List:

As I have discussed previously, Peirce seems to endorse a version of the
PSR when offering the hypothesis of a necessary being (*Ens necessarium*)
to explain why there is something rather than nothing (R 288:91[178],
1905)--"I show that logic requires us to postulate of any given phenomenon,
that it is capable of rational explanation," including "the Three
Universes" as "all the phenomena there are" (R 339:[283r&285r], 1908 Aug
28). How might we reconcile this with his explicit dismissal of the PSR in
other contexts? For example ...


CSP: In regard to human knowledge, he [Leibniz] put forth many ideas which
had great influence, all of them rooted in nominalism, yet at the same time
departing widely from the Occamistic spirit. Such were his tests of
universality and necessity; and such was his *principle of sufficient
reason*, which he regarded as one of the fundamental principles of logic.
This principle is that whatever exists has a reason for existing, not a
blind cause, but a reason. A reason is something essentially general, so
that this seems to confer reality upon generals. Yet if realism be
accepted, there is no need of any principle of sufficient reason. In that
case, existing things do not need supporting reasons; for they *are *reasons,
themselves. A great deal of the Leibnizian philosophy consists of attempts
to annul the effect of nominalistic hypotheses. (CP 4.36, 1893)



Of course, Peirce emphatically rejected nominalism and embraced
(scholastic) realism, affirming the reality of some generals, including
reasons. He even says here that existing things "*are *reasons,
themselves," and thus "do not need supporting reasons," presumably because
they are manifestations of not only 2ns (and 1ns), but also 3ns. In other
words, he seems to view the PSR as a nominalist maxim that is,
nevertheless, fundamentally incompatible with nominalism.



A few years later, in his entry for "sufficient reason" in Baldwin's
*Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology* (CP 6.393-394, 1902), Peirce quotes one of
Leibniz's own definitions of the PSR--"that nothing takes place without
reason ... that is to say, that nothing occurs for which one having
sufficient knowledge might not be able to give a reason sufficient to
determine why it is as it is and not otherwise" (from *Monadology*, 1714).
Here, occurrences instead of existents must have reasons, which require
someone with "sufficient knowledge" to formulate them, again suggesting
nominalism; specifically, conceptualism--reasons are not real generals,
they only exist in individual minds. As Peirce adds, "he [Leibniz] does not
say that there really is a sufficient reason, but that anybody favorably
situated would be able to render a sufficient reason." On the other hand ...


CSP: The principle of sufficient reason may very well be understood to
express our natural expectation or hope to find each unexpected phenomenon
to be subject to reason and so to be intelligible. But to entertain this
hope for *each* is not necessarily to entertain it for *all*.



This echoes and summarizes the following passage from "A Guess at the
Riddle," which comes just a few paragraphs before Peirce's cosmological
remarks in that manuscript (CP 1.412).


CSP: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an
explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of
that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is
what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual
hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things
intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing
unintelligible is a self-stultification. ... True, there may be facts that
will never get explained; but that any given fact is of the number, is what
experience can never give us reason to think; far less can it show that any
fact is of its own nature unintelligible. We must therefore be guided by
the rule of hope, and consequently we must reject every philosophy or
general conception of the universe, which could ever lead to the conclusion
that any given general fact is an ultimate one. We must look forward to the
explanation, not of all things, but of any given thing whatever. (CP 1.405,
EP 1:275-276, 1887-8)


Although "there may be facts that will never get explained," Peirce
evidently considered "the all of reality" from which every fact is
prescinded (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906) to be such that the PSR is applicable
to it--not Leibniz's nominalist maxim, but a "regulative principle" or
"intellectual hope" in accordance with scholastic realism. It follows
directly from "this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that
in order to learn you must desire to learn and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think"; specifically, its famous
corollary, "Do not block the way of inquiry" (CP 1.135, EP 2:48, 1898).

CSP: The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists in
maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic,
ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable,--not so much
from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to
know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could possibly
be reached is *retroduction*. Now nothing justifies a retroductive
inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, however,
no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it *inexplicable*. That
therefore is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or excuse.
(CP 1.139, EP 2:49)


Accordingly, our proper operating assumption is that the entire universe is
intelligible--not just all its parts, but also as a whole--and thus
"capable of rational explanation." After all, "What is reality? ... As I
have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working hypothesis
which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing anything" (NEM
4:343, 1898). The alternative to supposing a necessary being is claiming
"that the total real is a consequence of utter nothing," which "is absurd"
because "nothing is self-contradictory and impossible" (R 288:91[178]). It
amounts to maintaining that "the co-reality of the three universes" is
"utterly inexplicable," which is a nominalist position that "no reasoning
can ever justify or excuse." Perhaps this is why Peirce eventually suggests
that "all Atheists are Nominalists" (SWS:283, 1909).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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