHY these two - which I feel provide very different outlines of these questions - became acceptable within society. That is, my immediate view is that Platonism forms the ground for a societal mindset that is only found in very large populations - and is the foundation for monotheism - which requires a large population in order to develop [ with monotheism understood as a force to assimilate large and diverse populations].Peirce, on the other hand, with a different outline of knowledge generation, seems to me to fit into the modern quantum physics view - which is setting up an ‘open society’ so to speak [See Karl Popper] and an evolutionary, adaptive view of knowledge generation. ..along with a restraint developed within the self-organization of the system itself [ habits].The problem with the above - is that it sounds as if ‘my mind is made up’!!!Edwina_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
On Nov 8, 2024, at 10:20 AM, Mike Bergman <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Jeff,I really like the way you framed this. I, for one, would enjoy reading such a discussion on this list. (Edwina?) As someone quite unfamiliar with Plato, I would especially like to see contrasts and consistencies drawn in Plato's and Peirce's methods of inquiry. I hold fallibility and the knowability of truth to be cornerstones in Peirce's architectonic.Best, MikeOn 11/8/2024 3:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:Edwina, List,You say: "In Plato and others, I understand that knowledge is a priori and the existential world is a weak and possibly corrupt version of this ‘wholeness’. Indeed, this assumption is a basic format of most monotheistic religions!"Not being a Plato scholar, I find the dialogues great fun to read--especially in the company of others--such as students. At times, it can be challenging to sort out the views of the various interlocutors. My general approach is to interpret the texts as exercises--written by Plato--for the students at the Academy. Considered in this light, then one can think of the works as an opportunity to rehearse various lines of inquiry in the company of others who were at the Academy, such as Eudoxus, Thaeatetus and Aristotle.I think of Plato as a philosopher who is engaging in active inquiry. Instead of treating his "Platonism" as a collection of conclusions he has adopted, I interpret most of the arguments as lines of inquiry being explored. It is clear he thinks some lines are more promising than others. Having said that, the various interlocuters (Socrates included) often find themselves retracing their steps--trying to figure out where they might have gone wrong.I read Peirce in a similar way. He is often considering a range of hypotheses, and he is exploring various ways competing hypotheses might be put to the test. Through this process, theories of logic, metaphysics, etc. do take shape, but Peirce considers many of the conclusions drawn as provisional in character. One could, as he does in some places, stop and assign varying degrees of confidence to the propositions that make up a given theory. If one took the time to do that, I think we would find many of the propositions attributed to Peirce are held with degrees of confidence that range from low to moderate. He holds such views because he doesn't yet see better answers to the questions at hand. There are numerous shortcomings in the explanations offered, but he is hoping such views might lead to better hypotheses at some point in the future.So, if you want to take up some of Plato's lines of inquiry, let me know. Doing so would require that we look at the texts and try to sort out the arguments--bit by bit. An attempt to summarize Plato's views in a sentence or two will, I tend to think, miss the living and growing character of the methods and processes of inquiry he is modeling in the dialogues.Yours,Jeff
From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>Sent: Thursday, November 7, 2024 3:20 PM
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Cc: edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Plato and PeirceJeff, listI repeat some of my points from a previous post - which is a focus on what I see as a fundamental difference between Plato and Peirce - which is - the direction, so to speak, of knowledge. In Plato and others, I understand that knowledge is a priori and the existential world is a weak and possibly corrupt version of this ‘wholeness’. Indeed, this assumption is a basic format of most monotheistic religions!Whereas, the sense I get from Peirce is a rejection of this concept - with its an essential split between Mind and Matter - and an outline that almost rejects full knowledge and instead, sets up an infrastructure where knowledge, which includes the actual existential forms that matter can be, actually evolves and increases and yes - even changes!This is a huge difference.The a priori Platonic universals [Forms] posits knowledge as a priori timeless nature. This sets up a mindset focused around the concept of ‘purity’ and ’the ideal’. But the Peircean outline, to me, rejects this. My understanding of Peircean universals is that they, as habits of Formation, are generated within and by existential matter as it evolves and interacts with other existents. [objective-idealism].His whole outline of the emergence the universe [ 1.412] and 6.214—is as an evolutionary cosmology [6.102] “where all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of. Growth and to a Schelling-fashiooned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind” 6.102….And “ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas’. 6.104. In this reference, it seems to me that generals actually evolve within the universe.And since the three categories are basic modes within the universe - then, the universe has its own capacity to self-organize and generate these universals - as outlined in 1.412, where habits emerge and develop. And ’the unsettled is the primal state”. 6.348 - which would be, I suggest, the opposite of Platonism.That is - Peirce sets up a semiosic infrastructure, which, in my view, enables such an evolutionary and almost unknowable universe.1] He defines the three categorical modes of being as basic to the universe. These modes include teh capacity to change without intention [Firstness]; the reality of existential individuality [ Secondness] and the reality of commonality among these individualities [ Thirdness].2] And Peirce’s outline of the Complete Sign as an irreducible triad as the basic method of such adaptive evolution sets up a method for the informational transformation of data from one Sign to another Sign, and, with the categories, the transformation of their input data into generals. ]See outline in 6.142]…”the affection of one idea by another”… “It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as a subject”. And “No sign can function as such except as far as it is interpreted in another sign’ {8.225f]….the essence of the relation is in the conditional futurity”.3] I note again Peirce’s insistence that this semiotic triad is an active, transformative function -1908 MS[R]277By a Sign is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a MInd something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define [very imperfectly as yet] a Complete Sign”. [my emphasis]. And “signs …are triadic” 6.344..3] The concept of the Dicisign -, ]See outline in 6.142]…”the affection of one idea by another”… “It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as a subject”. ..That is - Dicisgns, are not merely descriptive [ mental] of an object but are indexically connected to that object. I stress this fact - that the dicisign is materially, physically, connected…and is basic to the Peircean infrastructure.If you add to this format, the categories, you produce a system where existential information and knowledge can be both generated, increased - and lost. {See Robert Marty’s The Lattice of Five Paths]/As Peirce outlines in his description of a semosic interaction 8.314]…”The Dynamic Object is the identity of the actual or Real meteorological conditions at the moment” - ie - the DO is not an external object but THIS external object with which I am interacting in THIS semiosic function. This thus moves the information of the DO into a semiosic transformation.As such, by continuous induction, “a habit becomes established [ 6.145]. ….”Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reason become united under one general idea followed by he same reaction”…6.146. This sets up a habit or general…ie..one that is generated within existential matter by the ‘Mind’ that is operative within matter as Thirdness.—————My point is - that this system is the complete opposite of the Platonic system - and - I’d say that the Platonic system with its concept of the ‘ideal ‘ [whether a priori or in the future] is grounded in much of the thought processes of the world [ certainly in monotheism!] - and the Peircean system is… very different.Edwina
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.-- __________________________________________Michael K. Bergman 319.621.5225 http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
